

A program which leaves unresolved some of the most urgent facets of this war--the release of prisoners, for example;

And a program which extends the duration of the war, not only for us but for the Vietnamese as well.

In short, there are grave shortcomings in the Vietnamization program at present. Its fate, as a purely military contingency plan, is uncertain. On this basis alone, therefore, I would find it very difficult to vote for this aid request.

A second question which has not yet been answered satisfactorily is whether this relatively small amount of aid--which we are led to believe must be appropriated immediately--will be of more than marginal value to Cambodia. Or, once we have made this initial downpayment, will we be faced with the yearly argument that we cannot let Cambodia down in the middle of our commitment? According to the testimony of the Secretary of Defense, this is what we may expect.

The administration has made no case for the urgency of this request.

The administration has told us nothing about the current situation in Cambodia or about the prospects for the Lon Nol government.

Does that government have popular support? Will its army be capable of meeting a determined effort of the North Vietnamese?

On one question there can be no doubt. The war has widened into Cambodia. We ourselves have carried the war into that country on one occasion. Our job now is to see that the United States does not again become directly involved in this expansion.

Therefore, before voting to commit the United States to this program of assistance, we need to know more about the present situation in Cambodia which has prompted this urgent and last-minute request.

I concur with the statement of the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that this matter should receive a very serious probing before we rush to commit ourselves to what we know not what.

Finally, Mr. President, I find it deplorable that the administration has waited until the last minute to come to Congress with this request, leaving us little time to examine the issues and to ask questions. I submit that we cannot make decisions of such grave importance or develop a rational policy on such short notice. Nor should we be expected to do so.

Judgments of such critical importance to our foreign policy should never be made in haste, especially when there is no clear justification of the need for haste. I intend to consider similarly presented requests in a like manner in the future.

I submit, Mr. President, that the experience of the past 6 years has shown that we cannot act and devise a policy afterwards to conform to our actions. We are all too painfully aware of the costs of such a lack of foresight.

The administration has maintained that what they have done and what

they will do in Cambodia will make for a more safe and more rapid withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam.

With respect to the safety of our withdrawal, the answer is not clear.

With respect to the rapidity of our withdrawal, our past actions in Cambodia have not appreciably increased the rate of our withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Regardless of whether these administration claims are right or wrong, our decision must proceed from a careful policy review and a clear understanding of the facts of the conflict in Cambodia. Should immediate action then be necessary, I am certain that the Members of the Senate will assume responsibility and take the necessary initiative.

We are only a month away from a new Congress which could take up this issue in depth. I commend the junior Senator from Arkansas for his willingness to do just that.

Secretary Rogers has testified that an end to the conflict in Cambodia is not in sight. I suggest that 1 or 2 months delay in our decision will not do irreparable damage to the security of Cambodia.

Numerous sources upon which the administration may draw for aid to Cambodia over the next couple of months were cited yesterday in the Senate. I need not repeat them today.

For those of us in the Senate who voted to commit the United States to a war in Vietnam, the issue of Cambodia is symbolic of the mistake we made in the past. Yet it is also a very real issue which can bear directly on our efforts to disengage from the battle in South Vietnam.

We stand to save ourselves much grief by giving this issue the careful review it demands.

Therefore, I urge my colleagues to weigh this decision most carefully.

Although we may disagree individually as to the best policy to follow in ending this war, let us be united in our firm intention that at least one aspect of our policy in Southeast Asia is clear: we will become involved in no more wars there.

Mr. President, whatever the fate of this amendment, I intend to support final passage of House Resolution 10911. I will do so because of the merit of the other items contained in this authorization measure which I feel should be approved.

The restoration of funds for programs in the Republic of China and the Philippines which were diverted for use in Cambodia;

Additional assistance to apply in the disaster relief effort in East Pakistan;

Because I do not feel that these other programs should not be sacrificed--especially the aid for East Pakistan--I will reluctantly support final passage of this legislation, even if the Gravel amendment is defeated.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to state that the amendment dealing with Cambodia should be viewed as very much more important than the money involved. It is an important matter of policy which has been presented to us without opportunity to have ade-

quate hearings. It can go over until next year without any sacrifice of money. They have the money and they will have it available under existing authority. That is all I wanted to say. It is much more important than the money being voted.

I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Idaho and then I will yield the remaining time to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. CHURCH. If the distinguished Senator from Alaska wishes to proceed I would yield to him first.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, if there were anything I would wish for it would be that everything I say now or have said with relation to our involvement in Southeast Asia were wrong. I would hope that the view I hold that the money being appropriated here as the first step in the web of entanglement is not the first step on the part of this administration to legally broaden the war. The thing that would make me happiest is for my views to be wrong. Of course, only time will prove that, and I hope time will work against my view; but if not, then Members of this body have been placed on notice that this event did not slip through unheralded and that it was--

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRAVEL. I care not to yield. I would like to finish my comment and yield in a few moments.

It cannot be said this event slipped through unheralded or that it was overly complicated as an issue.

At this point in time we have a policy in this country with regard to Vietnam which was initiated by the Chief Executive and up until this time it remains his policy, as an individual, and also as the Chief Executive of the United States. The moment that we appropriate these moneys, and authorize these moneys, that policy is no longer his as an individual--it still remains his policy as a part of his administration--but at that time it becomes the official policy of the United States because it has been verified and sanctioned by this body.

Therefore, when we tell people in Southeast Asia and Paris or any other place in the world that we are withdrawing from Southeast Asia, and they read, not in the newspapers, but in our own budget documents, that we are spending more money, other nations can then look at us and they can judge for themselves whether or not we are truly withdrawing and whether or not we are guilty of rhetoric that says we take one step forward in order to take two steps backward.

The whole thesis that I have maintained, and that I believe my colleague, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright) maintains, is a very simple one. We are going to get out of Vietnam one day. Some of us would hope that day would be soon. If it were soon it would save not only our money but also, and more importantly, our blood.

Mr. President, I read yesterday a passage which I thought was eloquent beyond compare.

15 Nov 1970

On the campus front: what prospects for peace?

STATINTL

None, says William Worthy, veteran reporter and analyst

By William Worthy

William Worthy, correspondent of The Baltimore Afro-American and a former Nieman Fellow, was in Vietnam the year before and the year after the French defeat at Dienbienphu. Seven years later, (1962) in Midstream magazine, he predicted disaster for this country in Vietnam.

"We must recognize that the young in many areas of the world today are in the midst of a revolution against the status quo . . . They will prevail. They will achieve their idealistic goals one way or another. If they have to pull governments tumbling down over their heads, they will do it . . ."

Robert F. Kennedy, 1964

"The future comes with the same degree of violence which is used against it." — Barrows Dunham in "Heroes and Heretics"

A decade ago, in the tense period leading up to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, reporter Laura Berquist of Look magazine was interviewing Che Guevara in Havana. Despite Washington's tightening of the economic noose, Fidel Castro had not yet taken his country into the Soviet camp, and he was still making speeches critical of communism.

Miss Berquist wanted to know how far to the left the Cuban revolution was going to go.

Che's reply was direct: That question should be directed "to your own government in Washington. The

Cuban revolution will go as far to the left as it is pushed."

In the minds of Middle Americans banking on the thousand new FBI agents, the National Guard and stiff new laws to repress campus upheavals, the history of revolutionary Cuba since Che's remark should give pause.

Hard-nose counter revolutionary solutions seem to have dubious long-term effectiveness in this final third of the twentieth century. For another six or seven years the Cuban government held open the door for normalization of relations with the United States. But around 1967, as a result of the war in Vietnam, Castro finally decided there could be no reconciliation with the colossus to the North until, as he put it, there is a complete change in our system.

Am I implying that rebellious college youth, at some point in the 1970s, will in large numbers give up entirely on the land of their birth? Any thoughtful answer requires a sober backward look at the extraordinary, cumulative and accelerating record of passionate violence and turbulence on and off campuses, in three years:

Just this year, from January to October, 333 bombing incidents occurred in the United States,

according to the Department of Justice. Campus bombings numbered 25, with an additional eleven near a campus or in a college town. The figures do not include arson (by which many ROTC and other campus military buildings have been destroyed), or attempted arson or attempted bombings.

In July, the chief deputy attorney general of California told a Senate subcommittee that the rate of bombings in his state alone had risen, since June, to nearly twenty a week. Leftists, he said, had stolen five tons of explosives from a California dam construction site over a period of years without the contractors being aware of it, while right-wing Minutemen had stolen 1400 pounds of dynamite from a construction site in 1965.

Last spring, when students firebombed a Bank of America branch near the Santa Barbara campus of the University of California, policemen seized 94 pounds of military C-4 plastic explosives and 39 grenades from residents in the area.

SINCE October, 1967, 432 war protesters have admitted responsibility for 22 separate draft board raids in which over one million non-duplicated draft files have been destroyed. During the same period, a growing number of top-drawer corporations with military contracts, including IBM, General GE, IT&T, and Standard of New Jersey, have been hit with

disruptive and records-destroying actions.

Most recently, eight persons not only destroyed all 1-A draft files in Rochester, New York, but also invaded, at night, the hitherto sacrosanct offices of the FBI and the US Attorney. (Five years ago, what American, young or old, would have even thought of a political raid on Mr. Hoover's "awesome" precincts? The fact that the unthinkable is now frequently happening is perceptively analyzed in a brilliant piece on the new youth culture and consciousness in the September 26 issue of The New Yorker.) The raiders, who were caught by the merest chance when a cop on the beat happened to pass the Federal Building, obtained lists of informers and information on FBI procedures against the Black Panther Party and other revolutionary groups.

PRIOR to the September 26 release of the report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, Chairman William Scranton met with a limited group of correspondents and revealed that the commission believes that out of seven million students on the country's campuses, a million are demonstration-minded, and that the trend is to "steady growth" in the number of dissenters. The commission complained in its report to Mr. Nixon that "an increasing number (of students), not terrorists themselves, would not turn even arsonists and bombers

A CAMBODIAN BID IN LAOS REPORTED

Troops Would Get U.S. Arms
There for Operations

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Nov. 8.—According to informed sources, Cambodian officers are discussing with members of the entourage of Prince Boun Oum, the feudal chief of southern Laos, the possibility of sending sizable numbers of Cambodian troops to Laos to be equipped with United States arms.

These arms, it is said, would be in addition to the limited program of American military aid now granted to Cambodia.

At this stage, the sources said, the United States has not been brought into the discussions, which were initiated by the Cambodians. However, the impetus for the talks arose from the fact that about 1,500 Cambodian soldiers are being trained under the auspices of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in southern Laos.

The Cambodian idea is simply that Cambodia has more troops than arms, and Laos needs soldiers but has found it easy to get weapons and equipment from the United States.

Prince Operates Independently

The Cambodians evidently see no need to raise the issue with the Government of Premier Souvanna Phouma, of having their troops equipped, trained and operating in the panhandle of Laos.

Not only is Prince Boun Oum's authority in southern Laos almost independent of the central Government, but also, perhaps of more importance, his dealings with the Central Intelligence Agency on military operations run by the agency in the Ho Chi Minh Trail region are direct and do not pass through Vientiane.

The C.I.A. supplies a mercenary army in Laos through funding that apparently has escaped strict Congressional control, while American aid to Cambodia is a limited program with a spending ceiling for the present fiscal year of \$40 million.

Although an additional appropriation is expected by early next year, it would still be easier to escape budgetary restrictions by supplying Cambodian troops through funds for Laos.

5 Battalions Considered

No specific proposals have been made, but Cambodian officers are thinking in terms of five battalions, each of about 600 men. They feel that such a force would be of equal value to Laos and Cambodia and could operate in either country.

At the moment, the Vietnamese Communists control roughly the eastern half of the Laotian panhandle as well as the adjoining Cambodian provinces of Ratanakiri and Stung-treng to the south.

The Laotian Government is worried about Communist attempts to widen the Ho Chi Minh Trail network westward to supply their forces in Cambodia.

Cambodian authorities consider it imperative to introduce at least small military units into the occupied provinces to give the civilian population a rallying point and to counter Communist political influence in the regions they have held since April.

Greater Containment Needed

Intelligence reports of a growing Communist build-up in southern Laos have added urgency to the need for troops to contain the Communists, keep their flow of men and supplies under surveillance and call in American air strikes. Most of American bombing is now concentrated on southern Laos.

According to informed sources, the Communist build-up has already caused an increase in raids across the border into Laos by South Vietnamese irregulars led by American Special Forces troops. It has also led to Thai troop reinforcement of Laotian Government forces in Champasak Province, between the Thai border and the Mekong River.

20 OCT 1970

STATINTL

FROM PEKING

SIHANOUK TALKS TO AMERICANS

Cambodia's deposed Prince says why he thinks U.S. policy helps spread

Communism in Asia

In February, 1968, I visited Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia. During a long interview that later appeared in LOOK, he spoke to me frankly — as a neutralist — about his fears of Chinese expansionism as well as American intervention in Southeast Asia. After he was deposed as Chief of State last spring, I wrote him in Peking—where he has been living ever since — suggesting we have another talk. He replied that he had made it a rule not to give interviews but would answer my questions by mail as soon as he had time. Then he cabled, saying he would receive me in Peking after all and suggested I apply for a visa at the Chinese Embassy in Paris. When the Chinese turned me down, Sihanouk promptly cabled from Peking saying he would send me his answers via the French Diplomatic Pouch. Here they are.

William Attwood
Editor in Chief

Do you believe the American Government was in any way implicated in the action that deposed you — and if so, in what way and by what agencies? There were numerous plots fomented against me by the CIA in cooperation with the satellite governments of

South Vietnam and Thailand between the years 1956, when Cambodia started diplomatic relations with the Peoples' Republic of China, and 1965, when, as a consequence of too many murderous aerial bombardments of our national territory by the U.S. Air Force, we had to sever diplomatic relations with Washington.

All these plots failed, thanks to the loyalty of the army and the police and their Commander in Chief, Gen. Lon Nol, the same man who committed treason against me in 1970.

If, in connection with these plots, I have mentioned the names of the CIA, the government of Saigon and the government of Bangkok, it is because material proof regarding them and the identity of their agents was gathered by the secret police, then under Gen. Lon Nol himself.

The CIA and the governments of Saigon and of Bangkok have openly maintained the "army" of Khmers-Serei [Free Cambodians] in South Vietnam and in Thailand. This army—like the "Free Cubans" trained in Florida to be hurled from time to time against Fidel Castro—was often hurled against me, but was each time defeated by the royal army aided by the militia.

Certain American newspapers have revealed the existence of reports addressed by the American military chiefs in Saigon to the Pentagon, in which the authors specifically requested "a change of political orientation"

in Cambodia (which meant my overthrow) and the invasion of my country by American forces in order to "destroy the Vietcong sanctuaries." These reports emphasized that unless this was done, the war could not be won by the United States in South Vietnam.

President Johnson did not dare adopt this "extreme solution," but now we see both "the change of political orientation" and the invasion by American and satellite forces. All the arguments advanced earlier by the "hawks" in Saigon were repeated in the televised speeches made by President Nixon, in particular those of April 30 and June 30, 1970.

President Nixon himself has declared that his Government had nothing to do with my being forced out of power in Phnompenh. Without questioning the political honesty of the American Chief of State, I must express my astonishment that Mr. Nixon thought he had to do all this—intervention by the American, South Vietnamese and Thai armies; intensive air bombardments of Cambodia without limitation of time or space; official appeal to all countries friendly to the U.S.A. to come militarily to the aid of the regime of Lon Nol; and offers of very important military and financial aid so that Lon Nol and his

STATINTL

campus front

A decade ago, in the tense period leading to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, reporter Laura Berquist of *Look* magazine was interviewing Che Guevara in Havana. Despite Washington's tightening of the economic noose, Fidel Castro had not yet taken his country into the Soviet camp and he was still making speeches critical of communism.

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His reply was direct: That question should be directed "to your own government in Washington. The Cuban revolution will go as far to the left as it is pushed."

In the minds of Middle Americans, banking on the thousand new FBI agents, National Guard and stiff new laws to repress campus upheavals, the history of revolutionary Cuba since Che's remark should give pause. Hard-nosed counter-revolutionary solutions seem to have dubious long-term effectiveness in this final third of the Twentieth Century. For another six or seven years the Cuban government held open the door for normalization of relations with the United States. But around 1967, as a result of the Vietnam war, Mr. Castro finally decided there could be no reconciliation with the colossus to the North until, as he put it, there is a complete change in our system.

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1. This year, there have been nearly 340 bombing incidents in the United States, according to the Justice Department. Campus bombings have numbered 26, with another dozen near a campus or in a college town. The figures do not include arson (by which many Reserve Officers Training Corps and other campus military buildings have been destroyed), or attempted arson or attempted bombings.

* 2. In July, the California chief deputy attorney general told a Senate subcommittee that the rate of bombings in his state alone had risen, since June, to

nearly 20 a week. Leftists, he said, had stolen 5 tons of explosives from a California dam construction site over a period of years without the contractors being aware of it, while right-wing Minutemen had stolen 1,400 pounds of dynamite from a construction site in 1965.

3. Last spring, when students fire-bombed a Bank of America branch near the Santa Barbara campus of the University of California, policemen seized 94 pounds of military C-4 plastic explosives and 39 grenades from area residents.

4. Since October, 1957, 432 war protestors have admitted responsibility for 22 separate draft board raids in which more than a million nonduplicated draft files have been destroyed. During the same period, a growing number of top-drawer corporations with military contracts, including Dow Chemical, General Electric, International Telephone & Telegraph and Standard Oil of New Jersey, have been hit with disruptive and records-destroying actions.

5. Most recently, eight persons not only destroyed all 1-A draft files in Rochester, N.Y., but also invaded at night the hitherto sacrosanct offices of the FBI and the United States Attorney. (Five years ago, what American, young or old, would have even thought of a political raid on J. Edgar Hoover's "awesome" precincts? The fact that the unthinkable is frequently now happening is perceptively analyzed in a brilliant article on the new youth culture and consciousness in the September 26 issue of *The New Yorker*.) The raiders, who were caught by the merest chance when a beat patrolman happened to pass the federal building, obtained lists of informers and information on FBI procedures against the Black Panther party and other revolutionary groups. After being held in \$100,000 bail each, the eight are being rushed to trial this month. The government obviously does not want the defendants touring campuses and discussing the fruits of their raids.

Prior to the September 26 release of the report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, Chairman William Scranton met with a group of correspondents and revealed that the commission believes that of seven million students on the country's campuses, a million are

demonstration-minded, and that the trend is to "steady growth" in the number of dissenters. The commission complained in its report to President Nixon that "an increasing number [of students], not terrorists themselves, would not turn even arsonists and bombers over to law enforcement officials."

To the dismay of many middle-class

Mr. Worthy, a correspondent of the Baltimore Afro-American and a former Nie-man Fellow, is a free-lance journalist who has been published in Esquire, Ebony, Ramparts, Christian Century, Midstream and Life magazines.

The future comes with the same degree of violence which is used against it.

—Barrows Dunham in "Heroes and Heretics."

parents, their sheltered children can leap from a generally conservative position to bomb-throwing activism during one short academic year.

Not all students or others being hotly pursued by the police and FBI know the route into, or avail themselves of, underground escape channels. Revolutionary violent acts are "decentralized," locally planned and autonomous; there is no national directorate or national coordinating apparatus. But there does exist an effective North American network for hiding and protecting revolutionaries and for getting them out of this hemisphere to countries "where the FBI can't go," as Pete Seeger put it in his 1962 song about Robert Williams's flight from North Carolina to Cuba.

In the case of revolutionaries, including Weathermen, who are opposed to going into exile, the FBI has a poor track record; their "wanted" pictures remain on Post Office walls month after month, certainly a strong encouragement to others inclined toward revolutionary violence. The country is so large, youth and student disaffection is so vast that, after dramatic and well-publicized bombings, one has the distinct impression in most cases that the FBI doesn't know for whom to look. The three White Panthers soon to be tried for the 1968 bombing of a Central Intelligence Agency office in Ann

Rent-a-Troop

The efforts of Senator Fulbright and other critics of the Administration to block further American involvement in Southeast Asia deserve the utmost commendation, but success seems unlikely. It is difficult to see how Congress can really curb a President who is determined to wage undeclared war.

The excuse for the invasion of Cambodia by U.S. troops was that it had become necessary to protect our troops in South Vietnam, and to bring them back to the States as the South Vietnamese took over the burden of the ground war. Under popular pressure, led by student activists, Mr. Nixon set a deadline for the withdrawal of American ground forces from Cambodia. Subsequently, under a smoke screen of clumsy semantics and what *The Washington Post* calls "creeping rationale," we are in effect deepening the American involvement in Cambodia in precisely the way that critics predicted. A child can read the deceptions embodied in the script that is offered as justification for Administration policy.

As many as fifty U.S. planes daily are flying close support missions in aid of the Cambodian army, which has yet to win a major action in the field. The talk about planes being used only to "interdict" enemy supplies has reached a new high in dishonesty. As Senator Mansfield notes, some of the targets are "one hell of a way from the Ho Chi Minh Trail." As all of us must do who expect even occasional sidelights on the Executive decision-making process, he deplores the failure of the Nixon Administration to "call things as they are."

These air strikes are increasing. Military authorities refuse to disclose the number of sorties, but correspondents report twenty-five a day in July, forty-nine a day during the first few days in August, and toward the end of August, sixty-five a day. Recent reports leave no doubt that the President has given the Air Force authority to strike North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops and supplies anywhere in Cambodia.

We are fighting the war by proxy on the ground, as well as giving unstinting support by air. The following examples of what Senator Young of Ohio calls the "Nixon Rent-a-Troop Doctrine" can be counted:

(1) Tammy Arbuckle describes in the *Washington Star* (August 21) how the United States is "stepping up secret operations in Cambodia with guerrilla teams directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. . . ." Earlier stages of American intervention in South Vietnam and Laos are being repeated in Cambodia.

(2) There are some 20,000 South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, fighting in support of the Cambodian army which by itself, and without American air power, would be helpless to resist the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong. We pay for the South Vietnamese forces indirectly.

(3) Thai "volunteers" are in Laos and arrangements are under way for 5,000 "volunteers" to be sent to Cambodia. We will pay for these troops, or they will not be sent. Let it be noted that under the SEATO treaty we are pledged to come to the aid of Thailand, if that country's efforts on behalf of the Lon Nol government should in any way be threatened.

(4) The South Vietnamese and the Americans are in the process of adding about three divisions to the National Khmer Army. These forces are being recruited, equipped and trained in South Vietnam—naturally at American expense.

Vice President Agnew announced on August 23 that "we are going to do everything we can to help the Lon Nol government." For once Mr. Agnew was being candid. In fact, he was understating our purpose. As he spoke, we were already doing everything possible to shore up the Lon Nol regime. Nor does the Administration rule out the possibility that American ground troops may return to Cambodia, should that be deemed necessary to protect American troops in Vietnam. The script is completely elastic in its provisions.

From a moral standpoint, the "war by proxy" is even more obnoxious than direct action by American powers, but of course Nixon, Agnew, et al., have no interest in that aspect. From their standpoint, the war by proxy has the supreme advantage of keeping American casualties at a level which will avoid a public revulsion of the kind that caused President Johnson's political downfall.

That this scheme has so far been successful is partly the fault of the press. For the most part, the editors and publishers cooperate with the Administration. There are some fine reporters on the scene—T. D. Allman for instance (he was expelled from Cambodia for that very reason)—and they supply the facts, but the papers tend to play down their findings. Allman quotes a neutralist ambassador in Pnom Penh: "From the very beginning, Lon Nol and Sirisk Matak were absolutely confident that the United States would rescue them." But the ordinary American never hears such things.

If he did, the struggle in the Senate to control the war makers might gain popular support. Of all the Senate moves, the most realistic is the Hatfield-McGovern end-the-war amendment. It provides for a systematic, planned military withdrawal by a fixed date. It also is the safest way to get the troops out. But the Administration still hopes to win the war, as Mr. Agnew said with only slight disguise in one of his jingoistic speeches. The only remedy at hand would seem to be to roll up impressive anti-Administration majorities in November. Severe setbacks would alarm Mr. Nixon and his coadjutors, and their fears for 1972 might make them more amenable to Senate control.

August 31, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

Evidence that the largest American corporation, such as Lockheed, the Penn Central Railroad, General Dynamics, and LTV, are susceptible to failure under certain circumstances has surfaced recently. This fact, in my opinion, makes highly questionable the wisdom of placing too large a percentage of our defense dollars in the hands of a single corporate entity.

The country's economy has taken a serious downswing which makes it more important than before to balance our defense spending geographically.

The Nixon administration's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, headed by Mr. Fitzhugh, has within weeks recommended that huge defense contracts be divided where possible to avoid overconcentration and to maintain a reasonable mobilization base. If the report of this team of experts had been made 6 weeks earlier and if the Department of Defense had heeded the advice of this committee, it is probable that the Navy would have divided the DD-963 contract. And the contract should be divided now.

I yield to my distinguished colleague from Maine, Senator SMITH.

Mrs. SMITH of Maine. Mr. President, I listened with interest to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi when he stated that the Navy had told him that the increased cost would be \$225 million. I think this is somewhat suspect, since Admiral Sonenshein increased that from \$225 million to \$600 million in about 6 weeks' time.

AMENDMENT NO. 862

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. EAGLETON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Under the previous order, the Chair now lays before the Senate amendment No. 862 which the clerk will state.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

SEC. . (a) In accordance with public statements of policy by the President, no funds authorized by this or any other Act may be obligated or expended to maintain a troop level of more than two hundred and eighty thousand armed forces of the United States in Vietnam after April 30, 1971.

(b) After April 30, 1971, funds herein authorized or hereafter appropriated may be expended in connection with activities of American armed forces in and over Indochina only to accomplish the following objectives:

(1) the orderly termination of military operations there and the safe and systematic withdrawal of remaining Armed Forces by December 31, 1971;

(2) to secure the release of prisoners of war;

(3) the provision of asylum for Vietnamese who might be physically endangered by withdrawal of American forces; and

(4) to provide assistance to the Republic of Vietnam consistent with the foregoing objectives.

Provided, however, That if the President, while giving effect to the foregoing paragraphs of this section, finds in meeting the termination date that members of the American Armed Forces are exposed to unanticipated clear and present danger, he may suspend the application of paragraph b(1) for a period of not to exceed sixty days and shall inform the Congress forthwith of his findings; and within ten days following application of the suspension the President may submit recommendations, including (if necessary) a new date applicable to subsection (b) (1) for congressional approval.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 30 minutes to the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), one of the cosponsors of this amendment.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Oregon for yielding me this time.

Mr. President, as we move to consider the end the war amendment, we get to the target center of what is the overriding issue before the American people today.

Shall we, at long last, take the decisive steps to end American military involvement in Southeast Asia?

Or, shall we continue present policies, which, whatever their merits may be, give no real assurance of total military disengagement?

Whatever else we are accomplishing by this debate, we are keeping faith with the American people by bringing this central issue to a vote.

The debate on our military policies has been long and impassioned between responsible elected Representatives of the people, Representatives who are alike in their devotion to the national interests but deeply divided on exactly what our national interests are and on the policies that will most effectively implement those interests.

I am deeply grateful to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), and his colleagues of both parties, who have carried the administration's side of this issue, for the fair and high-minded plane on which they have conducted the debate.

To question the motives of the dedicated men in this Chamber, who have fought the uphill battle against traditional public attitudes to bring about this vote on a definite plan to end the war, would be an incalculable disservice to a free people.

We disagree in matters of judgment—not in fundamental objectives nor in devotion to our country.

I have never met more devoutly patriotic men than the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), and the other sponsors of the amendment to end the war.

If I am convinced of anything about the American people, it would be that every responsible American wants to support his President, in time of war, regardless of party differences.

The optimum solution for ending our involvement in Indochina would be for the President to take the necessary moves to get all of our troops out and to create the necessary preconditions for giving

peace negotiations a credible chance of success.

I do not question that this is what the President wants.

But one after another of the current news reports tell us the familiar story of increasing involvement, as the dispatch of yesterday that said:

Fresh evidence that American planes are carrying out direct bombing missions in support of the Cambodians came through a Cambodian radio at a government strong-point near Phnom Penh yesterday.

We are repeatedly told that the only way we can safely withdraw our troops is by extending our engagement.

The pronouncements of the Vice President in his recent trip to Southeast Asia give little solace to those who believe we should get out of Southeast Asia as soon as it can be safely and systemically done.

Although Mr. Nixon acknowledges that the settlement in Indochina must be political, not military, our policies, in point of fact, continue in hot pursuit of a military victory.

The President continues to refer to peace negotiations, and his appointment of Ambassador Bruce to the Paris peace talks was a commendable and statesmanlike move. But at the same time, Mr. Nixon pledges our country to the perpetuation of the Thieu-Ky regime in Saigon. Flatly, this objective and the objective of realistic peace negotiations in Paris are mutually incompatible.

In this country, the pendulum of public opinion about the Indochina war has swung back and forth between deep concern and apathy—or despair. For a number of months, following last November, an almost unbelievable amnesia enveloped the Nation—a lapse of memory about the on-going horror of the killing, maiming, and destruction in Vietnam. Then, for a time, the fog lifted.

The revelations of My Lai shocked us into awareness of how this war is brutalizing our own people. The discovery by news correspondents of the extent of our Government's involvement in Laos aroused new doubts and apprehensions. The invasion of Cambodia was the straw that broke the camel's back.

In the heat of the national concern over the Cambodia invasion, I believe that the passage of the amendment to end the war would have been assured.

Now the cutting edge of the public protest has somewhat dulled, although I am convinced that the deep-lying sentiment is as strong as ever.

In my own State, the untold story, as I see it, is of the peace movement that has emerged in the small communities of middle America—not among the youth, who were already with it, but among the calm and established adult citizens of these communities.

The on-going story of the Indochina war is one of abstract comparatives. There were "fewer casualties" this week than the week before—or than 6 months before. We tend to lose sight of the fact that the men killed are flesh-and-blood people, not statistics, and that for each one killed there are many others horribly maimed or otherwise incapacitated.

But I am convinced that an increasing

A French Expert's View: China— The Real Winner In Cambodia

BY PHILIPPE DEVILLERS

PRESIDENT NIXON'S decision to mop up the Cambodian sanctuary will have long-term results that the American people do not expect. Rather than shortening the war, the move will extend it and make it even more dangerous.

"It was the drop which made the bottle pour out," Chou En-lai, the premier of China, has said. "Following the sudden overthrow of a royal, neutral and even pro-Western prince [Norodom Sihanouk] by just a group of ambitious politicians and generals supported by the CIA, no government in the world can now feel secure. Now is the time for action."

American intervention in Cambodia has indeed given China a valuable opportunity. For years, it has been waiting to take over the leadership of Asian nationalism and anti-imperialist resistance. The decision has facilitated the work of the Chinese political strategists.

Secretary of State William Rogers indicated recently that he recognized this, when he told an interviewer: "They [the Chinese] have increased their influence with Hanoi as the result of the Cambodian incursions. We think the Soviet Union's influence has decreased at the expense of Communist China. Whether the Communist Chinese have any reason to want to bring an end to the war or not, we do not know. We rather doubt it. We think it serves their purposes to have the war continue, because, in effect, they use Hanoi as their instrumentality for causing trouble."

When Ho Chi Minh died on September 3 of last year—about a week after having written to President Nixon that a bit of goodwill could permit a settlement to take place—

east Asia. He is the director of Southeast Asian Studies at the Center for the Study of International Relations in Paris and professor at the Institute for Political Studies there. He was a correspondent for *Le Monde* in Indochina in 1945-46 and in charge of the Foreign Relations Desk in the Prime Minister's Office in 1950-52. He is the author of four books on Asia and has been a visiting professor at Cornell University.

the Maoist group in Hanoi, led by Truong Chinh, increased its influence. Convinced that the White House did not want to negotiate seriously, except on the basis of North Vietnam's political surrender, the Maoist group won a shift to the strategy of "protracted war"—protracted until 1972 and the next U.S. President.

RATHER THAN respond to valuable overtures from President Nixon, Secretary Rogers and others, Hanoi and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in South Vietnam preferred to use the pretext of U.S. insistence on "mutual withdrawal" and "the legality of the Saigon government" and to remain immobile in Paris. This reflected, perhaps, a stalemate in the political struggle in Hanoi.

There are hints that in the Communist camp other voices were saying that this tactic could not achieve results and could even lead to uncontrolled developments. It would be wiser, they reasoned, not to let opportunities pass.

There was significance, in this respect, to the trips made by Le Duan, Ho Chi Minh's real heir, to Moscow in January, and by Le Duc Tho, the chief adviser to the delegation at the peace talks, to Paris from January 30 to April 10. The

At the same time, in Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk maneuvered on his own to defeat the "protracted war" plan. He agreed with Prime Minister Lon Nol that something had to be done to press the Vietcong out of Cambodia, and was going to Moscow and Peking to ask them to request from Hanoi more discretion and realism. Both Le Duan and Sihanouk were thus moving in a direction that could have brought a resumption of serious negotiations in Paris—the cheapest way to end the war.

Nixon's Cambodian decision wrecked, for a long time, any diplomatic possibility of a settlement and polarized forces in Indochina in such a way that the United States now can expect years more of fighting there—if the Paris negotiations fade out. This can only raise serious doubts about the quality of information supplied by the American intelligence services or Washington's capacity to assess any situation in Asia.

The President apparently made his decision on purely military grounds: prevent the Vietcong from preparing or launching important offensives while the American withdrawals are proceeding; deprive them of sanctuaries and resources; support Lon Nol's government in its struggle against the VC; accelerate the "Vietnamization" in South Vietnam and save American lives. Indeed, the motivation for the decision was only local and military, linked to the belief in the "necessity" of reinforcing the Saigon regime and maintaining in Paris a political position that Washington knows well to be unacceptable for the other side.

Surprisingly, the decision neglected vital political considerations. The stake was not Sihanouk as man or leader but Cambodian neutrality. On March 18, Paris, Moscow and Peking seemed un-

The following diary containing a record of recent events in Cambodia compiled by some French witnesses on the scene. Guardian staff correspondent Wilfred Burchett has translated the diary, adding explanatory notes indicated by brackets.

April 1-3: Attacks against small military posts in Svay Rieng province.

April 4: On the night of April 3-4, attack against a post at Chipou [Svay Rieng, where the famous "Parrot's Beak" area is located], with 377 rifles, 30 light machine-guns, three U.S. carbines, one mortar, three heavy machine-guns and large quantities of munitions seized from the government garrison. This is the first big attack in this province.

April 5: Anti-"Vietcong" and anti-Vietnamese campaign starts in Phnom Penh accompanied by pasting up of crude slogans. The racist character of the campaign is early evident. Vietnamese are removed from responsible posts in public and private organizations. In some administrative branches all Vietnamese are fired. Cambodians of Vietnamese origin are not permitted to take part in military training. Armed patrols start to circulate in Phnom Penh after dark.

April 6: Lon Nol asks for foreign military aid. Some journalists, including two Americans, three French and three Japanese who went to Chipou are captured by the guerrillas.

April 7: The village of Chipou falls to the guerrillas. Cambodian MIG's bomb the region and strafe a pagoda. Government troops fall back on Prasaut. American helicopters and artillery are used against the partisans. All Vietnamese in Svay Rieng province are herded into camps. They have to buy their own food. Government troops start to loot Vietnamese homes. Chou En Lai announces in Pyongyang that "The Chinese government and people are behind Sihanouk." This is the first official Chinese reaction since March 18.

April 9: A locomotive is blown up at the Phnom Penh station. A curfew is introduced for all Vietnamese in Phnom Penh.

April 10: The Prasaut "affair." Government troops massacre between 100 and 150 Vietnamese civilians.

April 11: Anti-Vietnamese rally at the Phnom Penh stadium. Only seven ambassadors attend. Those from socialist countries, France and Great Britain stay away.

April 12: First big round-up of Vietnamese in Phnom Penh carried out by the police and the Navy. The Navy removes all males over 14 years of age from the village of Chruai Changvoar—between 600 and 800—and massacres them on the banks of the Mekong, throwing the corpses into the river. They do the same

Chronology of Cambodia takeover

thing with part of the Cambodian demonstrators arrested at the Japanese bridge at the end of March. [Chruai Changvoar is a fishing village across the Tonle Sap river from Phnom Penh at the junction of the Tonle Sap and Mekong rivers.]

April 12-18: Numerous massacres of Vietnamese take place elsewhere with public display of the corpses [for instance at the Kompong-Kantout pagoda]. The police arrest Vietnamese in the streets. Organization of concentration camps, called "regroupment centers." One, on the Takmau road [Takmau is a village 5 miles southeast of Phnom Penh], in an abandoned factory contains all male Vietnamese from Samrong-Tom district. The women who remained in their villages were systematically raped by government troops in the days and weeks that followed. Camps are organized elsewhere, each containing 6000 to 8000 Vietnamese. Almost all provinces follow the same example. At Kompong Chhang, At Takeo, Kompong Cham—in the stadium—at Kraichmor—concentrated on an island in the Mekong. Many of these Vietnamese are executed on the spot or at a place near Kompong Speu [about 20 miles south of Phnom Penh] by execution squads.

April 14: Guerrillas attack Krek in Kompong Cham province. Americans launch a lightning attack in this region, employing 40 helicopters.

April 15: The army proposes that peasants should undergo training courses and set up self-defense groups. Actually when the courses are finished, the Army conscripts the peasants and sends them to the front, resulting in widespread desertions of the peasants who know that the partisans are mainly fellow-Cambodians.

April 15-16: Journalists contact "Khmer Rouges." [Literally Red Cambodians, groups of left-wing Cambodians who took to the jungle for survival after the repression of progressives from 1967. In part of Kompong Cham province the partisans are mainly "Khmer Rouges" and Cambodian peasants.] First discovery of corpses in the Mekong. Considerable international reaction from the 16th on-

April 17: The Cambodian army shoots and massacres with bayonets 100 to 150 Vietnamese—men, women and children—at Takeo. [Capital of the province of the same name southeast of Phnom Penh.]

April 18: Railway bridge on the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville line blown up. The railway line is cut at three points.

April 19: The town of Saang—20 miles from Phnom Penh—is occupied by partisans.

April 21: At Saang, about 100 Vietnamese hostages are pushed ahead of government troops towards the partisan lines [Lon Nol's idea according to Gen. Sosthenne Fernandez, who commanded the action]. The scene is filmed by TV cameramen. [The Cambodian Army cut the hostages down from behind when they refused to advance.]

April 22: Sihanouk again appeals to the people to take to arms, Caribou transport planes land at Pochentong [Phnom Penh airport], bringing weapons of Chinese origin captured by the Saigon army.

April 23: Saang is recaptured after three hours of intense air and artillery bombardment. The only person remaining in the town is an old Buddhist bonze. Government troops loot the town.

April 23-30: Massive intervention by Saigon troops and by 2000 "Khmer Krom" Special Forces, as well as "Khmer Serei" bandits, in Svay Rieng and Takeo provinces respectively. ["Khmer Krom" are South Vietnamese "Green Berets," of Cambodian ethnic origin. The "Khmer Serei"—Free Cambodians—are traitor groups originally based in South Vietnam, but after their bases were destroyed by the NLF, they were transferred to Thailand. They were used as sabotage and espionage commandos to try and overthrow the Sihanouk regime. Both "Khmer Krom" and "Khmer Serei" are entirely armed, financed, trained and controlled by the CIA. They are the CIA's forces used to attempt to prop up the Lon Nol regime.]

The government is also sending young people into battle after 2 to 4 days training; hundreds of them were killed [for instance in a clash with partisans at Kbal Po, 4 miles from Takeo].

National highways Phnom Penh-Svay Rieng, Phnom Penh-Takeo and Phnom Penh-Kampot are cut or partially occupied by the partisans. The partisans are extending their activities to the East and the South. [Battles of Takeo, Angtassom, Elephant mountains, Kep, Kampot and in Kompong Cham province where they have occupied Chlong on the banks of the Mekong and then Memot. The Elephant mountains in the southern coastal areas are a traditional resistance base, Kep is a seaside resort about 100 miles south of Phnom Penh. Lon Nol's troops tried

Troops Skirt Laos Hills As Border Base Closes

KHAMDUC, Vietnam, Aug. 21 (AP)—"No, no, my men have never gone into Laos," giggled the South Vietnamese colonel. Then he turned to a U.S. commander and said: "Not my battalion. Maybe your battalion?"

"Not mine," the American laughed.

"You see," said the Vietnamese officer, Lt. Col. Pham Van Nghin, "one time we make contact with the Vietnamese maybe one click (kilometer) from the border. But they refuse to fight us and run back to Laos. We don't need to follow."

That action, just over half a mile from the frontier, was, according to Nghin, the closest any troops of his Sixth Regiment, Second Division, or the two long-range reconnaissance companies attached to it had ever been to Laos.

But some crewmen of U.S. helicopters that have ferried government troops in the high and densely jungled hills of this frontier region say that as large a South Vietnamese force as a battalion—about 400 men—has crossed the border.

They said their helicopters recently carried the troops into landing zones just short of the frontier, and that the South Vietnamese walked across a short distance and returned a few days later. They were looking for enemy supply caches, the pilots said.

The helicopter landings were so close to the border, they said, that some aircraft could not help being carried across the frontier by their flight patterns as they arched up and away from the dropoff zones.

Earlier this week, the Vietnamese government's clandestine propaganda radio claimed the South Vietnamese had launched a major operation across the frontier into Saravane province in the southern Laotian panhandle—the same area where five U.S. helicopters were shot down this month, three of them on Aug. 15.

The Laotian premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, denied the claim. American officials said no U.S. helicopters had carried South Vietnamese troops into Laos but added that South Vietnamese units have sometimes crossed the border in

although none have done so during the Kam Duc operation.

Sources in Saigon also confirmed again that South Vietnamese reconnaissance units sometimes operate in Laos, observing enemy movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In any case, joint U.S.-South Vietnamese force may pull out of Kham Duc in the next several weeks, ahead of the monsoon rains that begin in this area in October.

Firebase Dak Rose, halfway between Kham Duc and the frontier, has been closed and its men were moved elsewhere.

The mission of the Sixth Regiment, said Nghin, was to cut off enemy supplies flowing in from Laos.

He said his troops so far had killed about 200 North Vietnamese while losing 24 men killed and 128 wounded; U.S. losses were put at four killed and 25 wounded seriously enough to be evacuated.

Caches uncovered have not been huge. The finds, in addition to some weapons and ammunition, have included a small North Vietnamese hospital and 150 bicycles.

U.S. Admits Possibility Of Laos Incursion

The State Department officially acknowledged yesterday that South Vietnamese troops with American advisers "may" have crossed the Laotian border in "protective reaction missions" early this month.

That indirect and qualified concession to Pathet Lao charges of allied incursions was first reported by The Washington Post on Thursday. That account also said allied sources unofficially conceded that clandestine "reconnaissance" units often enter Laos and sometimes raiding parties also.

Other published reports yesterday said covert reconnaissance and commando operations directed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency have spread into Cambodia as well.

The general area of these incursions is the border sector of Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia. It is the outlet end of the so-called

Ho Chi Minh infiltration trail from North Vietnam through Laos, which branches out into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The State Department's official acknowledgment of "possible" allied thrusts into Laos were carefully limited yesterday to what spokesman Robert J. McCloskey reiterated as "the inherent right of self-defense" invoked by troops under attack.

He said:

"Allied forces of course may engage in protective reaction missions which might at times involve some American equipment and advisers."

STATINTL

LED GUERRILLAS AGAINST SIHANOUK

Top Cambodia Rebel Now Serves Nol

By DONALD KIRK
Star Staff Writer

SAIGON — Cambodia's most celebrated rebel is still fighting for the "nationalist cause" even though he is no longer in revolt against his government.

The name Son Ngoc Thanh means little outside the Indochinese peninsula, but for a generation he posed what many observers regarded as the most serious threat to the government of the then Cambodian chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Thanh, prime minister under the Japanese in the closing days of World War II, fought Sihanouk incessantly, both militarily and politically, until the Prince was overthrown on March 18 by rightist elements in his own government.

"On that day," said Thanh, "I turned over my troops to the government of Gen. Lon Nol," the Cambodian Prime minister who helped engineer the coup.

Free Cambodians

Thanh's "troops" were some 4,500 Khmer Serei, or free Cambodians. He led them for 12 years on the South Vietnam side of the Cambodian frontier.

Trained since 1964 by U.S. Special Forces advisers, the Khmer Serei have fought with the Cambodian army in practically every major battle against the Vietnamese Communists since May.

Thanh maintained his troops during their rebel days with funds supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency. "I no longer command them. They are part of the Cambodian army," he said.

Remain Loyal

But the Khmer Serei, still profess loyalty to their legendary leader. They stand out from the rest of the Cambodian forces in almost any engagement in which they're involved.

For one thing, they wear American-style fatigues and boots and carry American-

made rifles, radios and other equipment.

And then, according to those who have covered the off-again, on-again war in Cambodia, the Khmer Serei are considerably more effective militarily than most of their undertrained, under-equipped Cambodian army comrades.

"At least they seem to know how to handle themselves," remarked one seasoned observer. "They're not completely inexperienced and they don't look for somewhere to hide as soon as they hear some shots fired in the distance."

Future Elite

Some Americans describe the Khmer Serei as the future elite of the Cambodian army. "By elite I mean in comparison with the rest of them," said an American officer. "They may make the difference if anything does, in some big battles we're anticipating this winter."

The praise of the Khmer Serei does not surprise Son Ngoc Thanh, who formed his first guerrilla forces in the jungles of western Cambodia after fleeing from Phnom Penh in 1952 after an argument with Sihanouk over his policy of conciliation with the French colonial rulers.

"They have had constant experience along the Cambodian border," said Thanh, a short, wiry man who, at 62 still looks physically capable of leading a guerrilla army in the field.

Ambushed Viet Cong

"They were recruited from among Cambodians living in South Vietnam. Many had fled from Cambodia.

Knowledgeable sources here say Thanh's army "crossed

the frontier all the time on secret missions to ambush North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units.

Thanh insists the Khmer Serei are now under Cambodian government control "in every sense." But some sources believe they still receive money, indirectly, from the CIA.

Thanh would not discuss how much his men were—or are—paid or where the Khmer Serei had obtained their funds.

He preferred instead to talk about the prospects of the Cambodian government, on which he now serves officially as a "councillor" to Prime Minister Nol.

"The government will survive," he said as reports were

arriving here of a new buildup of north Vietnamese troops within several miles of the capital of Phnom Penh.

He said the Communists will never occupy Phnom Penh.

Downfall "Inevitable"

"Sihanouk cared for himself and not his country," said Thanh. "His downfall was inevitable in view of his policy of favoring the Vietnamese Communists."

Thanh feels vindicated now that Sihanouk has fallen.

"But I'm still fighting for my country," he said, "even though I no longer lead my men in battle. We are closer to true freedom than ever before."

S13910

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

August 21, 1970

ings Institution to the Committee for Peace Through Law, a blood kin of the Amendment To Extend the War Committee?

Can a nonprofit foundation retain its tax exemption if it participates in only one side of an issue?

Are research and speechwriting services provided for lobbying groups by a nonprofit foundation regarded as gifts or political donations?

These, too, are questions that must be answered.

LOBBYISTS AND THE COURTS

Mr. President, the Supreme Court's criteria for applying the lobbying law are these: First, the lobbyist must have solicited, collected, or received contributions; second, one of the main purposes of such contributions must be to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress; and third, the intended method of accomplishing this purpose must have been through direct communication with Members of Congress.

It is a fact that Senators involved in the Amendment To End the War Committee have solicited and collected contributions. It is a fact that the main purposes of the contributions has been to influence the vote on the McGovern-Hatfield amendment.

That leaves only one question. Has the method been through direct communication with Members of the Congress? Mr. President, certainly the Amendment To End the War Committee has used indirect communications and members of the committee have used direct communications to lobby for the end the war amendment.

There are the TV and newspaper ads asking the American people to pressure Senators, and members of the committee, when they discuss the issue, are, in effect, lobbyists.

The question then is, should members of the committee, who are also Members of the Senate, be required to register as lobbyists? Have they done so. Do they intend to do so?

NEW GROUND

Mr. President, regardless of the merits, if any, of the war amendment, there is no doubt that its sponsors have broken new ground in the field of lobbying.

I believe, however, that it is more a quicksand than solid ground. I believe they have inaugurated a practice that is fraught with danger to this body.

I believe that in their eagerness they do a disservice to the Senate and the Congress by lobbying their colleagues and by soliciting money in order to bring pressures against those colleagues.

NEW LEGISLATION

These activities are in a relatively untested and murky legal realm, and one cannot say with any firm authority that statutory provisions have been violated. However, today I am proposing legislation to clarify this area. The public interest demands that firm lines of demarcation be drawn and currently existing loopholes be closed.

Our democracy affords a free and unobstructed opportunity for citizens to petition the Government for redress of their grievances as well as the right to express their views.

representatives in the Congress on legislation and issues of importance.

At the same time, however, if the integrity of the legislative function is to be maintained and preserved, identification should be required of parties seeking to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by direct appeals to the Congress or by stimulation of the public intended to produce direct communication with the Congress.

The legislation I propose specifically imposes the full requirements of lobbying disclosure on Members of Congress who engage in these activities.

There is more at stake here than merely the loss of the peace amendment. At stake is whether the Senate is going to remain a deliberative body.

The text of the bill I introduce provides as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 307 of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (2 U.S.C. 266) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"The provisions of this title also shall apply to any Member of Congress who directly or indirectly solicits, collects, or receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally to solicit or aid in the solicitation of communications to be made by members of the public to one or more other Members of Congress for any of such purposes."

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NELSON). The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 4274) to amend the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act with respect to certain activities of Members of Congress, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Young) for 20 minutes.

THE NIXON RENT-A-TROOP DOCTRINE: TWENTIETH CENTURY HESSIANS

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, American people should know that officials of our Central Intelligence Agency are spending many millions of dollars of American taxpayers' money to enlist, arm, maintain, and train thousands of Thai "volunteers," so-called, in a continuing effort to maintain the Lon Nol government in power in Cambodia. In addition, generals of our Armed Forces in Vietnam with the assistance of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and his staff are continuing all-out efforts to support the Korean forces in Cambodia. Not only CIA officials but AID officials and officers of our Armed Forces are enrolling, equipping, and trying to mold into a fighting force thousands of Cambodians. This, despite the fact that Cambodians historically have been a placid peace-loving people. It is expensive business for American taxpayers to try to make good fighting men of them.

This is evident from today's news re-

ports that the capital city, Phnom Penh, is under attack by the Vietnamese forces within 6 miles of the Emperor's palace.

In addition, Mr. President, leaders of our Armed Forces are also going all out with our foreign aid money and our military and military advisers to equip more and more Thais to fight as our allies and, in fact, as mercenaries.

We Americans would do well to remember that those patriots who fought and won our war for independence despised the mercenaries from Hesse-Cassel and other German archdukes who rented troops to King George III. Gen. George Washington captured 2,000 of these mercenaries in his surprise attack on Trenton after crossing the Delaware on Christmas night. This great victory was regarded as the turning point in our Revolutionary War. Later, in General Burgoyne's invasion from Canada, many more Hessians were captured in the surrender at Saratoga.

Now Pentagon officials report that the first installment of this 20th century Hessian fighting force numbers 5,000 troops, secured by agreement with the Government of Thailand. This 5,000 is the first contingent of so-called volunteers who will invade Cambodia. Unfortunately for our generals, at the present time all Cambodia, except a small area around the capital city of Phnom Penh, is controlled by forces opposed to the present rulers of that country. The fact is, Cambodia is not under the control of the government we are supporting.

The Prime Minister of Thailand has announced:

We have reached an agreement that the United States will help finance Thai troops to be sent to Cambodia. Also, we have reached an agreement that the Cambodian soldiers undergoing military training in Thailand will also be financed by the United States.

Here is a demonstration that President Nixon has expanded and escalated our involvement in Southeast Asia instead of bringing our boys home.

It is also well known that the United States is recruiting more Koreans to add to those already in Vietnam. We have all along paid and maintained the ground troops of South Korea who have been in Vietnam since late 1965, and now we are expanding that force.

Mr. President, we are becoming more and more involved in waging war in Southeast Asia. Buying more and more mercenaries. Engaging in continual bombing in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. And the same generals and policymakers who send our own boys to death in a senseless Asian struggle, now spend your money and mine to buy mercenaries to continue their folly.

The American people want to get our boys and our money out of this endless Asian struggle. The Nixon rent-a-troop doctrine will not accomplish this goal. It is with a feeling of sadness I report this situation.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, the able and distinguished senior Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) in his remarks on the trade bill now pending in the other body made a number of references to the tariff import quota system and the

21 August 1970

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0004002

Secret U.S. Action Rises in Cambodia

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE—The United States is drifting towards a secret war in Cambodia.

Central Intelligence Agency operatives based in Southern Laos are running Laotian intelligence gathering and commando teams into Northern Cambodia, well informed military sources here say.

This, combined with denials of what is obviously close U.S. air support for the Cambodian Military puts U.S.-Cambodian operations on a similar footing as secret operations in Laos, though perhaps not on quite so large a scale on the ground.

Sources said the CIA ground operation into Cambodia is run by the agency's substation in the Mekong River town of Pakse in Southern Laos. Laos troops from the 2nd Special Guerrilla Unit based on Bolovens Plateau in Southern Laos are used in their operations. They are led by ex-U.S. militia on hire to the agency.

A smaller group of Kha Lave tribesmen is based in Laos at a location which cannot be disclosed for reasons of military security. They operate into Northeast Cambodia against parts of a Communist base area known as 609. Most operations to date have been in Cambodia's Stung Treng Province where the local Cambodian population speaks Lao as their primary language.

Stung Treng was part of Laos before French rulers in 1904 shifted it under the administration of Phnom Penh. Common language plus Lao and local populace feeling that Stung Treng belongs in Laos anyway has helped Laotians in their military operations there.

Teams of eight or ten men, sometimes including two Americans, survey new Communist infiltration routes into Northern Cambodia leading from Southern Laos toward Communist headquarters near the Cambodian town of Rovieng, sources said.

Teams have attacked trucks, ammunition and rice caches by calling in U.S. air strikes.

These air strikes are part of the interdiction operations which President Nixon already has admitted.

KHA tribal teams operate in

the Seesa River area of Cambodia's northern "Green Triangle" of Labansiek, Bokod and Lumphat. Teams are supplied by air drops made by Continental Airlines' aircraft flown by American pilots. Continental carries out similar missions in Laos for the agency.

Sources said these Lao special guerrilla units operating from light airstrips in the Bolovens plateau now are responsible for surveillance of Hanoi's traffic all the way from

Ban Bac on the Sekhong river to Rovieng in Cambodia.

These American operations are "vital," according to well informed sources, to achieve some success in interdicting the reinforcement and resupply routes Hanoi has pushed through Southern Laos to Northern Cambodia in recent months.

These Communist supply routes support Communist attacks against hard-pressed eastern Cambodia into South Cambodian defenders at Kompong Thom and Siem Reap and convoys moving across Northeast Cambodia into South Vietnam.

Reds are expected to further improve these routes and perhaps launch new attacks against Laos to do this. The secrecy policy, however, is not carried out on military grounds. Sources admit that the Reds already know the locations of Lao guerrilla airstrips and have clashed with teams inside Cambodia.

Protects Laos Stance

Secrecy in part protects the official Laos stance of neutrality and partly avoids public

pressure in the United States against U.S. involvement in Laos and Cambodia.

Also because the Central Intelligence Agency, and not the military, is carrying out the operation, secrecy is naturally excessive.

Sources believe that if dovish senators and other segments of the U.S. public understood how necessary these operations are to relieve pressure on Cambodians and South Vietnam, there would be less problems in both funding and secrecy.

STATINTL

21 AUGUST 1970

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00040021000

Secret U.S. Action Rises in Cambodia

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE—The United States is stepping up secret operations in Cambodia with guerrilla teams directed by the Central Intelligence Agency, well-informed sources here say.

The teams move into northern Cambodia on intelligence gathering and commando raids from a base in southern Laos, the sources say.

Combined with denials of what is obviously close U.S. air support for the Cambodian military, the increased activity puts U.S.-Cambodia operations on a similar footing as secret operations in Laos, though perhaps not on quite so large a scale on the ground.

Sources said the CIA ground operation into Cambodia is run by the agency's substation in the Mekong River town of Pakse in Southern Laos. Laos troops from the 2nd Special Guerrilla Unit based on Bolovens Plateau in Southern Laos are used in their operations. They are led by ex-U.S. militia on hire to the agency.

A smaller group of Kha Lave tribesmen is based in Laos at a location which cannot be disclosed for reasons of military security. They operate into Northeast Cambodia against parts of a Communist base area known as 809. Most operations to date have been in Cambodia's Stung Treng Province where the local Cambodian population speaks Lao as their primary language.

Stung Treng was part of Laos before French rulers in 1904 shifted it under the administration of Phnom Penh. Common language plus Lao and local populace feeling that Stung Treng belongs in Laos anyway has helped Laotians in their military operations there.

Teams of eight or ten men, sometimes including two Americans, survey new Communist infiltration routes into Northern Cambodia leading from Southern Laos toward Communist headquarters near the Cambodian town of Rovieng, sources said.

Teams have attacked trucks, ammunition and rice caches by calling in U.S. air strikes.

These air strikes are part of the interdiction operations which President Nixon already has admitted.

KHA tribal teams operate in the Bolovens Plateau area of Cambodia's northern "Green Triangle" of Labansiek, Bokod and Lumphat. Teams are sup-

ported by Continental Airlines' aircraft flown by American pilots. Continental carries out similar missions in Laos for the agency.

Sources said these Lao special guerrilla units operating from light airstrips in the Bolovens plateau now are responsible for surveillance of Hanoi's traffic all the way from Ban Bac on the Sekhong river to Rovieng in Cambodia.

These American operations are "vital," according to well informed sources, to achieve some success in interdicting the reinforcement and resupply routes Hanoi has pushed through Southern Laos to Northern Cambodia in recent months.

These Communist supply routes support Communist attacks against hard-pressed eastern Cambodia into South Cambodian defenders at Kompong Thom and Siem Reap and convoys moving across Northeast Cambodia into South Vietnam.

Reds are expected to further improve these routes and perhaps launch new attacks against Laos to do this. The secrecy policy, however, is not carried out on military grounds. Sources admit that the Reds already know the locations of Lao guerrilla airstrips and have clashed with teams inside Cambodia.

Protects Laos Stance

Secrecy in part protects the official Laos stance of neutrality and partly avoids public pressure in the United States against U.S. involvement in Laos and Cambodia.

Also because the Central Intelligence Agency, and not the military, is carrying out the operation, secrecy is naturally excessive.

Sources believe that if dovish senators and other segments of the U.S. public understood how necessary these operations are to policy pressure on Cambodians and South Vietnam, there would be less problems in both funding and

STATINTL

16 Aug 1970

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400210001-7

INTERPRETIVE REPORT

STATINTL

Sihanouk's Voice Hard to Hear From

By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star Staff Writer

HONG KONG — While the military situation in Cambodia remains uncertain, and the political stability of the Lon Nol government is still open to doubt, Prince Norodom Sihanouk is having problems.

The exiled Cambodian leader has failed to win widespread acceptance for his contention that he was unconstitutionally ousted from the post of chief of state.

His efforts to secure acceptance of his Peking-based "royal government of national union of Cambodia" as the legitimate regime have bogged down. Only 17 Communist and left-leaning countries have recognized it in preference to the government in Phnom Penh.

And he is running out of places to visit, of crowds ready to feed his love of popular acclaim.

Still Has Room for Hope

These problems do not mean that Sihanouk's cause is necessarily doing poorly and his future prospects are dim. The situation inside Cambodia remains fluid enough to offer him hope of outlasting Premier Lon Nol.

The hope is dependent upon continued military support from Hanoi and conditioned by uncertainty over North Vietnam's ultimate intentions.

With a touch of desperation, Sihanouk has issued an open letter to "the kings, heads of state and heads of government of non-aligned countries" appealing for support.

Took Week to Print

It is so long — more than 12,000 words — that the New China News Agency made it public in installments from Aug. 8, the day Sihanouk released it, over a week that ended Friday.

"Your majesties and your excellencies," Sihanouk asked, in effect, how can you turn your backs on me — me, your old friend?

Switching to third person, he wrote that "Norodom Sihanouk has had the honor to be your humble 'colleague' since the year 1941 when he ascend-

ed the throne" of Cambodia. He "participated by your side" in the 1955 Afro-Asian conference in Bandung and, "still by your side," in the 1961 Belgrade non-aligned summit conference.

News Selected With Care

This personal touch ignored the fact that only Ethiopia's Haile Selassie among present non-aligned leaders was in power in 1941, and few were even in 1961.

The letter used a careful selection of Western news reports on events in Cambodia since Sihanouk's ouster March 18 to depict conditions supporting his case. There was particularly heavy reliance on French writers who saw the CIA behind every anti-Sihanouk move — a charge that no one has documented and many independent observers have rejected.

Sihanouk argued at length that the Cambodian constitution did not make it possible for him to be removed as chief of state. He also contended that the adoption of a republican form of government under Lon Nol would violate the 1947 constitution and would lack the approval of a genuinely free referendum.

Claims Popular Roots

The open letter claimed that Sihanouk's exile government "has its 'roots' among the people and possesses all the attributes of a legal government."

The government was appointed "after having been elected by the general congress of adherents of the national united front of Kampuchea," Sihanouk's political party formed in exile.

The front was originally known, from initials of the French version, as FUNK, but

apparently some Cambodian or Chinese public relations man thought better of that and switched to the English initials NUFK.

The letter did not mention that the NUFK congress was held in Peking and not attended by the three ministers whom he described as its "principal members." Sihanouk denied reports that he had once had the three murdered, before he switched to their leftist side.

His government has so far been recognized by Albania, Algeria, China, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Iraq, Libya, Mauritania, North Korea, North Vietnam, Romania, Sudan, Syria, South Yemen and Yugoslavia.

Noticably missing from the list are the Soviet Union and its most loyal followers. The exile government's minister of finance, Thiounn Mumm, recently visited Moscow and some East European capitals seeking support.

Intensive lobbying also has been under way in non-aligned countries. Special efforts have been made, so far without success, to gain admission to the non-aligned summit conference of 74 nations scheduled to begin Sept. 8 in Lusaka, Zambia.

Peking

Most non-aligned nations seem inclined to try to avoid having to make a decision on which Cambodian government to recognize. Neither is likely to be seated at Lusaka, although Phnom Penh also has been trying to gain admission.

Picks Up Some Support

Sihanouk continues to pick up support from Cambodians abroad. His government issued a statement Friday welcoming the adherence of Cambodian students and a diplomat in Czechoslovakia. Last month an official sent on a mission to the World Bank by Lon Nol defected on the way home and went to Peking.

On Aug. 1 the "Voice of the NUFK" radio began broadcasting. Sihanouk's open letter claimed that the station is "in the liberated zone" of Cambodia, but this seemed unlikely for logistical reasons.

There is precedent for it to be in southern China. The "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" and the "Voice of the People of Thailand," both Chinese-controlled Communist insurgent stations, are located there.

A news agency, the "Agence Khmere D'Information (AKI)," was established Monday to distribute material on the exile movement.

E - 5,552

AUG 8 1970

In Laos And Cambodia

STATINTL

In spite of the administration's well publicized moves to reduce American troop commitments in South-east Asia, certain disturbing aspects of the situation have not been satisfactorily explained. The reference is to what is going on in Laos and Cambodia, which tends to undermine heartening action elsewhere.

Troop withdrawals are steadily under way in South Vietnam and can be expected to continue; the administration has committed itself to deadlines. In South Korea, the announced pullout of troops appears likely to be made, even in the face of objections by the Seoul government.

A disturbing situation continues, however, in both Laos and Cambodia. In the former, there is no longer much of an attempt to hide the CIA's activities through its Air America operations. Television network newsmen have filmed Air America planes supplying American-paid troops. Support for an army of perhaps as many as 10,000 is reportedly being financed by the CIA. There seems little doubt that the Central Intelligence Agency not only is functioning in Laos, but enjoys behind-the-scenes administration support.

In Cambodia, it now is clear that United States aircraft are aiding the Cambodian army. Though the Defense Department offers half-hearted denials of this, newsmen on the scene report that U. S. planes are carrying out more than their officially sanctioned missions to cut supply lines. Most such "interdiction missions" seem to occur close to where Cambodian troops happen to be in trouble.

There is nothing new about contradictions between official policy positions and what is reported by newsmen. In the past, such discrepancies have for the most part worked to the disadvantage of long-range American interests. The benefit of troop withdrawals from South Vietnam and South Korea may be nullified, or at any rate made less significant, by continued involvement in Laos and Cambodia.

AUG 6 1970
 M - 111,867

Whalen asks spy shakeup

By Richard Thomas

WASHINGTON -- A resolution to keep clandestine intelligence operations in line with national policy and eliminate duplication and competition among U.S. spy agencies is to be introduced today by Rep. Charles W. Whalen Jr., R-Dayton. Whalen cited last year's unsuccessful attempt to include CIA funding in a military appropriations bill as an example of confusion that the committee could prevent.

The measure establishes a joint committee on intelligence, having jurisdiction over the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research, and the intelligence departments of the armed services. In that instance \$200 million of a \$500 million request for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) was in fact earmarked for the CIA. The two items were separated when Congress learned of the ploy.

SPONSORING IT with Whalen are Sens. Eugene J. McCarthy, D-Minn., and Mark O. Hatfield, R-Ore., and Rep. Donald M. Fraser, D-Minn.

Whalen said the resolution springs chiefly from concern that intelligence operations, in the absence of coordinated congressional oversight, sometimes contradict policies of Congress and the executive branch.

"Who knows if the overthrow of the Cambodian government (the coup which ousted Prince Sihanouk) was a CIA operation?" he asked. "I'm not saying it was, it's just that it may have been a covert operation" that members of Congress were not told about.

THE PURPOSE of the committees, but the existing setup release security matters," he said, but rather to provide an oversight panel to consider intelligence ventures in the light of national policies.

Many intelligence endeavors now are reviewed by one of several congressional committees, but the existing setup fails to coordinate diverse and sometimes conflicting operations, he said.

2 AUGUST 1970

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400210001-7

Dear Prince: STATINTL

Since You Went Away . . .

By A. J. LANGGUTH

MONOROM HOTEL
PNOMPENH, CAMBODIA
AUGUST, 1970

PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK
c/o PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
PEKING, CHINA

DEAR PRINCE SIHANOUK:

I FOUND your photograph the other day, torn by shrapnel and lying in the dust near a bombed-out pagoda at Oudong. A monk either hadn't heard the directive of last March that your image was henceforth banned throughout Cambodia or had ignored it. This old laminated photo had been tacked to the wall of his hut until the morning a rocket caved in its thatched roof and sent it flying. You were younger in the picture, thinner, holding a bouquet of yellow flowers and smiling with that expression of vague discomfort I see so often on the faces of your countrymen. In Cambodia, a furtive, grateful smile

A. J. LANGGUTH, a former Times correspondent, is on a freelance reporting tour of Southeast Asia.

seems to be the best defense against ill fortune.

Riding back from Oudong, we stopped to let pass a battalion of Cambodian soldiers, untested and exuberant boys who cheered and applauded themselves, all the while showing their teeth in that same self-conscious way. They were traveling to war in civilian buses painted bright green and gypsy blue because their allies hadn't yet provided enough military trucks. A few miles to our right, almost lost in gray clouds, rose Pnom Oudong, the hill where Cambodia's capital once stood.

The Communist forces—call them Vietminh or Vietcong or the North Vietnamese Army or the Khmer Rouge—had taken the hill for strategic as well as symbolic reasons, and they could watch our car racing down Route 5 and could count the Government buses as they moved toward Kompong Cham.

The Communists that day were also holding Angkor, and according to other reports, you planned to go there and proclaim your government inside the sacred ruins. You had done

something like that once before, in 1953, when the French treated you like a 30-year-old adolescent and tried to distract you from your demands for Cambodian independence with another round of Paris nightclubs. You exiled yourself in Bangkok and at Battambang until the French gave way. Now you wait in Peking for a wave of history that will restore you again to power.

Given the American appetite for absolutes and quick solutions, we have often found your political style bizarre if not immoral. For a decade one newsmagazine referred to you as "Snooky" for your crime of raising doubts about the Pax Americana. But less chauvinistic observers have been just as distressed by your contrariness. What to make, for example, of your relationship with Lon Nol, the general who deposed you? For years you have alternated praise for him with denunciations. You removed him as Premier in 1967, then insisted last August that he accept the job again. On a dozen occasions you've predicted that he and Prince Sirik Matak would try to unseat you and yet, it now appears, you never really believed your own warnings. Intrigue, compromise, tendentious neutrality—the dodges and twists to your policy have been hard to follow, so that when I returned to Cambodia after six years away from it I set myself only four questions and tried to keep them simple: Why were you deposed? Did the United States take part in removing you? Can the present Cambodian Government survive? Would the people of Cambodia be better served with you back in Pnompenh or as a permanent guest of Peking?

INEVITABLY the answers proved more convoluted than the questions, more subjective, and often clumsy with parenthetical qualifications and disclaimers. But looking down at your photograph on the ground, I decided I would share my conclusions with you. Given the avidity with which you have conducted state business in the world's press, I doubted that the public nature of my letter would

When I heard last March 18 that

the Cambodian National Assembly had voted to remove you as chief of state, I drew the same conclusion that's occurred to much of the world. I assumed that the Government of the United States, acting through the most-publicized secret agency in the history of espionage, had a hand in pushing you from office. From Paris you made that accusation. And the North Vietnamese, who had seen their embassy sacked in Pnompenh one week earlier, seemed to believe it. Over the next days when Lon Nol tried to bargain with Hanoi and Peking he should not have been surprised that they rebuffed him. Why deal with a puppet of the Americans? Lon Nol was ready to make certain concessions to protect Cambodia's neutrality, including the continued passage through the eastern provinces of medical supplies for the Vietcong. But how could a government with so strong an anti-Communist bias be trusted?

That suspicion of American involvement is not going to die. It is too useful a propaganda tool. And the nature of intelligence work makes it impossible to say flatly that no secret understanding was reached. With some justice, you have always been convinced that American agents were implicated in the attempt to do away with you in the late fifties. You even produced a movie about it—"Shadow on Angkor"—though I haven't seen the picture and theaters in Pnompenh are now booking the American Westerns you had prescribed for so long.

Officials of Lon Nol's Government deny categorically that they had dealings with the C.I.A., but the accusation doesn't anger them. They are well-disposed toward the United States and many of them would have been delighted to have had guarantees from American agents before embarking on a step so traumatic as the banishment of the man who is still God-king to a sizable part of the population. "One American representative of a peace group was in Pnompenh last week, and he told me Gen. Lon Nol has been paid by the C.I.A. since 1958." A Cabinet minister looked at me half-hopefully

continued



The Road to Phnom Penh: Cambodia Takes up the Gun

ON MARCH 18, AN AMERICAN-backed military coup overthrew the neutralist government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, forcing the Cambodian left into all-out insurgency and providing American counterinsurgents with yet another Vietnam. First South Vietnam; then Laos; now Cambodia—American power has finally toppled the last domino in Indochina into communist revolution.

For over a decade, the United States had tried to unseat Sihanouk and replace him with a right-wing regime. Though a conservative in domestic policies, Sihanouk jealously guarded his country's independence, knowing that entangling alliances could only lead Cambodia straight into the Indochina war, and from there into a full-scale revolution of her own. He also knew that if Cambodia ever became a junior partner in America's Asian alliances, she would open herself to the territorial expansion of her traditional enemies, the Thais and the South Vietnamese.

He was right. General Lon Nol, Cambodia's new ruler, has abandoned neutrality. South Vietnam's General Thieu has agreed to occupy Cambodia, defending Lon Nol from the Cambodian people, at least until a successful Cambodianization of the war permits the withdrawal of South Vietnamese combat troops. The Thais have volunteered military aid and their own combat troops. And the Americans, striking from air and land, are turning Cambodia into the newest battlefield in an unending war.

Sihanouk, meanwhile, is now chief of his country's revolutionary movement. "America attracts communism," the former neutralist once explained, "like sugar attracts ants."

Sihanouk first became King of Cambodia in 1941, appointed by the Vichy French, who from the outset of World War II administered the country on behalf of the Japanese. In early 1945, after Vichy fell to the Allies, the Japanese seized direct control of Indochina, made the right-wing collaborator Son Ngoc Thanh premier, and pushed Sihanouk to declare Cambodia independent of French rule. Following the defeat of Japan in World War II, the French returned, jailing Son Ngoc Thanh and forcing Sihanouk to make Cambodia "an autonomous state within the French

Union." This effectively reestablished French military and economic control, and gave the French the use of Cambodia and Cambodian troops in their campaign to regain control of Vietnam from the Viet Minh.

In reaction to the French takeover, many of Son Ngoc Thanh's followers fled to Thailand, where they organized a Cambodian independence movement. The new group, the Khmer Issarak, covered the political spectrum from right-wing nationalists to communists, and included ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia. By 1953, the anti-French Khmer Issarak, working closely with the Viet Minh, controlled three-fifths of Cambodia.

SIHANOUK, HIS NATIONALIST credentials now in question, began his own "royal crusade for independence." Capitalizing on French fear of the Khmer Serai and the Viet Minh, he skillfully maneuvered the French to back his crusade and, in October 1953, declared the independence of Cambodia.

Sihanouk's success undermined the nationalist position of the Khmer Issarak. Son Ngoc Thanh and a few of his right-wing followers went into exile in Bangkok; the great majority of the Khmer Issarak, including the left, accepted Sihanouk's offer of amnesty and laid down their arms.

Sihanouk then set out to govern Cambodia in classic fashion: balancing right against left, class against class, while maintaining his own position as the indispensable man-in-the-middle. He permitted the communist Pracheachon Party to operate openly. But, stepping down from the throne, he actively campaigned for his own "Buddhist Socialist" Party, the Sangkum, helping it establish exclusive control of the National Assembly. He surrounded himself, both in the Sangkum and in his cabinets, with representatives of the entire span of Cambodian political life, including veterans of the Khmer Issarak. Yet he ran the government as a one-man show, single-handedly making decisions on even the most trivial matters.

Economically, Sihanouk practiced a kind of top-down socialism. But, rather than promoting growth, the profits of

July 21, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

gether income taxes for families with incomes under \$3,600.

Adoption of my bill would be a meaningful first step toward fairness and modernization of our revenue laws.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN). The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 4102) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for an increase in the amount of the personal exemption, introduced by Mr. YOUNG of Ohio, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

OUR MAN IN NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, Robert S. Boyd, chief of the Akron Beacon-Journal Washington Bureau, recently returned from 2 weeks' traveling in North Vietnam. Mr. Boyd is one of the foremost investigative reporters in the Nation.

I ask unanimous consent that his report which was published in the Akron Beacon-Journal of June 7, 1970, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HANOI BELIEVES NIXON INVENTED VIET WAR (By Robert S. Boyd)

In North Vietnamese eyes, Richard Nixon is even worse than Lyndon Johnson was.

Although it was LBJ who bombed the daylight out of their country, Nixon is considered even more treacherous, stubborn and cruel than his predecessor.

They believe Nixon invented the Vietnam War.

In the Museum of the Revolution in Hanoi, which covers the 40-year struggle against French and then American intervention, there is an interesting exhibit devoted to Nixon.

It is dated 1953, and it shows him smiling and chatting with the former French puppet emperor, Bao Dai.

The caption asserts that this was when Nixon—then a freshman vice president—conceived his policy of "Using Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese."

Another display shows Nixon visiting Hanoi in the Spring of 1954, before the French defeat. He toured Dien Bien Phu on that trip.

The exhibit recalls Nixon's April 1954 speech suggesting American aid to the French—a project which President Eisenhower rejected.

In other words, Hanoi dates Nixon's "Vietnamization" plan of 1970 back 17 years—even before the French collapse.

That's how long they say the President has been trying to make South Vietnam into an American "colony" by means of Vietnamese troops.

As a general rule, American presidents are not among North Vietnam's favorite people. The last good one, in their eyes, was Abraham Lincoln, whom Ho Chi Minh admired in his youth.

It is the North Vietnam view: Woodrow Wilson fouled up by ignoring the young Ho's plea for Vietnamese self-determination at the end of World War I.

Franklin Roosevelt showed promise, but he died before he could be of much help.

Harry Truman sold out to the French in 1946 and supported their campaign to hang on to their old colony.

Dwight Eisenhower refused to hold the promised elections to reunite Vietnam in

1956. Instead he created a tyrant, Ngo Dinh Diem, and put him in Saigon.

John Kennedy beeced up the American "advisers" and launched a "special war" of counter-insurgency against "liberation forces" in South Vietnam.

Lyndon Johnson "Americanized" the war with half a million GIs, and expanded it to North Vietnam.

And now, at the bottom of the barrel, comes Richard Nixon.

Nixon's "Vietnamization" plan is crueler than LBJ's "Americanization" of the war, said Luu Quy Ky, secretary general of the North Vietnamese Journalists Association.

"The cruelty lies in the fact that if Nixon uses the blood of other people, he will not be as economical with it as with American blood," Ky said.

Nixon is also more deceptive than LBJ, according to the North Vietnamese. Vietnamization is only a ruse to lull the American public, they argue. While cutting down U.S. casualties and costs, Nixon is actually prolonging and extending the war, they say.

The harshest indictment of Nixon I heard in my two weeks in North Vietnam came from H'ang Tung, a smiling, deceptively mild-mannered intellectual who is editor in chief of the official communist party newspaper, Nhan Dan (The People).

"Nixon has accelerated his own defeat—his political defeat at home and the defeat of his policies in Indochina," Tung said.

"Why? Because he has done things contrary to common sense. Things that even those who used to agree with him now dissent from. Things that even President Johnson dared not do."

Tung cited what he called Nixon's "escalation" of the war in Laos, the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia (which Hanoi claims was a CIA plot) and now the invasion of Cambodia.

Nixon even succeeded in making a Communist ally out of Cambodia's pleasure-loving Prince Sihanouk, Tung scoffed.

"We couldn't do that," he said, "but your Nixon did."

The editor noted sarcastically that Nixon undertook the Cambodian operation only days after his Secretary of State told Congress it wouldn't be done, and after a Senate committee voted against helping the Lon Nol government of Cambodia.

"Nixon acted in defiance of the Legislature," Tung said. "His acts bring much dissent. He is more unpopular than Kennedy or Johnson."

"Nixon claims his 'silent majority' supports him. But that is self-deception. The votes cast for Nixon in your last election were not meant for him to expand the war, but to end it."

Many Americans may find it poor taste for an official of a Communist dictatorship to criticize the President for failing to consult public opinion.

A number of American bomb casings that have fallen on Vietnamese soil have been derisively painted with his name.

Billboards, slogans and cartoons mock him.

And one day, in the southern part of the country, while American planes were roaring overhead on a bombing mission, a 23-year-old girl looked up and said quietly: "Nixon's airplanes."

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. In accordance with the previous order, the Senator from South Carolina is recognized for not to exceed 20 minutes.

THE OMNIBUS CRIME BILL

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, there can be no doubt that there is an urgent

need for additional measures to combat the alarming rate of crime that is flourishing in our Nation. This is particularly true in the District of Columbia. S. 2601, the District of Columbia crime bill, provides these additional measures, and will, in my judgment, be instrumental in effecting a reduction in the number of crimes committed. However, it is unfortunate that certain provisions of this bill have been, and still are, the subject of gross misunderstanding by responsible critics and inaccurate reporting by the news media.

Mr. President, the provisions of this bill have been exhaustively studied in committee by the House and the Senate, debated on the floor and again studied by the House-Senate conference. All provisions which were deemed unconstitutional or unwise were eliminated. However, there is still controversy surrounding pretrial detention and no-knock provisions of this bill. Critics of these measures have argued that such provisions are unconstitutional and will be misused by the courts and law enforcement officials. It seems to me that a careful reading of this bill and a study of its legislative history, should dispel any doubts one could possibly have regarding its constitutionality or the fact that many safeguards were included in order that the possibility of misuse would be eliminated.

Let us first consider pretrial detention. It must be remembered that the concept of pretrial detention is not new. In 1927, a provision for pretrial detention was included in the American Law Institute's model code of criminal procedure. In the mid-1960's pretrial detention was considered by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and by the House Judiciary Committee. In 1966, the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia recommended legislation to authorize the pretrial detention of those defendants who present "a truly high risk to the safety of the community." Since that time, other studies have been undertaken by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the Judicial Council Committee To Study the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the District of Columbia. All of these studies confirmed the fact that a system of pretrial detention was necessary to prevent dangerous criminals from committing additional crimes after being released on bail.

These studies, showing the serious problem of recidivism during bail, prompted the measure we now have before us. However, some critics argue that pretrial detention is repressive and that the courts cannot be trusted to administer its provision in a fair and impartial manner.

Section 23-1322 of the act provides in part that:

(a) Subject to the provisions of this section, a judicial officer may order pretrial detention of—

(1) a person charged with a dangerous crime . . . if the Government certifies by motion that based on such person's pattern of behavior consisting of his past and present conduct, and on the other factors set out in Section 23-1321(b), there is no condition or combination of conditions which

What You Should Know About Cambodia

by Lloyd Shearer

In 1961 when President John Kennedy ordered the first of 10,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam, most Americans knew nothing about that country—its location, its people, its history.

Nine years later, after more than 50,000 young Americans had died and another 300,000 had been wounded in war-ravaged Vietnam to prevent a Communist takeover there, President Nixon ordered 40,000 U.S. troops into Cambodia.

Again—most Americans know precious little about Cambodia, except perhaps what their President has told them, which is: "We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire."

Whether our incursion into Cambodia—described by the President as "the most successful operation of this long and difficult war"—with our subsequent capture of enemy supplies in tremendous numbers will end the war instead of expanding it, whether it will aid the Vietnamization program and speed the withdrawal of American troops instead of delaying it—only the months ahead will tell.

Cambodia meanwhile remains in the forefront of the news. Under the circumstances it would be well for the American public to learn something about that "land of the white parasol," for no matter who does the fighting there in our crusade to stop the march of communism in Indochina—whether it is the Thai army, the South Vietnamese army, or the Cambodian army of Gen. Lon Nol—it is the American people who have paid, are paying, and will continue to pay for the war, which has already cost us more than \$120 billion and whose end is nowhere in sight.

Dealers in rice

Cambodia is a land of tropical hardwood forests and incredibly fertile rice paddies. Most of the rice is sold to American troops in the Cambodian in-

cursion was locally grown and sold to the North Vietnamese by Cambodian farmers and government officials. Only recently have they turned against the Communists. Our Central Intelligence Agency maintains a list of such double-dealing Cambodians.

Rice and rubber are the two traditional Cambodian money crops. The land suffers from a lack of minerals, and practically all manufactured goods are imported. The average Cambodian has an income of about \$103 per year.

Cambodia covers an area of 67,500 square miles, which makes it approximately the size of Missouri.

Its population is approaching 7 million, and its climate is typical of other Asian monsoon-belt countries. The dry season extends from December to May. Monsoons then flood the land, making the roads impassable. Like Vietnam, Cambodia is for Americans a climatologically difficult country in which to fight a war.

The annual rainfall in Phnom Penh, the capital city, is 60 inches, with the rainy season, from mid-May to mid-November, accounting for 51 inches. The humidity is consistently high and strength-sapping, and there are only two relatively comfortable months, December and January. Cambodia in diplomatic circles is considered a hardship country. Duty there calls for higher pay.

Americans welcomed

The Cambodians are a small, slender, copper-faced, easygoing, peaceful, friendly people who welcomed American soldiers with open arms. Most of them are Khmers, descendants of an Asian people whose civilization reached its height from the ninth through the 14th centuries. Traces of that splendor can be seen in the ruined city of Angkor Wat, visited by Jacqueline Kennedy amidst much fanfare in 1967.

At the end of the 14th century, the nameless from the east began moving in

on the Khmers, subsequently chipping away large chunks of Cambodian territory. Basically, this is why the Cambodians fear and hate their traditional enemies, the Thais and the Vietnamese, who now play the anomalous role of protecting from the Communists a people and territory they once sought to plunder.

There are several minority groups in Cambodia: about 500,000 Chinese who own and run most of the shops; 500,000 Vietnamese who are merchants, artisans and fishermen and are now being repatriated to South Vietnam; 50,000 Khmer Loeu (hill tribesmen); 80,000 Cham-Malays (Moslems descended from the ancient kingdom of Champa); 25,000 Thais and Laotians, and 5000 Europeans, most of them French.

Thailand grab

It was France which saved Cambodia from annihilation by its neighbors in 1863 when it made Cambodia a French protectorate. In 1942, when Thailand joined Japan in declaring war against the U.S. and its Allies, it had already annexed part of northwestern Cambodia. After the war, however, the French compelled the Thais to return the territory.

For the past 30 years, Cambodia has been dominated off and on by Prince Norodom Sihanouk who was displaced in March by a *coup d'etat*.

Sihanouk used to be King. He ascended the throne of Cambodia in 1941 at the age of 19 and insisted at the end of World War II that France grant his country independence. The French stalled as they did in Vietnam. Sihanouk thereupon began a public campaign against French rule. In June, 1953, he entered voluntary exile, refused to return to Phnom Penh until France, her hands full in Vietnam fighting Ho Chi Minh and his guerrillas, finally granted independence to Cambodia on Nov. 9, 1953.

After Sihanouk abdicated the throne in favor of his father. He re-

continued

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

11 July 70

Rushed to Press!

the Second Indochina War

Cambodia and Laos

by WILFRED G. BURCHETT

Another great book of reportage, responding to the urgent need to understand the new stage of the war opened by Nixon's invasion of Cambodia.

Out of his rich knowledge gained as an on-the-spot reporter for over 25 years, Burchett shows how the CIA maneuvered the coup which overthrew Sihanouk, and then provided its own Special Forces to sustain the puppet regime in Cambodia.

He was there when the Summit Meeting of the Indochinese Peoples (Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians) set up a program and a new strategy of unity in the war; and when the new Government of National Unity for Cambodia was formed. He shows why

STATINTL

U.S. correspondents tell their tale

STATINTL

By PHILLIP BONOSKY

Three of the most extraordinary documents (published recently) to come out of the present war are the joint work of three American correspondents who were captured in Cambodia May 7 and held prisoner by the guerrillas for six weeks before being released.

Richard Dudman, of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch; Michael Morrow, of the Dispatch News Service International, and Elizabeth Pond, a special correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor were intercepted on Route 1, "the main highway from Saigon to Phnom Penh," down which they rode in an International Scout cart that May day in an effort to discover where the war had gone to. Instead, they found themselves suddenly taken prisoner, and for 40 days lived behind the "enemy lines" sharing the food and way of life of their captors, getting to know many of them as individuals, and in general, discovering, in the words of Richard Dudman, that "We saw a well organized movement of Cambodians and Vietnamese guerrillas in a determined war against American tanks and planes." And learned "what kind of people they are as we traveled with them on foot, by bicycle and occasionally by truck from one village to another."

It was a remarkable experience, unmatched by any other American journalists. But what is even more remarkable than the details of their imprisonment is the testimony which each brought back, in his own terms, adding his own insights, of the kind of man (and woman) who is our "enemy", against whom we are counseled by Nixon to send fire and disease and bombs to kill in ever-mounting genocidal numbers as representing the greatest of danger to our "way of life".

Nixon had sent American troops

to Cambodia scarcely a week before the capture of the three correspondents. As Elizabeth Pond was to remark: "Personally I had been deeply dismayed by the American decision to send troops to Cambodia."

In fact, she was to make a point of what was already certainly an unusual attitude with which the three of them worked in Cambodia, that they "never quite accepted the premise of an adversary relationship, even at the moments when we were most frightened."

And, in the beginning of their ordeal, they were often frightened. Their first captors took them for CIA spies, and it was nip and tuck (they felt) whether they would survive long enough to prove their identities as newspaper correspondents. In the first villages they came to, the villagers denounced them as CIA spies and there were demands for their immediate execution. But, then, after once being beaten (that is, the men), they were rescued finally by a lieutenant of the guerrilla army, who assured them that if it was established that they were bona-fide newspaper correspondents no harm would come to them.

And his word proved to be good as gold. For, soon after, as they were to report, their status changed, and from "enemy agent" they graduated into a kinder classification. In fact, no guard was placed on them at all after they were cleared. But, Elizabeth Pond reported: "An escape attempt was the last thing that any of the three of us would have tried, and this appeared to be understood. As time went on, weapons were freely left in our presence, even in the absence of soldiers."

Strange enemy! But their relationship with their captors deepened even more as time wore on. They became an integral part of the company, running for shelter from the marauding American helicopters, sharing what food there was, sleeping wherever there was a roof, or none at all. But all this in common with the "ene-

my" soliders, who, in time, broke down into individuals as they got to know them better.

They were far from the faceless, ignorant "puppets" of the wily Communists, the men they came to know. They were men with a common background of active resistance, which for some extended over 20 years,

and included fighting the French; they were men who had learned to subordinate their own private fates to the fate of their country. "To live without freedom and independence," Dudman quotes one of his captors as saying, "is as good as being dead." And another one: "We miss our families, but we have an obli-

gation to oppose American aggression. When we have won we will go home in peace."

Their sincerity, their single-minded devotion to the freedom of their homeland, their willingness to subordinate their own personal aims and ambitions to the common aim of liberating their country — this the Americans did not dare question. Practically, they stood in a strange relationship to these men and women, whose determination to fight was unambiguous and existed on a moral level infinitely superior to the moral level of their opponents, including, at least formally, themselves.

The three Americans were not unaware of this. They made no attempt at any time to defend or even explain the position of their own government. In fact, as Miss Pond explained, they were themselves opposed to it. As a result, their reports of life among the Cambodian and Vietnamese guerrillas testify to a people for whom they could barely hide their admiration, even in a certain sense, their envy.

It's obvious to the reader, though the idea is never expressed overtly, that, as they got to know their captors better, to exchange ideas with

The Long Shadowy Hand Of America's CIA

Since every action of the United States Central Intelligence Agency is top secret it is hard to ferret out the facts, but over the years fragments emerge which throw some light on its activities.

Its budget is split among a 100 items in the United States' multi-billion dollar defence appropriations. Only two or three Senators and Congressmen, members of a watchdog committee, are privy to its size.

The CIA itself reports to another super-secret body, the National Defence Council, which for the record says virtually nothing. Even its membership is secret.

But it can be said that the CIA budget rivals that of many medium-sized nations, and it employs tens of thousands of agents throughout the world — probably more than Russia.

The CIA is quick to point out that it operates only outside the limits of the continental United States, its work internally being done by the FBI. Each foreign post has a "Resident" who controls the activities of his men in the field. Often the Resident operates out of the United States Embassy in the nation concerned, much to the disgust of regular diplomats who call CIA men "spooks," sometimes to their faces.

Control

Controlling and co-ordinating these world-wide operations is a huge staff in CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia — a massive concrete building tucked away behind a grove of trees just off a super-highway a few miles from Washington, DC.

A coy direction sign announces it as the Public Works Department for the District of Columbia.

CIA critics say this piece of cloak-and-dagger nonsense which deceives nobody is typical of the theatrical amateurism of the entire CIA operation.

The CIA's most spectacular failure was, of course, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

Despite its protestations at being only an external agency, CIA agents were active in Miami, Florida, recruiting Cuban refugees to fight.

The agency's advice to the Pentagon and White House on the degree of support Prime Minister Fidel Castro had in his own country proved completely erroneous. Many liberal Senators claim that the agency is so paranoid about Communists and Communism that its collective judgements are often seriously distorted.

Certainly the record indicates that the CIA is more likely to be friendly to right-wing politicians and military men than anybody else. They have been accused, often with convincing evidence, of interfering on the side of the generals in several Latin American and Caribbean countries, notably Guatemala, Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil.

Mainstay

The agency has been a mainstay of President Ky's military regime in South Vietnam, and there is no doubt that it had a big hand in toppling the neutralist

government of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia.

Perhaps its most sickening intervention was in Greece, where the colonels oligarchy boasts of the support of the United States Government as it imprisons and tortures its democratic opponents.

The evidence indicates that the CIA uses all classic tools of a spy organisation — assassination, murder, bribery and blackmail of officials. Last year the CIA was implicated by Green Beret troops in Viet-

nam who were charged with the murder of a Vietnamese national, said to be a double agent.

Another agency, little-known outside of the United States that plays a key role in supporting CIA activity is the National Security Agency (NSA), not to be confused with NSA, the space agency.

Headquartered in a

Security

sprawling complex at Fort Meade, Maryland, some 30 miles from Langley, the NSA's security arrangements are, if possible, even tighter than those of the CIA. It bristles with Marine guards and anybody walking around the building without conspicuously displaying his identity will instantly have a

gun barrel at his head. NSA's principal task is to crack the diplomatic and military codes of every other nation on earth. It employs some of the most sophisticated computer equipment ever assembled.

The results of this work are useful to the CIA and the National Security Council. But several allied governments have expressed annoyance over the exercise.

The growing criticism is making it more difficult for the CIA to recruit suitable personnel. It is said that they are more and more turning to men with a law

Almost without exception, military coups around the world in recent years have brought charges of involvement by America's Central Intelligence Agency. Recently King Hussein has hinted at CIA interference in Jordan. What is this shadowy organisation and how does it work? R. W. Cocking investigates for Gemini News Service

enforcement background, as opposed to the more free-wheeling Ivy League college graduates who used to make up the core of their key people.

One problem is that men resigning from the CIA often find that employment at Langley offers real obstacles to getting a new job.

A well-publicised case occurred in Washington recently when a CIA employee resigned to return to university teaching. He was on the short list for a plum appointment, but when it became known he had been a researcher for

the CIA his name was dropped from consideration.

Defenders of the agency argue that every major power must be in the intelligence business as a matter of self-protection.

On the charge of amateurism, one CIA man told me: "Sure we make a lot of mistakes. After all, the United States has been running the world for only a little more than 25 years. Before us, the British were doing it for nearly 300, which gave them plenty of time to learn how to run an intelligence network."

STATINTL

STATINTL

'C.I.A. mercenaries infest Cambodia

By TOM FOLEY

Cambodia: May, 1970, is a slim, 15-page report prepared for the use of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by two of its staff members, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose. The two committee staffers went to South Vietnam and Cambodia during the U.S.-Saigon invasion, were briefed by top-ranking U.S. Saigon and Cambodian civil and military officials, and returned to Washington to prepare a small package of political dynamite which is this report:

One of the most shocking parts of the report deals with the "ethnic Cambodian" troops from South Vietnam's Mekong Delta. These Khmer Krom, Lower Cambodians, were organized, trained and equipped by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to form the mainstay of the CIA's Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) in South Vietnam. The CIDG are the mercenaries who man Special Forces camps along the South Vietnamese border. They seem to have performed other functions too.

It was publicly known that sometime in late April, the U.S. began airlifting thousands of Khmer Krom troops into the Cambodian capital of Phnom

Penh to help defend the Lon Nol regime. The Senate staffers' inquiries about the precise date when the Khmer Krom had intervened in Cambodia were all rebuffed by U.S. military and civilian officials in Phnom Penh and Saigon.

But an American newsman in Phnom Penh told Lowenstein and Moose "that he had talked to one of the Khmer soldiers who had told him that he had been in Phnom Penh for four to six weeks, which would mean that he had arrived there during the month of March." (Emphasis mine—T.F.)

This is a crucially important admission. Prince Norodom Sihanouk was ousted by the Lon Nol clique on March 18, but the country was supposed to have remained at least theoretically neutral until near the end of April. The new Lon Nol regime made quite a point of the assertion that the "Viet Cong" and "North Vietnamese" were the only foreign troops in Cambodia. Now we find that CIA-trained ethnic Cambodian troops were in the Cambodian capital in March, perhaps during or even before the Lon Nol coup.

This may go a long way toward explaining many of the bewildering events of March in

Phnom Penh, which were so uncharacteristic of the Cambodians and baffled people who had lived and worked with them for years. No one would have thought that Cambodians could have been organized to attack and plunder the embassies of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Almost no one would have thought it possible for the easy-going, tolerant Cambodians to launch real pogroms against the peaceful, Roman Catholic fishermen of Vietnamese descent who live in a separate quarter of Phnom Penh. Yet, these things happened, and Cambodians were seen waving banners inscribed: "Kill the Viet Cong!" If it were to be assumed that the leaders of these activities and the brutal massacres which followed were Khmer Krom, trained CIA killers who have been fighting in South Vietnam for years against the National Liberation Front, then many people would feel that things begin to fall into place.

Even if none of these assumptions are made, however, the fact that the CIA's Khmer Krom troops were in Phnom Penh in March is enough to rule out the possibility that the Lon Nol coup was a home-made affair.

July 7, 1970

S10654

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

EXPERIENCES AND OBSERVATIONS IN CAMBODIA—ARTICLES BY RICHARD DUDMAN

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, Richard Dudman, the chief Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, has written a fascinating series of articles describing his experiences and observations during the 5 weeks he was held in enemy hands in Cambodia. I believe that the articles speak most eloquently for themselves and, without further comment, ask unanimous consent that the six articles which appeared in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
June 22, 1970]

EXPERIENCES AND OBSERVATIONS IN CAMBODIA (By Richard Dudman)

The rice paddies stretched emptily on both sides of us. The countryside was deserted. We were frighteningly alone.

Suddenly a Vietnamese in a sports shirt and carrying a Chinese-made automatic rifle slid from behind a big tree. We stopped our car and scrambled out, hands up.

"Don't shoot," called Mike. "We are journalists."

That was the beginning of my 40 days with the guerrillas. We were prisoners in Cambodia.

It was the start of an extraordinary experience in the new war that America is fighting in Cambodia. Of 23 correspondents who have been captured there by the enemy, we three are the only ones held for any length of time who have been released.

TIMES OF TERROR

In nearly six weeks of hiding in jungle and paddyland there were times of terror when our lives were at stake. There also were much boredom and occasional happy times playing chess with our captors and making a feast of roast dog. We lost weight, but except for some ant bites, minor infections and dysentery, we came out in reasonably good health.

It also was a newspaperman's, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see life on the other side in the chaotic new conflict that has spilled over from the war in Vietnam.

We saw a well-organized movement of Cambodian and Vietnamese guerrillas in a determined war against American tanks and planes. We gradually learned about their hatred of America, their tactics, their relationship with the Cambodian peasants and what kind of people they are, as we traveled with them on foot, bicycle and occasionally by truck from one village to another.

Being the first to be released, we feel an obligation to the 20 correspondents still missing. Although we made no deal for our release, we decided to withhold a few details, such as the exact place of our release, for fear of jeopardizing our colleagues.

TAKEN FOR SPIES

Our captors suspected us of being spies for the Central Intelligence Agency, and we are determined to avoid doing anything that would feed their suspicion of other correspondents they have captured.

It was May 7 when it all started. Just a week earlier President Richard M. Nixon had opened a new dimension of the war in Southeast Asia by announcing that American and South Vietnamese troops were invading Cambodia.

At noon Miss Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor, Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International and I set out from Saigon to see how far the invasion had penetrated.

Driving down Highway 1, the main route from Saigon to Phnom Penh, we were waved on at a checkpoint manned by friendly Cambodian forces. The sentry gave us no warning, but suddenly about a mile west of Svay Rieng, in the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia, we realized we were alone. The rice fields were deserted. No peasant trudged along the highway.

When we reached a blown-up bridge with no warning sign, we knew the worst. We had unwittingly entered the no man's land between Allied forces and the guerrilla troops supporting Norodom Sihanouk, the ousted Cambodian head of state.

Swiftly we turned our International Scout and headed back along the deserted road toward Svay Rieng. We had gone only 100 yards or so when a Vietnamese with an automatic rifle stopped us. In a moment a Cambodian joined him.

With rifles trained on us, they ordered us to empty our pockets on the pavement and then motioned to us to start walking. Hands raised, we clambered down a collapsed bridge span and up the rubble on the other side.

CAPTORS STARTLED

The sudden throb of a helicopter engine alarmed our captors. "Di, di, di (hurry, hurry)"—they ordered us to run. There was no cover except an occasional tree. Some of the trees had been felled and lay across the highway as makeshift roadblocks.

When Beth lagged behind, a man on a bicycle who had joined us gave her a lift. After running about two miles, we were led down a side path. In a thatched-roof hut, Mike and I had to take off our pants and shoes. They were returned to us after a thorough search and we were given cups of tea.

Our first interrogation began a few minutes later in an other hut. A young man wearing a pistol did the questioning. Mike explained in Vietnamese that we were international journalists. He said that he and Beth are Canadians, and I was an American.

An older man with one eye, who had been listening skeptically, took over the questioning. He accused us of being CIA agents. It was the first of many such accusations that would be made against us in the next five weeks.

A young man who spoke French arrived and took a friendlier tone. He said he was a Cambodian student from Phnom Penh and was working the Cambodians and Vietnamese revolutionary forces fighting the Americans and South Vietnamese. He told us we would not be shot in any event. If we were what we said we were, he promised, we would be set free.

But the friendly tone vanished when a gray-haired man with a stern manner arrived. He didn't believe a word of our story. Over and over Mike told him how we had set out from Saigon that morning to see and report what was happening in Cambodia.

After more questions we were taken from the hamlet on bicycles. We pedaled two or three kilometers and then came to a big Czech-made truck, camouflaged with tree branches, it stood at the side of the road in what appeared to be a large village. We were herded into the vehicle with about 10 Cambodian soldiers. One carried a Chinese AK-47 automatic rifle; another, a light machine gun.

Their mood was getting more dangerous. The Cambodians watched us intently but impassively. We offered a smile; no response. The soldier with the automatic rifle kept it pointed at my chest. When I motioned politely to him to point it to one side, he waved it angrily at me and put the gun to my head. He kept it there all the while the truck bounced along jungle roads.

ANGRY CROWDS

The danger mounted at each village an angry-faced crowd of men and women gathered and climbed the tailgate of the truck for a look at the hated Westerners. The French-

speaking Cambodian student got into the spirit of the capture, and his friendly manner disappeared.

Each time the truck slowed, he leaned out to boast about "the three Americans" inside. I suppose the villagers thought we were downed flyers from one of the American planes that had been bombing Cambodia since Sihanouk's overthrow.

At the last stop—at a sizable village—hatred reached a critical level. In twos and threes boys and young men climbed the cab and tailgate of our truck to glare down at us. They shook their fists. Several made obscene gestures. At one point an older man clambered to the cab roof and berated us.

There was a respite when a young Vietnamese soldier arrived and ordered the villagers off the truck. He asked a few questions and then he, too, assured us we would not be shot. He and others tied strips of toweling tightly around our heads, blindfolding us. Someone took me by the hand. Linking hands with Mike and he with Beth, we climbed over the tailgate to the ground.

A slip knot of binder twine went over my right wrist, and the other end was tied to a motorbike. Mike's wrist was tied the same way. "Di, di, di" came the command. Blindfolded, stumbling, fearful of breaking an ankle, we ran as fast as we could to keep up with the bike.

Several hundred villagers had gathered, and the motorbike pulled up through their gantlet. Fists and hands hit and shoved us from both sides. "Beat the Americans to death," the people shouted angrily.

Eventually the voices faded. The motorbike kept going, and we kept running. We must have run half a mile. I could feel under foot the path trailing off into heavy dust or sand. All I could think of were the mass graves I had seen outside Hue for civilians killed there by Communist forces during the Tet invasion of South Vietnam in 1968.

I was sure we were being taken out of town to be shot.

At last the motorbike stopped. We were cut loose. Then our hands were lashed tightly behind our backs.

We were led into a darkened building with a dirt floor. I heard a muttered conversation, then a sharp crack and a moan. It was Mike. I felt him slump to the floor. I thought he had been shot. I knew I was next.

Someone struck me on the back of the head with a wooden club and I dropped to the floor. Mike was unconscious for a few moments, but I was not. I lay there expecting to be kicked and beaten. Instead, I was yanked to a sitting position and ordered to spread my legs.

Our captors barked questions at Mike accusing us of being American spies. Then they were quiet. In the distance I thought I heard a woman's voice shrieking in pain. I was sure Beth, who had been separated from us when Mike and I were tied to the motorbike, was being tortured.

The first kindly voice we heard was that of a man who said he was a lieutenant. He asked if we were frightened. We said we were.

He said, "You are not going to be shot."

In a moment he brought a metal bowl of water and held it to our lips. He loosened Mike's bindings, which were so tight they had impaired his circulation.

Another period of silence—then we were told to get to our feet. We were led to another building, this one with a concrete floor. Beth was already there. She helped the soldiers remove our blindfolds and wrist bindings. I must have imagined those screams; she had not been harmed. She said a Cambodian soldier had made a half-hearted effort to rape her. Quick-witted, she had told him that he (the soldier) was her brother and she his sister and he stopped.

Six long hours had passed since our capture at noon; it was early evening and dark.

STATINT

Hear Sihanouk Lost Thru Own Scheme

STATINTL

BY SAMUEL JAMESON

[Chief of Tokyo Bureau]
(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, July 2—Somewhere in southern France in the month of February Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Lt. Gen. Lon Nol, the premier of the prince's government in Cambodia, met to make their final plans for a diplomatic thrust against North Viet Nam.

Sihanouk, who had been mounting a campaign against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong bases in his country for more than 16 months, already had wangled invitations from Moscow and Peking to visit both capitals. He accepted the invitation to visit Peking on Feb. 2.

The purpose of these visits, as Sihanouk announced publicly, was to bring pressure on both Communist giants to persuade the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to restrict their activities in Cambodia.

Attack Planned

A two-pronged attack was planned:

1. Sihanouk would demand a total withdrawal of all North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops.

2. Cambodians in Phnom Penh would be incited to stage demonstrations against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong embassies to add an air of urgency to Sihanouk's diplomatic move.

"Go and give them a lesson," Sihanouk told Nol.

Thus, the demonstrations that eventually led to Sihanouk's downfall were ordered by Sihanouk himself.

This story was revealed by a source in a position to know. His identity cannot be disclosed immediately because to do so might endanger his life.

U. S. Officials Know

High American officials apparently know of Sihanouk's role in the March 11 demonstrations. A White House official told newsmen in a not-for-attribution briefing on May 16:

"At least part of the revolution against him [Sihanouk] was indirectly engineered by himself in order to give him

bargaining power in Moscow and Peking and to demonstrate that he had a right wing opposition that had to be placated."

A transcript of that briefing was made available here.

The Nol government has insisted since March 18 that Sihanouk was ousted as chief of state because he refused to support "popular manifestations of the people's indignance" against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in Cambodia. That claim appears to be one of the reasons the government has not revealed Sihanouk's role in planning the demonstrations.

Don't Sponsor Riots

Another reason for keeping it secret is that governments do not sponsor demonstrations and burn embassies as a diplomatic tactic.

Sihanouk did not order the embassies sacked, the source close to the prince said. Nor is there any evidence Nol gave such an order. Just who added that finale to the staged performance is not known, but suspicion points to certain anti-Sihanouk members of the National Assembly.

Many diplomats in Phnom Penh who believed at the time that Sihanouk planned the March 11 demonstrations changed their minds after his ouster March 18. They now think Sihanouk's enemies originated the idea, and they insist that Sihanouk must have known that such a move would be dangerous.

Chain of Evidence

A chain of circumstantial evidence indicates that this reporter's source was correct:

1. Despite Sihanouk's dwindling political fortunes, the prince still had many followers, particularly in the police. On the night of March 16 the police attempted to stage a preventive coup on Sihanouk's behalf. Since the police intentionally stepped aside March 11 to permit the demonstrations to occur, they must have known of the plans in advance—and approved of them.

2. The fact that other demonstrations against the Viet-

staged in Svay Rieng Province on March 8 was announced publicly by the official news agency. Somebody among Sihanouk's supporters certainly would have informed the prince, who inevitably would have known as a result that trouble was brewing. Yet Sihanouk took no action.

3. The bulletin of the counter-government, an institution created by Sihanouk to criticize the actions of the official government, ran an editorial on March 12 praising the attacks on the embassies. Significantly, the editorial appeared before Sihanouk sent a cable condemning the Nol government. Obviously, the counter-government, filled entirely with Sihanouk "yes men," must have had some reason to believe Sihanouk would approve of the demonstrations.

March 11 Chosen

Sihanouk had told Nol, who returned to Phnom Penh Feb. 18, only to stage the demonstrations before the prince left for Moscow, the informed source said. That departure date was set later for March 13, and March 11 was chosen for the move.

Insiders insist the selection of the date was made without reference to the past. But it was on March 11, 1964, that the American and British embassies were sacked. And it was on March 11, 1967, that Sihanouk-sponsored demonstrations were staged in Phnom Penh to demand the overthrow of the Cambodian cabinet in office at that time.

That cabinet was headed by Nol, and Nol ultimately was forced to resign on April 29, 1967.

To understand what went wrong with the orchestrated crisis of March, 1970 [which will be revealed in a later article], a look at what had been happening in Cambodia since 1967 is necessary.

Support Dwindles

Unknown to the outside world, Sihanouk's support from Cambodian politicians, businessmen, army and intellectuals had begun to dwindle, even

In an election for the National Assembly held Sept. 11, 1966, Sihanouk for the first time allowed anyone who wished to seek office to run under the banner of his Sangkum political party. There were 415 candidates entered in the race for 92 seats. The results produced an assembly which was restive in the only role Sihanouk had assigned it previously: rubber-stamping Sihanouk decisions.

However, several factors kept this restiveness hidden from most diplomats in Phnom Penh.

One was the state-controlled press. Another was the fear of imprisonment—or even death—among Cambodians who may have wished to speak their minds.

Immense Popularity

The third—and most important cloak under which the decline of Sihanouk's power was hidden—was his immense popularity among the masses in Cambodia.

A man of boundless energy, Sihanouk would drive to exhaustion diplomats who traveled with him in the countryside. He would strip down to his shorts and join villagers digging a canal. He composed music. He produced, directed, and starred in movies. He wrote articles constantly and personally edited three magazines.

He was a superb orator in three languages. He had a keen sense of humor and often laughed at himself—albeit never at jokes others told about him.

He kept his country at peace as war ravaged Cambodia's neighbors. He built schools and roads. He beautified the cities. He made himself felt, seen and heard thruout Cambodia.

King to People

Most of all, he was the king to the common people, even tho he had abdicated the throne in 1955 to take a more active role in politics. He called his people "infants" or "my little Buddhas"—and the people adored it.

The educated elite did not.

Cambodians hit U.S. STATINTL bombing of temples

Daily World Foreign Department

The National United Front of Cambodia accused the United States Wednesday of bombing Cambodia's Oudong temples near Phnom Penh on June 26.

The NUFC statement, issued in Hanoi, characterized as "barbaric" the bombing and strafing by U.S. Air Force planes of the historic temples, which caused widespread destruction of the Cambodian people's national monuments and art treasures. It called the air raid a "grave crime" against the entire Cambodian people.

A second temple attack took place Wednesday near the ancient temple city of Angkor Wat. A Lon Nol government spokesman in Phnom Penh claimed that "Al-
lied" planes had attacked "the Viet Cong" there. Another air attack was made on Phnom Krom, another temple complex 10 miles south of Siem Reap.

U.S. mercenaries

The Nixon Administration meanwhile was sending thousands more of its Khmer Krom ("Lower Cambodian") mercenaries into Phnom Penh to defend the crumbling Lon Nol regime. The Khmer Krom troops, trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to fight in South Vietnam, were reported to be arriving in the Cambodian capital by air and road.

U.S. newsmen spotted a 40-truck convoy, carrying at least 1,000 of the Khmer Krom troops, as it neared Phnom Penh. At least 4,000 CIA-trained Khmer Krom soldiers are already in Cambodia, spread through the ranks of Lon Nol's army, where some reports indicate they occupy all command positions from the lowest unit up.

Saigon puppet troops, who still number at least 40,000 in Cambodia, are still engaged in military operations around the outskirts of Phnom Penh, and near the southern provincial capital

of Takeo. Large-size Saigon puppet armored forces are striving to keep open the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville highway to the country's only port and the western highway to the Thai border.

Capture by guesswork

A Nixon Administration spokesman in San Clemente, Calif., briefing newsmen on the result of the Cambodian invasion, claimed that U.S. troops had seized about 60 percent of the weapons and supplies "Communist forces" had hidden in their alleged Cambodian sanctuaries. He also claimed that 100 percent of the communist rice supply and 70 percent of their ammunition had been taken too.

The official then went on to say that estimates of how much supplies Communists had supposedly hidden in Cambodia were guesses at best. The "percentage" figures, he said, were based on an assumption that the Communists normally keep on hand a 14-month supply of everything. No basis was given for this assumption.

Spoils of war

A reporter for the conservative Far Eastern Economic Review

(Hong Kong) in Cambodia found how some of this "Communist rice supply" was liberated by Saigon puppet troops in the Parrot's Beak (Svay Rieng) region of Cambodia. The Saigon soldiers "were dragging huge bags of rice out of warehouses and were loading them on ARVN (Saigon army) trucks for transshipment back to Vietnam," the reporter stated.

"Were they seizing Viet Cong rice stocks, they were asked. 'No,' they replied. 'This is Prasaut, where the Cambodians killed all the Vietnamese.'"

The reporter noted that the whole area had been pillaged and then was razed to the ground, and commented that "it was a thorough job."

Liberated Scotch

The Saigon troops, though, had rather humble ideas about what to take. U.S. troops, according to American news sources, spent their time liberating such "Communist supplies" as Scotch whiskey and motorscooters. There was no indication of whether or not the Communists had laid in a 14-month supply of Scotch in Cambodia.

STATINTL

CAMBODIA

"Despite the troubles brought on by the surrounding war-like conditions . . . despite also some anxieties of a domestic order . . . my country, Cambodia, is one of the states of the Indochinese peninsula which fares best or, if one prefers it, which has the least problems in this first quarter of 1970."

Prince Norodom Sihanouk wrote those words—now so ironic—in an article for the April edition of *Pacific Community*. They were true when he wrote them. But before the printer's ink was dry, the Prince was deposed, and along with him went the delicate diplomatic and political balance which had so successfully kept Cambodia out of the Vietnam holocaust.

Once those restraints were gone, how quickly the Cambodian situation deteriorated! Within weeks all the beasts were out of their cages. The government encouraged ancient racial hatreds, and shortly, rafts of bloated corpses were floating down the Mekong River. Security in the border regions vanished once the fragile truce with the Viet Cong was broken. The first quarter of 1970 ended with burning villages, roads clogged with refugees, and the full-scale destruction of invading South Vietnamese and American armor sending up rooster tails of dust across the paddies and dry tapioca fields of Cambodia.

In Phnompenh, in the weeks immediately following the coup, there was a pathetic air of unreality and naïveté; of a lovely, peaceful country about to plunge itself into war. Old French tanks stood in the streets, their crews asleep underneath them in the sticky afternoons of the Southeast Asian hot season. Students, clutching their belongings in cardboard suitcases and bundles done up with bits of string, paraded in the streets on their way to join the army. They laughed and waved and sang brave songs as they climbed onto the trucks. It was 1914. It was "We don't want to lose you/But we think you ought to go," and "We won't be back till it's over over there."

It was a time of uncertainty, for no one knew if Sihanouk would soon return, and those who plotted against him were jittery and nervous. Two National Assemblymen, who had gone to the town of Kompongcham on the Mekong to explain to the people why the God King was gone, were torn limb from limb by an angry mob. It was reported that Prime Minister Lon Nol's own brother had also been killed, his liver torn from his body and cooked and eaten on the street in the time-honored Cambodian manner.

And on the bridge leading into Phnompenh across the Tonle Sap another angry crowd had been turned back with considerable loss of life by a fusillade from the government troops sent out to meet them. The government announced a figure for the number of people killed, but the major who opened fire confided that he had killed a lot more than that, and he drove us out to the bridge at night to show us the blood stains in the road. Coming back across the bridge he showed us where other victims had been tied up in rice sacks and thrown into the water. Omar and the Major took us out to see what Omar said were K.K.K. troops drilling in the night with brand-new Soviet-designed AK-47 automatic rifles. The Major said they were part of a shipment destined for the Viet Cong which the Cambodian army had siphoned off for their own use. We drove in the Major's Peugeot while a Land Rover full of troops followed at a discreet distance. Omar wore his sport shirt with one button undone, to allow easy access to a .45 automatic under his arm, which he pulled out to impress us. He wondered if we could get him a lightweight .38, the kind the CIA men wear. But what he really wanted was for us to get him twenty "talky-walkies" from Hong Kong.

Our nighttime tour of the defenses of Phnompenh moved on to the Major's favorite bar. There wasn't anybody else there, so the bar girls made a big fuss over the Major while Omar sat with his back to the wall making other victims had been tied up in a big thing out of watching the doors. Next we ended up in Omar's favorite nightclub; this time the met the Major in a French sidewalk boys in the Land Rover were invited in for a drink. Omar, .45 bulging in his armpit and all, grabbed the mike and crooned while the band accompanied him and the Cambodian troops shuffled about the dance floor in their baggy fatigues. "Look at those Cambodian pigs dancing with their hats on," a chic Vietnamese bar girl muttered.

With a colleague, Burton Pines, I came true: the schoolboys had locked the headmaster out and they were playing with guns; funny, except that the guns were real, and all the time one knew this wasn't an isolated banana republic rebellion. Those who knew something about real war—the North Vietnamese and, as it turned out, the South Vietnamese and the Americans too—would soon come in and take the game away from them.

Khmer empire. The K.K.K. troops were trained by the U. S. Special Forces as mobile strike forces in Viet-

Imperialism's Fifth Column

SEVERAL areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America have been the scene of reactionary plots in the first half of 1970. One of them, in Cambodia, culminated in a coup d'état. Information filtering into the press suggests that all the plots can be traced to the US Central Intelligence Agency headquarters at Langley.

Of course, the State Department consistently denies American complicity, and CIA guilt cannot always be pinpointed. In fact, it may well be that not all these conspiracies were directly instigated and organised by imperialist secret services—in some cases they may have joined at a later stage. But this much is certain: everywhere the cloak-and-dagger operators have been at work.

Supporting Israeli aggression

The first three months of 1970 saw plots in Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon and Cyprus. Some of the details have come to light. The Lebanese Interior Minister, for instance, announced that US Intelligence had a hand in provoking armed clashes between the ultra-Right Kataeb party and the Palestinian commandos. The Lebanese army and security forces were involved in the fighting. The Sudanese press points to the link between the CIA and the latest unsuccessful coup of the Ansar religious sect and the Al-Umma party, which speaks for Sudan's capitalist and landed interests. In Cyprus, the pro-fascist National Front which, the press says, operates with the encouragement of the Greek and US secret services, engineered an attempt on the life of President Makarios. The Iraqi authorities arrested a group of army officers and civilians charged with preparing a coup d'état. The press says they had the assistance of CIA and Zionist agents.

Each of these attempted coups had its own distinctive features. But all of them had one and the same political aim—to install pro-imperialist regimes and thereby strengthen the imperialist positions in the Middle East and, more specifically, in the Eastern Mediterranean.

That aim, doubtlessly, follows from the alignment of forces in this strategic area. The imperialists banked on the Israeli *Blitzkrieg*. They thought it would write *finis* to the progressive regimes in the United Arab Republic and Syria. That hope did not materialise. Nor have Israel's subsequent aggressive actions produced the desired results. They have not weakened the progressive regimes of these two countries. On the contrary, both in the UAR and Syria the government has been strengthened by the patriotism of the people, the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and the support of the world Communist, workers' and national liberation movements.

While giving the Israeli aggressors every assistance—modern armaments, generous loans—the US and other imperialists are relying more and more on their espionage and subversion machine. The events in Iraq, Sudan and Lebanon show that they are using it to hamper the growing unity of the Arab states in the fight to liquidate the consequences of the Israeli aggression. The idea, obviously, is to generate more friction, distrust and antagonism. That was the purpose of the CIA in Lebanon: armed conflicts were to provoke a major political crisis that would isolate the country from the progressive Arab states, place it under a police regime and impede, if not halt altogether, Palestinian commando action.

The aim was very much the same in Iraq and Sudan. But the imperialists were also out to undermine the rear areas of the Arab states directly confronting Israel. Coups in Baghdad and Khartoum would greatly complicate the UAR's and Syria's strategic and political position. To a certain extent the same aim was pursued in the Nicosia plot. There have been many press reports that the imperialists are anxious to overthrow the Makarios government and turn it into a NATO war base spearheaded against the Arab states and serving the Israeli aggressor.

Behind the Cambodian Coup

Thousands of kilometers separate Phnom Penh from Khartoum and Beirut, but in Cambodia too, the aim was to support the aggressive forces. It was to be achieved by use of the CIA technique.

Bogged down in Vietnam, US imperialism has long been encroaching on Cambodia's independence and sovereignty, trying to bring it under its influence and dragoon it into its Indochina gamble. One pressure technique was constant harassment by US forces operating from neighbouring South Vietnam. They bombed and shelled Cambodian border regions and several times CIA agents tried to overthrow Prince Sihanouk and set up a reactionary regime that would abandon the country's traditional neutrality and its solidarity with the Vietnamese in their fight to repel the aggressor.

With the US army facing increasing difficulties in Vietnam, the Pentagon decided to step up its activities in Cambodia. The plan, according to press reports, was to use Cambodian territory for operations against the South Vietnam National Liberation Front in what was conceived as a gigantic pincer manoeuvre. Apparently, the US military command began to press for action in Cambodia when it found that the Vietnamisation plan was not working out the way it had expected. And apparently Sihanouk's diplomatic tour abroad was chosen as the opportune moment for the CIA's "quiet Americans" to put through the plan.

Power in Phnom Penh is now in the hands of men who have joined forces with the imperialists to halt the country's progressive development and suppress the Indochina liberation movement. The first steps in that direction were made immediately after the coup. General Lon Nol's conservative regime has agreed to co-operate with the US and accept military "aid" from it. With the consent and approval of that regime, Saigon forces, supported by American aircraft, have invaded Cambodia in an attempt to outflank the NLF forces and suppress popular support for Prince Sihanouk, whose followers are fighting to overthrow the conservative government and keep Cambodia a peaceful and neutral state.

The world was shocked by the news of America's outright intervention in Cambodia where, as in South Vietnam and Laos, US troops are applying scorched earth tactics against the peaceful population. This fresh aggression by Washington brings out even more saliently the link between the coup d'état in Phnom Penh and imperialism's far-reaching neo-colonialist plans in South east Asia. To all practical purposes, Cambodia is being turned into a "third Vietnam", the second being Laos, where more than 12,000 American military "advisors" are involved in the war against the patriotic forces.

It can be safely said that neither the Saigon puppets nor the Laos and Cambodian reactionaries provide America with anything like a firm support base for its reactionary war in Indochina. And certainly they cannot fight that war with their own armies, even if given the latest American weapons. Consequently, the neo-colonialists will have to rely mainly on their own troops and extend their operations to the whole of Indochina. But the experience of heroic Vietnam has shown that half a million interventionist troops, armed to the teeth, cannot impose imperialism's will on a people determined to uphold its independence, sovereignty and freedom; a people, moreover, that enjoys wide international support.

New tactical elements

Has anything substantially new been added to the technology of imperialist plots and their political orientation, compared with the past? The answer is not enough information—the bulk of it, naturally, is kept secret—for a categorical affirmative answer. We can only judge by the tip of the imperialist subversion ice-

Three Come Back

"It was an experience we'll never forget," said Richard Dudman, "and it was a journalistic opportunity like nothing we've ever had before." The veteran correspondent for the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* grinned, then added: "Now that it's over we can say that." Elizabeth Pond of the *Christian Science Monitor* expressed a universal sentiment: "I hope this proves to be a precedent for the treatment of other journalists who may now be in Cambodia."

Dudman, Miss Pond and Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service were back in Saigon after 5½ weeks in the hands of soldiers who identified themselves as members of the "pro-Sihanouk Cambodian United National Front." In a carefully worded joint statement they reported that their only rough treatment occurred on the day of their capture, along Highway One about two miles west of Svay Rieng in the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia.

Suspected of being CIA agents, they were taken at gunpoint in a truck to several Cambodian villages and displayed as American captives. At their last stop they were blindfolded and marched through a gauntlet of jeering villagers. The two men next were tied behind a motorbike and forced to run half a mile, blindfolds still on. Then they were knocked to the ground with blows on the head and left in a darkened room with their hands tied behind them.

In Ten Homes. But once their credentials as correspondents were established, they were treated with "kindness and consideration" as they traveled about 200 miles, staying in ten different village homes. At one point they were asked to tape-record, apparently for the Liberation Radio or Hanoi, statements about their experiences, "but none that conflicted with our own views."

Eventually, the trio were honored guests at a meeting of 1,000 villagers at which speakers "expressed the gratitude of the Cambodian people toward those Americans who oppose aggression by the Nixon Administration in Indochina." They were also given an in-

terview with a military commander of the Cambodian United National Front. The joint statement did not provide details of the interview. Obviously, the three correspondents were holding back some facts for first-person stories. But they did report asking for information on the 20 other newsmen still missing in Cambodia. They got no reply.

THE MEDIA

Charles Hyatt

Dudman, Pond and Morrow in Saigon: Accredited as 'good people'

Forty Days

The telephone rang late one night last week in the offices of the Reuters bureau in Saigon. It was The Christian Science Monitor's foreign-news desk in Boston calling to ask the Reuters night man to expedite transmission of some upcoming news stories by the paper's correspondent, Elizabeth Pond. And that was how the Saigon press corps discovered that Miss Pond, together with Richard Dudman, Washington bureau chief of The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and Mike Morrow of Dispatch News Service International had returned safely from Cambodia 40 days after they were captured by enemy troops near the town of Svay Rieng.

The three—the first captured correspondents to return from the Cambodian war zone where eighteen other newsmen have vanished—were thin but in good health and high spirits after their adventure. They were determined to keep many of the details of their experiences behind enemy lines a secret, at least until they could write their own stories about the ordeal. But what they did reveal still made a fascinating tale.

Harrowing: Seized by two enemy soldiers near a bombed-out bridge on Route 1, the hazardous road from Saigon to Phnom Penh, the three reporters were taken in a truck through several villages and displayed as American prisoners of war. At first, their captors believed they were U.S. Government officials or CIA agents, and the three had to endure a harrowing day. In one town, they were taken from the truck, blindfolded and marched through a gauntlet of jeering Cambodian villagers. Then, Dudman said, he and Morrow were "tied to a motorbike, forced to run a half a mile while still blindfolded, knocked to the ground with a blow on the head, and left in a darkened room."

The harsh treatment abruptly ceased, however, after an enemy officer examined the three reporters. From that point on, they were treated as "good people" and friends by their captors. Nevertheless, for their own safety

the correspondents traveled some 200 miles and stayed in the homes of ten different Cambodian villagers during less than six weeks behind enemy lines. And their request to visit areas bombed by allied planes to estimate civilian casualties was turned down by an enemy officer who said it would be too dangerous for them to do so.

On their last day in captivity, the three journalists were given a sort of farewell party. "[We] left the liberated zone of Cambodia as honored guests at a meeting of 1,000 villagers," Dudman wrote. "Speakers expressed the gratitude of the Cambodian people toward those American people who oppose aggression by the Nixon Administration in Indochina. They asked [us] to write the truth about the situation in the Front-held areas..."

Anh Ba: Dudman's allusion to the "Front" and his stilted prose were apparently no accidents. Almost certainly in order to make things easier for other correspondents still held in Cambodia, all three reporters were careful to specify that they had been captured by the "Cambodian United National Front." (North Vietnamese and Viet Cong officials steadfastly deny they have any troops in the area, contending that only Cambodians are fighting against Premier Lon Nol's government.)

"I am convinced that the Front exists," said Miss Pond, "although what it consists of I don't know, because of our limited exposure." But Morrow, who speaks Vietnamese, recalls in one of a series of reports published by Dispatch News this week that the Vietnamese officer in charge of the three journalists, Anh Ba, "was nearly 6 feet [and] spoke Vietnamese with a pure northern dialect."

Morrow added that Anh Ba "was under orders to protect us at all costs—even his own life." And such concern over the safety of Morrow and his colleagues, even if it was motivated at least as much by propaganda as by humane considerations, held out hope that the newsmen still missing in Cambodia might also turn up alive and well. But despite their safe return and the exclusive stories

they were able to publish this week, none of the three journalists released last week would choose to tour Cambodia again in quite the same way. "What normal person would want to go wandering about in Cambodia, anyway?" asks Morrow. "You're likely to get shot at."

27 JUNE 1970

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0004002100

Mass actions planned in Cleveland

By Carl Davidson
Guardian Staff Correspondent

After a tumultuous, three-day meeting here June 19-21, the "National Emergency Conference against the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam War"—attended by 1500 antiwar activists—set the time and place for the next series of mass mobilizations against the Indochina war.

The first round will be local actions on August 6-9, the days commemorating the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Next will be support actions for the Chicano Moratorium's mass mobilization of the Chicano people against the war Aug. 29 in Los Angeles. Finally, there will be a day of nationally coordinated demonstrations Oct. 31 in major urban and regional centers across the country.

The conference differed from many in the past by the participation of a number of trade union officials, including officers from Meatcutters, Teamster and UE locals officially representing their membership. About 100 of those attending the conference registered as members of trade unions.

The meeting signified a deepening split in the antiwar movement. There were no representatives from the New Mobilization Committee—the major antiwar coalition. Nor any from the Communist party, Women's Strike for Peace or traditional antiwar groups. All of the organized political tendencies present, except the Progressive Labor party, had their roots in the Trotskyist movement.

The New Mobe is holding a conference of its own next week. But the presence of a large number of independent antiwar activists at the Cleveland meeting signified that the SWP's emphasis on mass mobilizations on the single issue of the war may prevail over the Mobe's as yet ambivalence on this question. In addition, there is a definite tendency within the New Mobe to place a greater emphasis on the tactic of civil disobedience than on the traditional mass marches. While most in the antiwar movement support the New Mobe's multi-issue approach of supporting struggles against racism and repression, this tactical confusion has helped lead to the current situation.

The tone of last week's sessions—held at Cuyahoga County Community College near downtown Cleveland—was set the first evening in a heated debate over whether Progressive Labor party and SDS Worker-Student Alliance should be represented among the opening speakers.

"Sellout"

When one of those speakers, John T. Williams, vice president of Teamster Local 208 in Los Angeles and a leader of a recent wildcat strike, tried—paradoxically and incorrectly—to compare U.S. aggression in Vietnam to a "brazen unauthorized wildcat strike," the house was brought down by a chorus of boos and chants of "sellout."

Williams tried to get his foot out of his mouth by explaining he wasn't against wildcats and that he was only taking the charges the government had thrown at him and thrown them back. It didn't work. Applauding when he called for a general political strike by the working class to end the war, did he get a prolonged round of applause and cheers.

Cleveland

The next morning, following votes on a series of procedural motions during the agenda debate, the voting power behind the different political tendencies present became clear and remained practically unchanged throughout the conference. The Socialist Workers party and Young Socialist Alliance held together a bloc of about 1000 votes, most of which were independent antiwar activists rather than members of either organization. PL-SDS had a bloc of about 350; the Worker's League, 80; and the Spartacus League and Labor Committees had about 20 each.

Because of the large number of people in the main meeting, along with frequent parliamentary hassles, some of the more interesting discussions and arguments occurred in small clusters of 10 or 20 scattered around the campus.

Student-worker discussion

One group of about eight students were talking with three rank-and-file Teamster truck driver and wildcat leader; and Sam Pollock, president of the Meatcutters District 427 in Cleveland. "My problem," said Pollock, "is that within my Local I'm considered a liberal. Then I come here and everyone thinks I'm a reactionary sellout." Williams added, "I came here for one purpose—to expose the fallacy that workers are supposed to benefit from this war."

One of the students offered that while he could see that all workers weren't like the "hardhats" in New York, they had to learn that most students weren't Yippies and Weathermen. Valdez suggested that they were both "in the middle of the road," which made some of the students uncomfortable.

Then he said, "You have to understand. A worker is like a horse. If you want to put a bit on him and ride him, you don't charge at him, but ease up on him and slip it on gently." The students politely grimaced and the session quietly broke up.

In another group, a Student Mobilization Committee staffer from Detroit was being soundly criticized for not rallying support for local struggles of black students and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers. "The best way to help them is to build the antiwar movement," was the answer. In several places, PL-SDS people were soundly criticized for calling the NLF leadership "revisionist sellouts" and calling Cambodia's Norodom Sihanouk a "CIA agent."

More "Maoist" than Mao

"That must make Mao a CIA agent too," someone said. "No, we just think Mao is making an opportunist mistake by supporting him," said the "Maoist" PL member. "You know, they have liberal politicians in Vietnam just like we have here and we have to oppose them."

Meanwhile, inside the conference hall, the first major political fight was shaping up. The issue centered on the political character of a demonstration planned for that evening outside a hotel where Vice President Spiro Agnew was speaking at a Republican fundraising dinner.

The SWP took the position that the action should be centered on the single demand for the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Indochina. PL-SDS, on the other hand, said since the

SOUPHANOUVONG: "NIXON'S GANGSTER LOGIC"

STATINTL

Civil war has raged for 20 years in Laos, situated west of Vietnam, north of Cambodia, east of Thailand, south of China. Progressive forces, led by prince Souphanouvong, chairman of the central committee of the Laotian Patriotic Front, now occupy virtually two-thirds of the country. The remaining third, along the western border with Thailand, is in the hands of a coalition "neutralist" and rightist regime supported by the U.S. (more than \$50 million a year) which sits in Vientiane, the administrative capital.

In the last months, the Laotian Patriotic Front has registered victory after throughout Laos. On June 9, patriotic forces captured the strategic town of Savane. In recent weeks, the liberation army has gone on the offensive in dozens of areas, including battles with troops from Thailand sent into Laos by the corrupt Bangkok military government to bolster the shaky Vientiane regime.

During his recent swing through Southeast Asia Guardian staff correspondent Wilfred Burchett submitted four questions to prince Souphanouvong. Following are his answers, received last week.

What is the present military situation in Laos? The Western press mentions that in capturing towns like Attapeu and Savane, the Pathet Lao forces have for the first time violated the 1962 cease-fire line. What is your comment?

The present military situation in Laos shows that on the one hand the American escalation of "special war" has been redoubled and on the other that the deeper they plunge in such escalation the greater will be the defeat of the U.S. and its puppets. From a strategic viewpoint they were severely defeated in the Plain of Jars. Indeed, this was the first serious defeat in Laos for President Nixon's theory of using puppet troops with maximum American firepower.

Despite such escalation the U.S. and puppet forces were not able to change the situation in their favor. On the contrary, they have been driven onto the defensive from a military point of view and politically they are more isolated than ever. As for the Laotian patriotic forces they have retained and constantly developed their position of active initiative. After having kicked the enemy out of the Plain of Jars and completely recaptured the whole area, the patriotic forces directed their attack against the hideout of the "special forces" at Sam Thong-Long Cheng. They liberated Attapeu and other places near the Bolovens plateau. That is to say they have punished the enemy in the jumping off points and bases for their criminal attacks.

Right from the start the Laotian patriotic forces have scrupulously respected the letter of the 1962 Geneva agreements. But as the U.S. and puppet forces have

undertaken a most criminal war of aggression against the Laotian people, our armed forces have been forced to fight back, making use of their sacred rights of self defense.

The patriotic forces must expel the enemy from those areas which it has illegally occupied, punish them in the bases from which they launched their attacks and perpetrated their crimes. In so doing we are safeguarding the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos and effectively defending the 1962 Geneva agreements. It is in basing ourselves on these agreements and on the concrete reality of the present situation in Laos and our desire for peace that we have put forward our five-point proposal for a political settlement of the Laotian problem (Guardian, April 11, 1970). Although there has been no responsible reply from the other side, we will nonetheless persevere in seeking a political solution based on our five points.

The U.S. puppet forces have never respected their commitments. Hardly were the 1962 agreements signed, than they launched an attack on the zones controlled by the patriotic forces, at the same time launching terrorist "pacification" operations throughout

the rest of the country. In fact they have completely liquidated what the Western press refers to as the 1962 "cease fire line." Just as they have torn up the whole 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

Those who sow the wind reap the whirlwind. If they don't want to reap another whirlwind the Americans and their valets in Vientiane, Bangkok and Saigon had better not sow any more wind. If they charge ahead, heads down, in new criminal adventures against the Laotian people they will have to bear the entire responsibility for the disastrous consequences.

The official explanation for the American bombings of Laos and the presence of U.S. troops there is the existence of a Ho Chi Minh trail and the presence of North Vietnamese troops. What is the extent of U.S. and Thailand troops in Laos and how serious are the U.S. bombings?

With a view to turning Laos into a neo-colony, the Americans have never ceased their interference and aggression against Laos nor their trampling underfoot its sovereignty, its independence and neutrality and their violation of the 1962 Geneva agreements. They have introduced thousands of U.S. advisors, CIA personnel

continued

and U.S. "special forces" to carry out "special war" and to take part in attacks against those regions controlled by the Pathet Lao and in terrorist raids against the population.

The U.S. air force has bombed and machine-gunned our Laotian territory for six years on end, sowing death and destruction over the whole country and using their air power as tactical support for puppet troops in their attacks into the regions held by our side. It is clear that without air support the puppet troops would be incapable of carrying out any actions of any importance. But U.S. air superiority has in no way weakened the combativity of the patriotic forces of the Laotian people. On the contrary, this has brought about well deserved return blows resulting in defeat for the aggressors.

The U.S. has not only used Thailand as a springboard for its aggression against Laos, as a logistic base for its "special war" and as a base for aerial bombardments of Laos, it has also introduced Thai combat units in support of the puppet troops. In giving a hand to the Americans and in pursuing at the same time their own expansionist aims in Laos, the reactionary authorities in Bangkok are guilty of complicity with the American aggressors.

Ever since Nixon came into power he has intensified the war of aggression against Laos. For example, by the attack against the Xieng Khouang region in the Plain of Jars; the intensification of air attacks at the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970 to a degree and ferocity never before known, including B-52 raids in south and north Laos. Still more serious, the Americans have introduced thousands of Thai infantry and artillery troops and Saigon puppet commander troops to take part in combat operations. This state of affairs has doubled the anxiety of certain political circles in the United States and among the U.S. people, who feel that one escalation will lead to another and that Laos will become a second Vietnam.

Nixon has advanced all sorts of slanderous arguments and fallacious pretexts to justify U.S. aggression against Laos. In using such pretexts as the "presence and aggression by North Vietnam troops" while it is precisely Vietnam that is the victim of U.S. aggression, Nixon is only reviving old slanders exposed long ago and condemned by public opinion. Nixon has even advanced "protection of American lives in South Vietnam" to justify the bombing and military activities in Laos. He used the same argument to invade Cambodia with over 100,000 U.S. and Saigon troops. This is gangster logic, making mockery of the rights of peoples and elementary rules governing relations between nations.

It is not a question of discussing the various pretexts advanced by the U.S. aggressors. The real question is that this "international gendarme" has absolutely no right to threaten with destruction any people in any country at all.

The U.S. has no right to carry out its criminal aggression against Laos, a country situated half way around the globe from the U.S. If the U.S. halts its air attacks and all other acts of military escalation and ends its interference and aggression against Laos to enable the Laotian people to settle their own affairs, the situation in Laos would immediately return to normal. All Laotian problems would be satisfactorily solved and lives and dollars of the American people would cease to be uselessly squandered in Laos. This is the true way to safeguard American lives as well as the dignity and authentic interests of the United States.

How do you evaluate the recent Summit conference in which you recently took part with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of the DRV, Nguyen Huu Tho of the PRG and Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodian head of state?

While the U.S. imperialists intensified and expanded the war of aggression against Laos, the Summit conference of the peoples of Indochina was a scathing

reply by the peoples of Indochina to these adventurous activities by the United States. It was a severe blow to the U.S. and "Indochinese fight Indochinese." The success of the conference highlighted new progress in the anti-U.S. struggle for the national salvation of the three countries of Indochina and marked an important contribution to the struggle for national independence and peace in Southeast Asia and in the world in general. That is why it was widely acclaimed and warmly supported by a very large section of international public opinion. The joint declaration of the conference (Guardian, May 30, 1970) is one of unity and struggle against the common enemy and will serve to reinforce and extend the relations of support, mutual help and long term cooperation between the peoples of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

The program will still further and intensify the coordination and unity of efforts deployed by the three countries in their fight against U.S. imperialist aggression. It will lead the struggle of the Lao, Khmer and Vietnamese people to new heights and will lead to complete victory over U.S. interference and aggression, transforming Indochina into an authentic area of independence and peace.

How do you see developments and the final results of the second war in Indochina?

In sending their troops to commit direct aggression against Cambodia, the U.S. imperialists have thus extended their war of aggression to the whole Indochina

In sending their troops to commit direct aggression against Cambodia, the U.S. imperialists have thus extended their war of aggression to the whole Indochina peninsula. In doing this the Nixon administration has thrown out an excellent challenge to the 50 million people of Indochina as well as to all thinking people in the United States and the world in general. This is nothing but a most adventurous act committed at a moment when American troops are in a defensive, passive posture. A mortal blow has been dealt to the "Vietnamization" concept in South Vietnam. The American forces have got themselves further bogged down in Cambodia. The development of this large-scale attack with over 100,000 GIs and South Vietnamese puppet troops proves the U.S. has not attained its strategic objectives there.

The development of the situation in Cambodia, after the U.S.-directed overthrow of the Cambodian head of state Norodom Sihanouk has also not turned out as the Americans expected. Responding to the five-point declaration of prince Sihanouk (Guardian, April 11, 1970), the political program of the National United Front (Guardian, June 20, 1970) and the manifesto of the Royal Government of National Union, the Cambodian people's struggle has developed very rapidly on a national level, taking over vast areas of the countryside including many towns and dealing heavy blows at the U.S.-Saigon forces, shaking to its very foundations the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime recently installed in Phnom Penh.

In extending the war of aggression to the whole of Indochina the Americans have got further bogged down and are in a critical impasse. This military adventure of the Nixon administration has only caused further indignation and swelled the movement of opposition to the war within the U.S. itself. From Congress to the university, from the lawmakers to GIs in numerous military bases in the U.S., from towns in the East to those in the West, the struggle of the American people has developed in increasingly powerful waves of protest. The Nixon administration is attacked on two sides—bogged down in Indochina and in the U.S. itself.

The lesson of defeat in Indochina was once the monopoly of the French followed by the Johnson administration. It will be the same for the Nixon administration which plows into the same rut.

Continued

U.S. imperialism has never experienced such a defeat, such an embarrassment, such difficulties and isolation as is the case today. The present situation is more than ever favorable for the struggles of the three peoples of Indochina against U.S. imperialism and for their national salvation. In the light of the joint declaration of the Summit Conference of the peoples of Indochina, the 50 million Cambodian, Laotian and Vietnamese peoples, fortified by the powerful support of people throughout the world, will further consolidate the active and victorious position already acquired and will step up their struggle to win final and complete victory.

KANSAS CITY, MO.
STAR JUN 26 1970

E - 325,351
S - 396,682

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Dealing With Reds Fatal for Sihanouk

By Robert Pearman
(National-World Editor of The Star)

Phnom Penh—If the Lon Nol government—the “Government of Salvation”—should fall tomorrow it will have outlived by more than a month its predicted life span.

For late in April along embassy row in the Cambodian capital there was none who would go so far as to predict the “salvation government” would have another month in power.

“The Viet Cong will be in Phnom Penh in six days,” a smiling European diplomat said, making it obvious that he found the prospect not at all displeasing.

In May they were saying the military situation was even more hopeless and as the Cambodians gave up large areas of their country to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese they began to refer to Lon Nol as the “mayor of Phnom Penh.”

But the monsoons of April have turned into the daily torrents of June and the Viet Cong are not in Phnom Penh and the Lon Nol government, though battered militarily and economically, stands.

For the Cambodians the military situation is probably worse than it was a month ago mostly because the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, chased out of the border sanctuaries, have planted new base areas deep in Cambodia. They now control nearly one-half the country and have gone on the attack at scattered points even in the “safe” western provinces.

Otherwise things look brighter for the three strong men in the Palace of Government:

- The regime is still united, and there is no significant opposition among the Khmer people.

- The accommodation with the South Vietnamese is complete. South Vietnamese forces will continue to operate in Cambodia, able to respond quickly in emergency situations. The Thais promise 20,000 troops of Khmer blood and have air support to give. Weapons have been forthcoming from several sources including the United States.

- The Cambodian army, 35,000 strong when Sihanouk went out on March 18, is today about 150,000. The new forces are green, untrained, underequipped. But they are willing to fight and the regulars have gained battle experience and have performed much better than anyone expected.

- Most significant, Lon Nol and company are still in control in Phnom Penh and Norodom Sihanouk has been reduced to a kind of floating guest artist, performing alternately on Radio Peking, Radio Hanoi and the Viet Cong Liberation Radio. As it was with Sukarno in Indonesia, time is on the side of the man holding the power, not on the side of the one who wants to gain it back.

THE STORY OF THE CHECKMATE of the white king, Norodom Sihanouk, a virtual god-leader, possessor of total powers, charisma and the love of his people, is a complex story.

For nearly three decades, from 1941, when he was proclaimed king as an 18-year-old school boy, until March 18, 1970, Sihanouk ruled Cambodia's 7-million people.

For the last 10 years as chief of state—he preferred to leave the only symbols of monarchy in the hands of his aging mother—he had guided the government and foreign policy singly.

There developed three problems:

- Corruption festered and grew, alienating the intellectuals.

- The incursions of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese grew. The Vietnamese for many months used Cambodian territory as unobtrusively as possible. But in the last year they radically changed their policy. They planted themselves, built homes, took over border areas.

- Cambodia had grave economic problems. Last December Sirik Matak, now the No. 2 man in the regime, overrode Sihanouk's wishes and pushed through economic reforms that devalued the riel, liberalized trade and banking and put Cambodia back into the international banking institutions from which she had withdrawn.

So Norodom Sihanouk's problems did not suddenly occur one morning in March—nor, as fantasy has it, of some CIA plot—they had been long abuilding.

ON JANUARY 6 SIHANOUK LEFT Phnom Penh for France to undergo treatment at a clinic.

Early in February seven cases of medical supplies for the Viet Cong were seized at Phnom Penh airport. They had been addressed to Oum Mannorine, minister for surface defense, brother-in-law of Sihanouk. Trinh Hoanh, now the minister of information, called for an investigation in the National Assembly.

On March 8 there were demonstrations in the eastern provinces against the presence of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. On March 11 there were mass demonstrations in Phnom Penh and the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong embassies were sacked.

There is some indication that these early demonstrations were Sihanouk sponsored. The rationale is that Sihanouk, ready to go to Moscow and Peking to ask the Chinese and Russians to persuade North Vietnam to step easier in Cambodia, wanted to have something to bargain with. What better arguments would there be than mass demonstrations?

Two facts support the theory. The Viet Cong embassy was coolly entered and sacked by 45 soldiers in civilian clothing. And it is hard to imagine that 10,000 students and civil servants would have spontaneously taken to the streets against an absolute despot unless they had been given the green light.

The next day, whether he had organized the demonstrations or not, there came some typical Sihanouk rhetoric from Paris in a telegram to the Queen Mother denouncing the demonstrations.

A second theory is that Sihanouk in Paris obtained from the French assurances of financial support that would ease his economic pressures at home. This theory makes Lon Nol and Matak the villains. When they learned that Sihanouk had won his money game, and that the sword they had held over him for months might be removed, they plotted a kind of quasi-legal coup; this theory has it.

Lon Nol and Sirik Matak offered to meet Sihanouk in Moscow. He told them not to come. He was planning to return to Phnom Penh on March 18 and the government prepared to receive him.

Captors Invite Three Journalists To Ho Chi Minh Birthday Party

By Michael Morrow
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Second of a series

SINGAPORE—May 19 was an awesome date in Indochina this year because it marked the birthday of Buddha and also that of "Bac Ho" (Uncle Ho). For Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Elizabeth Pond of The Christian Science Monitor and myself it brought the first unqualified assurance we would not be killed.

Anh Hai (Eldest Brother), the soldier in charge, had asked us to join him for a cup of tea.

"You know there is nothing to be sad about," he said. "Once we take a person prisoner we never kill him. War is not to kill people but to win a cause. We believe bad people are just misled. Bad Americans just don't understand.

"We don't like to kill Americans, not even American soldiers. We know they don't understand our situation. Everyone can be educated. When we capture someone, that is the end of our difference with him."

After our arrest by guerrilla troops on Highway One in eastern Cambodia on May 7, we had been treated fairly. The one exception was harsh abuse at the hands of some villagers and low-ranking soldiers on the first day. This was brought to an end quickly by army officers.

Haunting Fears

Still there was the haunting fear that suspicions we were spies would win out over our claims to being journalists. We stayed in homes and were treated more like guests than prisoners, but those in charge kept aloof, so we were isolated from them. Loneliness brought on fear.

The commander who told us the first night of captivity that we would be kept in safe custody was honest and honest. But three interrogations during the first

week and a half made me skeptical that the commander was still involved in the case. I began to have doubts that we could convince them we were independent-minded journalists, free of strings to the U.S. effort in Vietnam and Cambodia.

Our interrogators were conspiratorial and sinister men—or at least led us to believe they were—quite unlike the commander. Their main concern seemed to be the U.S. government's attitude toward us.

Why had the "CIA" radio referred to us as "nhân viên Mỹ" (American personnel)?

Why were the Americans broadcasting from helicopters about us, asking the people to bring us or any word to them? If we were really so independent and critical as we said we were, why was the American government paying so much attention to us?

I did not know if the American government was doing these things. I could imagine it was doing much more. I suspected it would not help our cause.

The depths of my depression came May 14, two weeks after capture, when a thin, middle-aged man in a gray-brown uniform interrogated us for the second time. His North Vietnamese accent, with its harsh "z" and "v" sounds, accentuated the steeliness of his manner.

"We are considering you as American personnel," he said.

"What does that mean?" I asked.

"You're U.S. government personnel. We're not sure yet whether you are CIA, military or refugee, but we are treating you as American personnel. I took his visit to mean we were now looked upon as prisoners of war, possibly classified as spies.

Our Imagination

After dark each evening we went outside to bathe. That night Elizabeth went first. She had decided to wash her hair and some

clothes, and was gone much longer than usual. Dudman and I hardly talked as the time passed. We were thinking the same thing. Finally we heard Beth's voice outside.

"We shouldn't let our imaginations get away from us," said Dudman. "Beth is today?" asked Anh Tu was gone so long I began to think...

Our treatment grew no worse but I could not recover confidence we would be released soon as news-men. I tried to prepare myself for a long stay with worse conditions, even for death some time soon.

The day before Ho Chi Minh's birthday we were moved to a new house, much larger than others where we had stayed. We were told this was because it was in a secret liberated zone where the people had had the benefits of the revolution for several years.

Despite the house's size, it initially had several shortcomings from our point of view. The house for the most part was one big room. There was one corner partitioned off, and to our dismay it was given to us, probably with the good intention of protecting our privacy. There was no window, few air currents and almost no contact with other people in the house.

We were less appreciative than we might have been if we had been living with others in the cool open space of the rest of the house.

Black Beetles

Moreover, we encountered a difficulty we had not had before—black beetles that fell on us from the roof.

In our first full day in the house it had not dawned on us that it was Ho's birthday, although we all normally would have been aware of it. We had slept most of the time, the food was ample and hearty, but our spirits had been low.

After dinner we were invited to come out to the large window, which looked out on the palm, mango and

banana orchard. Here the handsome, tall householder spent much of his time waiting for the beginning of the rainy season, the time for plowing, by drinking tea and smoking a rural type of marijuana.

"Do you know what day it is today?" asked Anh Tu (Third Brother), a 32-year-old Vietnamese. His wife, he told us earlier, had been killed a few weeks before in the massacre of Vietnamese by Cambodian government troops at Prasaut.

The day had not been different up until then. There had been no special food as is customary on holidays.

"Today is the birthday of Uncle Ho," he said. "Do you know who 'Bac Ho' is?"

I was taken very much by surprise. I felt guilty more than anything else—like forgetting the Passover in the house of a Jewish friend.

"Of course I know 'Bac Ho.' You mean Chairman Ho."

"Ho Chi Minh," he said, "We all wanted to bring Uncle Ho to Saigon while he was still living. We were not able to, and we feel very bad about that. We struggle harder now to make it up to Uncle Ho. We commemorate his birthday by fighting harder for the freedom and independence of our country and against the American aggression."

Anh Tu had shown very little emotion before. He rarely let anything beyond a neutral expression creep onto his rather long, hollow-checked face. Now he was suddenly very profound. He took a small red book from his pocket and showed it to us.

Ho's Biography

The pages of the tiny book were very thick and slightly brown. The type was tall and archaic. The title page had in large Vietnamese letters, "A Short Biography of Ho Chi Minh." A plastic-covered picture of Ho was inside the flap of the front cover.

"We all have these," said Tu. "We read them from

continued

JUN 1970

Villagers Offer Friendship

to Guerrillas

Richard Dudman, chief Washington correspondent for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, was in Indochina in 1959 and reported from South Vietnam in 1962, 1965, 1966 and 1969. He was visiting Cambodia when he and two other reporters were captured by Communist troops last month. They were released June 15. This is the second in a series of articles.

By RICHARD DUDMAN
Star Special Writer

For more than two weeks we fled westward in the midst of a massive migration of guerrilla troops and Cambodian peasants.

Night after night our Land Rover overtook long lines of shadowy figures, walking in single file or sprawled on the edge of the dirt roads.

A dirty rear curtain was kept down much of the time. At frequent stops, where a silent sentry sometimes gave a brief signal with a flashlight, we usually were directed to shield our faces with the cotton batik sarongs that had been given us for a change of clothing.

But sometimes, by moonlight or the frequent phosphorus flares protecting allied outposts a few miles away, we could make out that the troops carried mostly repeating rifles or carbines. Some bore the small haversack that we came to know as standard guerrilla equipment.

It was impossible to judge the nationality of the troops we saw. We thought it would be unwise to ask directly where a man or woman came from. Even later, the five guerrillas who held us—Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor, Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International and me—prisoner in Cambodia for 40 days gave us only limited information about themselves.

The fleeing peasants had with them all the household goods they could carry—mostly pots, dishware and a little food. Several women whom we picked up with babies in their arms, as well as lugging bundles and chickens, spoke only Cambodian. Occasionally they shouted greetings to acquaintances among the troops that had passed them earlier and whom our car overtook.

We saw hundreds, both civilian and military. One night alone, I counted 200.

In this massive migration we felt that we were watching the terrorization of the peasants of Cambodia. We felt we were observing the welding together of the local population with the guerrillas. The peasants were turning to the fighters as their best friends. We felt that this held the most serious significance for American policy.

AT EACH HOUSE where we stopped the villagers appeared to offer willing cooperation and friendship to the guerrillas. Our guards told us our rice got a

of supplies for our little group peel off a few riels to pay for a chicken.

Our guards often lived under the bamboo-slatted floors of the houses, which were raised on stilts. They stayed with the farm implements and pigs, chickens and ducks while we always had the best place in the house. The owners of the houses went to work each day in the rice paddies, apparently unworried at leaving their families and homes at the disposal of armed strangers.

In the late afternoons and evenings, by fading daylight or the tiny flames of a guerrilla's kerosene lamp, those of our guards who spoke Vietnamese sat around with the Cambodian villagers taking the first step in friendship—learning each others language.

In political discussions, our guards told us repeatedly of "the solidarity of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and of their unified struggle that will continue until all Americans are driven out and all of Indochina is free and independent."

They represented Norodom Sihanouk, the deposed ruler of Cambodia, as a key figure in this partnership.

WE NOTICED that when our guards passed a pagoda they unobtrusively removed their hats. It was a gesture of respect for local religious beliefs—all the more marked, because, as we learned later, they were atheists.

In the first few days of our capture we had three tough sessions of up to two hours each with harsh investigators from a higher headquarters. They accused us of being CIA spies. They said the first announcement of our capture described us as American personnel, not as journalists.

Fortunately, neither Beth Pond, Mike nor I was wearing military style clothing. All three of us customarily avoided such attire to be sure we were not mistaken for military. I was wearing a white polo shirt, I was about 100 yards from a military

uniform as it was possible to get.

The interrogation sessions were frightening. Questions were barked at us and the strain was intense, especially for Mike. Speaking Vietnamese, he bore the brunt and translated into English for Beth and me. Once I had to massage his back for 15 minutes to help him relax afterward.

One of our questioners was a stern-faced soldier whom I judged to be a North Vietnamese. He was in uniform and carried an official-looking khaki pouch. He ordered us to write statements giving details leading up to our capture—whether we had ever reported to the CIA or knew anyone connected with the agency, the dates on which we had visited Paris, Vientiane, Hanoi and Saigon and a summary of all stories we had written, as well as a list of personal references in those cities and elsewhere, and "international journalists" whom we knew personally.

LATER HE SAID our reports were not neat enough nor complete enough. He thought they contained errors and told us to rewrite them. Mike was convinced that it was the old Chinese technique of asking a prisoner to rewrite a statement time after time as a form of torture or punishment, wear him down and catch discrepancies.

The second statement, however, proved to be the last, except for a later addendum when they wanted us to state that everything we had written was true.

Another interrogator—a shifty-eyed, French-speaking man whom I took to be Vietnamese—told Beth in French, "We notice you have very peculiar cameras. They don't look like press cameras."

One of the most unpleasant persons we encountered, he always spoke with his hand held over his mouth, covering his

But the interrogations ended, and our relations with our

captors began to ease a few days after we were captured. I sensed a change when the guerrilla beside me in the Land Rover, before getting out to ask the way one night, slipped off his pistol and cartridge belt and laid them in my lap.

Often Beth, Mike and I were left alone in the back of the car with half a dozen Chinese and American repeating rifles, carbines and machine guns.

It never occurred to us to make a break. The guard surely would have shot us if we had tried. And if we had escaped them, we still would have been caught in a strange country among a totally hostile population without even the protection of our team of guerrillas.

GRADUALLY WE CAME to think of the five guerrillas who had us in now as escorts rather than guards. Before we were released, they were describing us as "not prisoners of war but travelers who lost their way."

Our life began to have its little pleasures. Sometimes our two meals a day, of mainly rice, were augmented with a snack of sweetened condensed milk, or a glass of tea with three heaping spoons of coarse sugar. Twice we had pastry similar to Boston crullers. Once we had fresh pineapple. On May 19, the guerrillas gave us one of the blocks of sweetened popped rice that were a special treat in their celebration of Ho Chi Minh's birthday. It was something like candied popcorn.

At the big house where we had been staying, Friday, May 22, was a day of rest and preparation, but Saturday began as a day of action that was the longest and hardest yet.

We had driven much of Thursday night. On Friday morning everyone seemed to be getting ready for something. One of the soldiers was using a needle and thread to repair his shirt. A nurse was filling her little kerosene lamp.

continued

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Red Officer Saved Writers From Mob

By Michael Morrow

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First of a Series

SINGAPORE, June 21—Quick action by a pro-Communist guerrilla officer probably saved the lives of this reporter and two other correspondents while we were in the hands of an angry mob the first day of our capture by the Khmer (Cambodian) United National Front in Cambodia on May 7th.

The officer, a 34-year old ethnic Vietnamese from Phnom Penh who has fought more than 10 years in both Indochinese wars, arrived on the scene with three of his men as a rabid, anti-American crowd was running Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and me blindfolded through a village, pulled along by a motorbike.

The officer came too late to save Dudman and me from a hearty clout on the head and an uncomfortable few minutes on the ground, still blindfolded, with our hands bound painfully behind our backs.

The officer posted one of his men with Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor, the third member of our party, and the other two between the crowd and Dudman and me. Meanwhile he went himself for help from higher authorities.

By doing so, the officer—who we later learned was called Anh Ba (Second Brother)—saved Elizabeth from molestation and Dudman and me from death, the seeming aim of the crowd.

We lived with Anh Ba for one month and two days before he recounted how he had acted, beyond the ken of our blindfolds, to save our lives on the first day of our captivity.

"The people wanted to beat you to death. Some wanted to do harm to 'Chi' (elder sister—Elizabeth)", the officer said. It would not have been right for them to kill you, not knowing whether you were good or bad people."

Before the mob incident, our capture by liberation

soldiers on Highway 1, a short distance west of Svay Rieng, had been fair. We had approached a blown bridge, realized we couldn't go on and started back. Two men stepped out from behind a tree and motioned to us to stop. They moved back behind the tree again for cover, with promise of a hail of bullets should we try to continue.

We got out of the car immediately and pushed our hands high in the air on the command of the Vietnamese, who had come forward with his AK-47 pointed toward us.

He told us to drop all our belongings to the pavement and to turn around.

Memories raced through my mind of the execution of a friend, Reuters correspondent Bruce Pigott, when the car in which he and several other journalists were traveling had been ambushed in May 1968 during the fighting in Saigon. George Syvertson of CBS, his camera crew and I had been the first to find Pigott and the others. The memory had stuck.

"Turn around," the soldier said. As the only Vietnamese speaker in our group, I responded.

"I'm afraid you're going to shoot us when we turn around," I said.

"Don't worry, I'm not going to shoot you. Turn around."

I had told him immediately when we got out of the car we were international journalists—and it was written all over the car in both Vietnamese and French. There was nothing else to do except deny we were Americans—which we did.

Into Ravine

We were led down and up the small ravine left by the blown bridge and farther along the road. I was still very shaken.

"Are you going to shoot us?" I asked.

"There's nothing to worry about," he replied.

I learned later the Vietnamese was a five year veteran, originally from the Mekong Delta. He and the

Cambodian were not bent on murdering us at all. They got Elizabeth a bicycle when she could no longer keep up and served us tea when we arrived at the site of their unit's headquarters.

We soon were out of the jurisdiction of our original captors, however, and were taken by bicycle to the next level of command—perhaps a battalion. The commander was a bitter-faced Vietnamese in his late 30s, with only one eye. There were Vietnamese and Cambodians in the command unit. One soldier wore a brush hat with the initials "FUNK" (Front United National Khmer) ball-pointed in on a bent up brim. It was my first introduction to FUNK.

"We'll have to have a reunion when this is all over," said Dudman with characteristic optimism, "... and get them to give us some paper and pencils. We've got to start writing."

Hostile Air

There was an air of hostility at this post, much stronger than at the previous one, but I was relieved when a man with a card marked "Presse" organized another move, to a small village.

We boarded a large truck with boughs plastered over the top of it for camouflage and started on a journey of about an hour.

The only one from the second post to join us was a Cambodian student who spoke French. Two other Cambodian soldiers who spoke only Cambodian were also picked up. All were young. They began bragging over the tail gate to villagers as the trip pressed on. The student, particularly, changed from a polite schoolboy to soldier overlord.

By the time we reached our destination, the student was no longer an interpreter who could be counted on to pass the word that we were journalists.

The truck ground to a stop. People crowded in around the tailgate and wineran, originally from the Mekong Delta. He and the

namese, peered in however, and told me to sit up. I misunderstood his Vietnamese to be "lie down" and did so. He became furious, as did the formerly docile student-interpreter. The student began shouting at me as though I were a dog, stamping hard on the floor and thrashing his arms about.

Three Blindfolded

I tried to ignore the blindfolds put on us before we were led out of the truck as just a security precaution. Elizabeth was taking it quite rightly in a more serious view. We stood holding hands. "Thanks for everything, it's been swell," she said.

"Well, I don't think it's come to that," I replied. We were walked together for some distance. Most voices were Cambodian. Some were Vietnamese, however, and these began to frighten me. I thought I heard distinctly one angry voice say, "Phai ha tu binh." (One must kill prisoners of war.)

"Start talking to them again, Beth," I said, trying not to let on I had heard what I thought I had.

She did, but the words "international press" had little impact on the deteriorating situation.

I began speaking to the Vietnamese speakers, telling them that I knew a certain man in the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris and he could surely vouch for my identity. This had even less effect.

Forced to Run

My left hand was soon pried from Elizabeth's hand and lashed by a length of rope at the wrist to a motor bike that I, still blindfolded, could hear just ahead of me. Dick was caught by the right wrist; we had grasped each other's free hand.

The motor bike soon started up, pulling us, lurching, forward. People prodded us in the back to run faster. I began feeling close to death.

Dick kept saying he couldn't run any farther.

22 JUN 1970

'It Was the Start of an Extraordinary Experience'

By RICHARD DUDMAN
Star Special Writer

The rice paddies stretched empty on both sides of us. The countryside was deserted. We were frighteningly alone.

Suddenly a Vietnamese in a sports shirt and carrying a Chinese-made automatic rifle slid from behind a big tree. We stopped our car and scrambled out, hands up.

"Don't shoot," called Mike. "We are journalists."

That was the beginning of my 40 days with the guerrillas. We were prisoners in Cambodia. enemy, we three are the only ones held for any length of time who have been released.

In nearly six weeks of hiding in jungle and paddyland there were times of terror when our lives were at stake.

There also was much boredom and occasional happy times playing chess with our captors and making a feast of roast dog.

We lost weight and suffered some ant bites, minor infections and dysentery, but we came out in reasonably good health—and with a good look at the "other side."

We saw a well-organized movement of Cambodian and Vietnamese guerrillas in a determined war against U.S. tanks and planes.

We gradually learned about their hatred of the United States, their tactics, their relationship with the Cambodian peasants and what kind of people they are as we traveled with them on foot, by bicycle and occasionally by truck from one village to another.

Being the first to be released we feel an obligation to the 20 other correspondents still missing. Although we made no deals for our release, we decided to withhold a few details, such as the exact place of our release, for fear of jeopardizing our colleagues.

Our captors suspected us of being spies for the Central Intelligence Agency and we are determined to avoid doing anything that would feed their suspicions of other correspondents they have captured.

IT WAS MAY 7 when it all started. Just a week earlier, President Nixon had opened a new dimension of the war in Southeast Asia by announcing that U.S. and South Vietnamese troops were invading Cambodia.

At noon, Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor, Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International and I set out from Saigon to see how far the invasion had penetrated.

Driving down Route 1, the main highway from Saigon to Phnom Penh, we were waved on at a checkpoint and by friendly Cambodian forces.

The sentry gave us no warning, but suddenly about a mile west of Svay Rieng, in the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia, we realized we were alone. The rice fields were deserted. No peasant trudged along the highway. No dog barked. Not a chicken squawked.

When we reached a blown-up bridge with no warning sign, we knew the worst. We had unwittingly entered the no-mans land between allied forces and the guerrilla troops supporting Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the ousted Cambodian head of state.

Swiftly we turned our International Scout and headed back along the deserted road toward Svay Rieng. We had gone only 100 yards or so when the Vietnamese, with the automatic rifle, stopped us. In a moment, a Cambodian joined him.

With rifles trained on us they ordered us to empty our pockets on the pavement and then motioned to us to start walking. Hands raised, we clambered down a collapsed bridge span and up the rubble on the other side.

The sudden throb of a helicopter engine alarmed our captors. "Di, di, di!" hurry, hurry, hurry! they ordered us to run. There was no cover except an occasional tree. Some of the trees had been felled across the highway as makeshift roadblocks.

When Elizabeth lagged behind, a man on a bicycle who had joined us, gave her a lift. After running about two miles, we were led down a side path.

In a thatched roof hut, Mike and I had to take off our pants and shoes. They were returned to us after a thorough search and we were given a cup of tea.

OUR FIRST INTERROGATION began a few minutes later in another hut. A young man wearing a pistol did the questioning.

Mike explained, in Vietnamese, that we were international journalists. He said that he and Beth were Canadians, and I an American.

An older man with one eye, who had been listening skeptically, took over the questioning.

He accused us of being CIA agents. It was the first of many such accusations which would be made against us in the next five weeks.

A young man who spoke French arrived and took a friendlier tone. He said, he was a Cambodian student from

Phnom Penh and was working with the Cambodians and Vietnamese revolutionary forces fighting the Americans and South Vietnamese.

He told us we would not be shot in any event. If we were what we said we were, he promised, we would be set free, naturally.

But the friendly tone vanished when a gray-haired, crew-cut man with a stern manner arrived. He did not believe a word of our story. Over and over, Mike told him how we had set out from Saigon that morning to see and report what was happening in Cambodia.

After more questions we were taken from the hamlet on bicycles. We pedaled two or three kilometers and then came to a big, Czech-made truck camouflaged with tree branches in what appeared to be a large village.

We were herded into the truck with about 10 Cambodian soldiers. One carried a Chinese AK 47 automatic rifle, another a light machinegun.

The Cambodians watched us intently but impassively. We offered a smile; no response.

The soldier with the automatic rifle kept it pointed at my chest. When I motioned politely to him to point it to one side, he waved it angrily at me and put the gun to my head. He kept it there all the while the truck bounced along jungle roads.

THE DANGER MOUNTED. At each village an angry faced crowd of men and women gathered and climbed the tailgate of the truck for a look at the hated Westerners.

The French-speaking Cambodian student got into the spirit of the capture and his friendly manner disappeared. Each time the truck slowed, he would lean out to boast about the "three Americans" inside.

I suppose the villagers thought we were downed fliers from one of the American planes that had been bombing Cambodia since Sihanouk's overthrow.

At the last stop — at a sizable village — hatred reached a critical level. In twos and threes boys and young men climbed the cab and tailgate of our truck and glared down at us. They shook their fists threateningly. Several made obscene gestures. At one point, an older man clambered to the cab roof and berated us furiously.

There was a respite when a young Vietnamese soldier arrived and ordered the villagers off the truck. He asked a few questions and then he, too, assured us we would not be shot.

* Incomplete as received

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400210001-7
FORT WORTH, TEX.
STAR-TELEGRAM

M - 102,470
S - 218,306
JUN 20 1970

Soviet Propaganda Mill Works Overtime on China

When friends fall out, the eroded loyalty can produce some nasty invective. In their parting of ways, Russian certainly has not been sparing of its feelings about Red China.

But so unexpected are the nature of the denouncements that they stagger the mind. In an issue of a Soviet foreign affairs weekly these charges are made:

Peking promoted the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, tried to control Pakistan, invaded India, stirred up trouble in Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, tried to overthrow the government of Burma and caused a "terrible tragedy" to its supporters in Indonesia, where about 50,000 Communists were killed after the army put down a left wing coup attempt.

Then comes the "good" part. Maoist agents, helped by Chinese resi-

dents of Cambodia, claims the publication, violated order there so "rudely" that even Prince Sihanouk was moved to protest. "And this Chinese interference in Cambodian affairs," claims the weekly with nary an illusion to the CIA, "was one of the factors that instigated the right wing forces of Cambodia to stage a coup d'etat and cooperate with the American imperialists."

Rather than chortle over the credibility gap these disclosures create in the Soviet propaganda mill by reversing previous contentions, we should hope now for a snap in friendship between Hanoi and Moscow. With it might come confirmation of what we've been trying to tell the world all along: North Vietnam is trying to dominate Southeast Asia.

The result was said to have been thousands of civilian deaths including Chinese, Vietnamese, and French immigrants in Cambodia.

18 June 1970

○ Cambodia: Why the Generals Won

Peter Dale Scott

President Nixon's ground operations in Cambodia with US troops will likely be over, as he promises, by June 30, 1970. The long-range strategy by which the Cambodian adventure was undertaken almost certainly will not be. For though the invasion itself was unprecedented, all of the prior elements in the scenario were often repeated clichés, from the initial military overthrow of a popular leader by a right-wing pro-American clique, to the announced response to an enemy "invasion" at a time when the prospects for ending the war seemed to be increasing. Most characteristic of all is the likelihood that Nixon was pressured by the Joint Chiefs to authorize the Cambodian adventure in great haste, and in such a way as to bypass or overrule most of his civilian advisers, as a response to an "emergency" for which US intelligence agencies and perhaps the Joint Chiefs themselves were largely responsible.

Even if terminated by June 30, the Cambodian adventure has confirmed yet again what some of us have been saying for years: that at present the US military apparatus in Southeast Asia will work to reject a new policy of de-escalation as certainly as the human organism will work to reject a transplanted heart. The formula to neutralize this rejection process has unfortunately not yet been discovered.

In other words one cannot understand what has happened recently in Cambodia without understanding the whole history of the Second Indochina War. One cannot for example appreciate Lon Nol's expectations in overthrowing Prince Sihanouk on March 18 without recalling the anti-neutralist military coups of late 1960 and April 1964 in Laos, or of January 1964 and June 1965 in Saigon. US personnel were involved in (or at the very least, cognizant of) every one of these coups.¹

Each coup was followed by, and helped to facilitate, an escalation of the US military effort which the overthrown regime would not have tolerated. As my colleagues and I tried to demonstrate in our book, *The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam*, the result (if not the intention) of every one of these escalations was to nullify a real or apparent threat of peace at the time. (I would now add that we failed sufficiently to emphasize the role of our civilian and military intelligence services in bringing about all of the crises in question, as well as the present one.)

The second cliché of the scenario was Lon Nol's deliberate breach of the accommodation hitherto established between the NLF troops in Cambodia and the troops of Pnompenh, followed by a precipitous retreat, in the face of what seem to have been only light enemy probes, back to the outskirts of Pnompenh itself. This gratuitous provocation of a much stronger enemy has been treated as irrational by several well-established American analysts, but it will be seen to have its own Machiavellian logic when compared to similar events in the Second Indochina War. By the same combination of absurd provocation and precipitous withdrawal in previous springs, Laotian troops (and/or their American advisers) secured the first commitment of US combat troops to Thailand—the first in Southeast Asia, for that matter—in May 1962, and the first bombings of Laos—which *Aviation Week* correctly reported to be "the first US offensive military action since Korea"—in May 1964.²

Thus Lon Nol's actions, far from being irrational, followed a recipe for US support which by now has been tested many times and never known to fail. The exigent realities of the monsoon season and the US budgetary process encourage an annual cycle of escalation which by now can be not only analyzed but predicted.³

The third and most frightening cliché is the phenomenon of the artificially induced "crisis" used as a pretext for hasty executive actions which declare wars and advise on foreign

policy. The military pressure on Nixon to escalate hastily in Cambodia recalls the pressure on Kennedy to escalate in 1962 and on Johnson to escalate in 1964, first in response to Laos and later in response to the alleged Tonkin Gulf "incident" of August 1964. In all cases, including the present one, a key role was played by our intelligence agencies, who first helped to induce a crisis which they subsequently misreported to the President.

Furthermore, all but the most rudimentary forms of civilian review within the executive branch were suppressed. When the first US arms shipment to Cambodia was announced on April 22 by White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler, his counterpart Robert McCloskey at the State Department admitted that he "knew nothing about it" (*New York Times*, April 24, 1970, p. 3). On April 23, the very day that "emergency" meetings of the Special Action Group began to consider the Fishhook invasion, Secretary of State Rogers told a House Appropriations subcommittee that "if US troops went into Cambodia 'our whole (Vietnamization) program is defeated,' and that 'we have no incentive to escalate into Cambodia'" (*Washington Post*, May 6, 1970, A1). In the wake of the Fishhook decision ("Operation Prometheus") it was suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

...pulled an end run in their effort to get the attack against the border areas approved. ... Some believed Mr. Laird found himself in the final stages of planning for the invasion without being fully consulted and informed during the preliminary planning stages [*Christian Science Monitor*, May 14, 1970].

Perhaps the most embarrassing plight was that of Senate Republican leader Hugh Scott, who was

...cut adrift with White House-inspired statements that renewed bombing of the North was a remote contingency at the very time a hundred American planes were dropping bombs across the demilitarized zone.⁴

Constitutional procedures under Nixon supposedly a "strict constructionist," have clearly deteriorated a long way since 1954, when Dulles had

17 JUN 1970

After Cambodian detention

Correspondents freed

Monitor correspondent Elizabeth Pond, who was captured in Cambodia May 7, has been released. First news of her release came Tuesday morning when she telephoned her father from Saigon to tell him she was well and unharmed. A joint story, written by Miss Pond (who in recent months has been on a leave of absence while working as an Alicia Patterson Fund fellow in South Vietnam), and the other two correspondents captured with her, follows. In a subsequent edition the Monitor will carry further details on Miss Pond's detention.

Three American journalists have been released safe and in good health after more than five weeks' detention by pro-Sihanouk forces in Cambodia: Miss Elizabeth Pond of The Christian Science Monitor, Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International.

On June 15 they were driven by jeep and motorbike to a section of Highway 1 that is controlled at night by the Cambodian United National Front. From there they hitched rides to Saigon on a convoy of South Vietnamese trucks returning from Phnom Penh.

They are the first of 23 foreign correspondents who have disappeared in Cambodia so far to have been released by the front. They were arrested May 7.

In the 5½ weeks between their arrest and their release the correspondents were well cared for by a small unit of front soldiers. They traveled a total of about 200 miles and stayed in 10 homes of villagers. They were well fed and protected against American and South Vietnamese air and ground attacks. They were asked to make statements about their experience, presumably for later broadcast, but none conflicting with their own views.

It was indicated to the reporters that the length of their stay was the time required for the front to verify their assertions that they were journalists. The original suspicion, which was pursued in several sessions of questioning, was that they were "American government personnel," possibly Central Intelligence Agency agents. Once it was ascertained to the satisfaction of the front that they really were journalists—and "good people"—they were treated as friends.

Captives displayed

The only exception to the good treatment occurred on the day of their arrest when they were transported at gunpoint in a truck through several villages and displayed at the entrance of the last village they were blindfolded and

walked through a gauntlet of jeering vil-lagers. The men were tied to a motor-bike and forced to run a half mile while still blindfolded, then were hit on the head and held in a room with their hands tied behind them.

A superior officer intervened, however, and these actions were halted. The soldier responsible for the rough treatment, the reporters were told later, was court-martialed for handling them harshly when their identity had not been established.

The correspondents left Cambodia as the honored guests at a mass meeting of about 1,000 villagers. The theme of the meeting was gratitude of the Cambodian people for those American people who oppose aggression by the Nixon administration in Indo-China. The journalists were asked to write the truth of the situation in front-held areas for their American and world readers.

At the end of their stay the three were given an interview with a Cambodian identified as the commander of the military region.

The reporters asked to visit areas where there had been B-52 bombing or strafing of civilian populations or areas where many civilians had been killed by American or South Vietnamese ground troops. This request was denied, however, on the grounds that there was still fighting in these places and the front could not guarantee the security of the journalists there.

The correspondents made inquiries but were given no information about other reporters missing in Cambodia or about American prisoners of war.

Clearing operation

The reporters had inadvertently entered an area controlled by the front at about noon on May 7 on Highway 1 about three kilometers west of Svay Rieng in the Parrot's Beak area.

They had driven from Saigon that morning to observe American and South Vietnamese forces then mounting a clearing operation on the main road. They were reporting on the effects of the

Freed Correspondents Tell Of 40 Days As Red Captives

Washington Post Foreign Service
SAIGON, June, 16—Three missing American correspondents re-appeared in Saigon today after being released by their captors who held them more than five weeks in Cambodia.

The three, who looked well although thinner than when they left, are Richard Dudman, chief correspondent of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in Washington, Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor and Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International.

They reported that they had been well treated by their captors. "Frankly I felt safer most of the time we were captured than I do in the streets of Saigon," Dudman said.

The three correspondents said they are hopeful that a number of other newsmen captured during the past two months are alive and may also be returned. Two Americans are confirmed to be dead, George Syvertsen and Gerald Miller, both of CBS.

Dudman said they were mistreated briefly on May 7, the day of their capture by local villagers near Svay Rieng in the Parrot's Beak of Cambodia.

"They forced Mike and me to run behind a motorcycle to which they tied us. At one point they also beat us to the ground. They were assumed to be resentful about bombings.

"But then an officer intervened and from that point on we were well treated," Dudman related.

The missing correspondents declined to go into details of their captivity until they had completed their own accounts of the extraordinary five weeks of captivity.

"They are impressive people," one of the three said of their captors.

They were released on Highway 1 in Cambodia Monday night and hitch-hiked into Saigon on a truck convoy. They slept at some point on the journey back and did not arrive here until Tuesday after-

[Their statement carefully avoided any mention of North Vietnamese or Vietcong troops in Cambodia, apparently in hopes that this might improve the chances of the other captive newsmen, the Associated Press reported.

[All Communist and other currently pro-Sihanouk forces in Cambodia are now gathered under the banner of the National United Front of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Dudman reported that he and his companions were captured by Front forces. The Front was launched by Prince Norodom Sihanouk soon after his ouster March 18 as Cambodia's ruler when he cast his lot with the Communist forces in Indochina to try to overthrow the men who deposed him.

[North Vietnam and the Vietcong never have admitted officially that their forces operated in Cambodia for years. This omission, Western officials have noted, compounds the release of any captured prisoners unless, as in the current case, the release is made in the name of the Cambodian Front.

Dudman filed the following account of the captives' release to The St. Louis Post-Dispatch which made it available to The Washington Post.

SAIGON, June 1—Three American newspaper correspondents hitch hiked into Saigon after being released last night in Cambodia by the pro-Sihanouk forces that had arrested them last May 7.

The reporters, Richard Dudman of the Post-Dispatch, Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International and Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor, were freed safe and in good health at 11 p.m. on a stretch of Highway 1 that is controlled at night by the Cambodian United National Front.

They had been driven there by jeep and a relay of motorbikes from a rear area. At dawn they caught a ride to Saigon with a South Vietnam-

ese convoy of military trucks returning empty from Phnom Penh.

They asked authorities of the Front for news about 20 other foreign correspondents still missing in Cambodia but received no reply.

In the five and one half weeks of their detention, the three were well cared for by five soldiers assigned to them by the Front. The traveled about 200 miles and stayed in ten homes of villagers. They were well fed and protected against several American and South Vietnamese air and ground attacks.

They were asked to make statements about their experience, presumably for later broadcast by the Liberation Radio or Hanoi, but none that conflicted with their own views.

Several interrogators told the reporters after their arrest that they were suspected of being "American government personnel" or possibly agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Once their credentials as bona fide newspaper correspondents was established and they came to be considered "good people" they were treated as friends and their release was arranged.

The only exception to generally good treatment was on the day of their arrest, they were taken at gunpoint in a truck through several villages and displayed as American prisoners of war.

At the last of these stops, they were blindfolded and marched through a gauntlet of jeering villagers. The two men were tied to a motorbike and forced to run a half mile while still blindfolded. Then both were knocked to the ground with a blow on the head and left in a darkened room with their hands tied behind them.

A superior officer intervened, however, and the reporters were treated from then on with kindness and consideration.

The correspondents left the liberated one of Cambodia as

16 JUN 1970

STATINTL

REDS RELEASE REPORTERS

'Richard Dudman Calling...

By HARRIET GRIFFITHS
Star Staff Writer

Mrs. Helen Dudman didn't believe it at first when the phone rang at 4 o'clock this morning and the operator said her husband, Richard Dudman, was calling from Saigon.

Dudman was one of three American correspondents captured by Communist forces in Cambodia on May 7.

"I thought the operator meant someone wanted to speak to him," Mrs. Dudman said.

The operator giggled. And Dick Dudman came on the line to assure his elated wife he was "in great shape," had lost a little weight, and had yet to have a bath.

Besides Dudman, 52-year-old Washington bureau chief of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, those released were Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor and Michael D. Morrow of Dispatch News Service.

The Associated Press quoted Dudman in Saigon as saying he had asked their captors about the fate of some 20 other newsmen captured by Communist troops in Cambodia and missing since April 3.

He said "we received no reply," and that neither he, Miss Pond nor Morrow saw any of the missing newsmen while they were in captivity.

Mrs. Dudman, who expects her husband home in about four days, had been optimistic about him all along and "just knew he would be all right."

"He is so cautious, and a very sensible man," she said. Besides that, he has had plenty of experience covering wars — about a dozen of them in the last 15 years.

When she had the first inkling of the capture, Mrs. Dudman said, "it didn't even occur to me that anything had happened to him — I just assumed he had a good story."

It was typical that he was going to write the story of his capture and release for his newspaper after calling his wife, and admonished her not to give out any news that might scoop his own paper.

"We didn't discuss why they sprung him," she said, however.

Mrs. Dudman said she was convinced the "community of journalists throughout the world — every nationality," had been useful in obtaining the release of the three, and expressed hope it would help the others still being held.

The Dudmans, married 22 years, have a daughter Janet, 20, working in Washington, and another, Martha, 18, an Antioch College student now in Paris — where her father expects to see her on his way home to Newark St. N.W.

TRIO DESCRIBES
THE CAPTURE

SAIGON (AP)—Three American correspondents held captive by Viet Cong troops in Cambodia for more than five weeks were released and returned to Saigon today apparently unharmed.

"We're safe and healthy, and we're in good shape," said Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post Dispatch, released with Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor and Michael D. Morrow of Dispatch, Inc.

Dudman said the trio received rough treatment at first when their interrogators suspected that they were American government personnel. But, he said, they were treated "with kindness and consideration" once their credentials as correspondents had been established.

The three, captured May 7, were released in Cambodia last night and arrived in Saigon early today after hitchhiking in from the border.

They were captured last month at the eastern edge of the provincial capital of Svay Rieng, 72 miles southeast of Phnom Penh, in a car they had driven from Saigon.

Dudman said the only exception to the decent treatment accorded them occurred the day of their capture, when he and Morrow, 24, were blindfolded, forced to run about half a mile behind a motorbike, then knocked to the ground and left in a darkened room with their hands tied.

He said in a statement prepared by the trio that they were freed "last night at about 11 o'clock in Cambodia on a stretch of highway 1" between Saigon and Phnom Penh.

He said they were taken to an undisclosed location on the highway "by jeeps and a relay of motorbikes from a rear area" and set free.

"Don't Know Anything"

Miss Pond, 33, said she didn't know if their release was arranged or why they were freed: "We don't know anything about the background of it."

Dudman said "there's no deal" between the trip and their former captors on what they will write, nor was any demanded as a condition to their release.

The trio gave only sketchy details about their ordeal, saying they wanted first to file the full story for their own publications. They will hold a news conference tomorrow.

Their odyssey, which Dudman said took in 200 miles of travel through 10 villages, began when they strayed into enemy-held territory about two miles west of Svay Rieng in the Parrots Beak area of Cambodia. Their statement gave this account:

They drove there "to observe the depth of penetration into Cambodia by the American and South Vietnamese forces then attempting to clear that main route (highway 1) to Phnom Penh."

They also were reporting on the effects of the invasion on the civilian population in the region.

The trio found their way blocked by a blown-up bridge and was halted by two soldiers who stepped from behind a tree as the reporters tried to drive back to Svay Rieng.

They were ordered to leave their car and were marched to an outpost, from which they were taken by bicycle to a highway and ordered into a truck.

CIA "Suspects"

They were taken at gunpoint in the truck though several villages and displayed as the last of these stops, they were blindfolded and marched through a gauntlet of jeering villagers.

Several interrogators told them after their capture that they were suspected of being U.S. government personnel or possibly agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Once their reporters' credentials were verified, Dudman said, they were considered "good people" and treated "from then on with kindness and consideration" and their release arranged.

The three reporters said they were "asked to make statements about their experience, presumably for broadcast by Radio Hanoi, but none that conflicted with their own views."

They did not elaborate on whether they made any statements to their captors.

The statement to newsmen read by Dudman said they "left the liberated zone of Cambodia as honored guests at a meeting of about 1,000 villagers."

STATINTL



AUGUSTA, ME.
KENNEBEC JOURNAL

M - 15,952

JUN 15 1970

Moscow's worry

Moscow's foreign affairs experts are having difficulty deciding whether Indochina is menaced more by U.S. or Red Chinese "imperialism."

Criticism of the American-South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia has given way to warnings to all Southeast Asian states to beware Chinese meddling in their internal affairs. Cambodia itself was singled out for a special red alert.

Moscow might have been expected to

attribute Sihanouk's overthrow to machinations of the CIA. Not so, this time. Peking is held responsible for meddling so clumsily that "rightist Cambodian forces" were driven to ousting Sihanouk.

Moscow's concern is appreciable. Understandably so. Red China has sublimated its internal squabbles to new and bolder ventures abroad. The New Left is Maoist — not Stalinist, Leninist or Muscovite — and the fount is Peking.

MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE
Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0004002100

M - 240,275
S - 674,302
JUN 14 1970

Power Politics Invades Once-Tranquil Cambodia

By RONALD ROSS
Minneapolis Tribune
Far East Correspondent

SAIGON, South Vietnam—The fate of tiny Cambodia totters in the balance of international power politics.

Well over half of this once-tranquil land, from Sihanoukville to Snuol, has been opened to all the horrors of the Vietnamese civil war.

Hundreds of Khmers have been killed and wounded; thousands of Khmer homes have been destroyed, towns flattened, plantations and rice fields laid waste.

And now the war knocks at the gates of the great Khmer temples of Angkor.

This is Cambodia 1970. These are the contending forces:

The three major outside powers, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union.

The two major nearby powers, the Vietnamese and the Thais.

The insiders, contending for political control of Cambodia's 7 million people—the forces backing the government of Prime Minister Lon Nol versus the forces backing exiled Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former Cambodian chief of state.

And then there are the other powers, some near, some distant, who hold stakes of one sort or another in the tragedy that is Cambodia:

The French, rulers of Cambodia when it was part of France's Indochina empire.

The British, co-chairmen, with the Russians, of the Geneva Conference that brought an end to the Indochina War in 1954.

The Japanese, emerging great power, seeking a new role in Asian and world affairs.

The Indonesians, 100-million strong, staggering back from the chaos of Sukarno's rule and anxious to find ways to bring peace to Southeast Asia.

The Laotians, no stranger to violence, are victims like the Khmers of forces beyond their control.

And the Malaysians, Singaporeans, Filipinos, the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan, the Burmese, the Koreans, North and South, the West Germans, and the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe.

In ways both large and small the fate of all is involved in what happens to little Cambodia.

Here's a closer look at the roles of the great powers:

The United States: In the most massive search-and-destroy mission of the war, 31,000 American troops plunged across Cambodia's eastern border to capture millions of dollars worth of North Vietnamese weapons, ammunition and other military supplies.

The purpose, in President Nixon's words, was "to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border" and to "attack the headquarters for the the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam."

Mr. Nixon on April 30 told the American people, "We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire."

On June 3, the President reported that "this has been the most successful operation of this long and very difficult war."

He said that "all of our major military objectives have been achieved" and that "the June 30 deadline I set for withdrawal of all American forces from Cambodia will be met."

At the time he was speaking, there were 14,000 American troops still operating in Cambodia.

Other Americans were serving as advisers with South Vietnamese forces and providing them with artillery and air support.

The Nixon administration has announced that all advisory and support activities—with the exception of American air power—will be withdrawn from Cambodia by the end of June.

The Soviet Union: The Russians are the principal supplier to the North Vietnamese of such sophisticated military equipment as surface-to-air missiles and MIG21 jet fighter-bombers and large-scale economic aid.

Also, the North Vietnamese, but in lesser ways (small weapons, medical supplies) are the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union also is seeking through diplomatic means to greatly increase its presence and influence in Asia.

China:

The Communist Chinese are the principal supplier to the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong of small arms, such as the AK47 automatic rifle and the small rocket.

China is the ideological champion of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. In the wake of Sihanouk's arrival in Peking, China, where he is now living in exile, China has become the driving force behind the creation of a united front of revolutionary parties in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Neither the Soviet Union nor China, as far as is known, has contributed military personnel to their allies in Cambodia.

South Vietnam:

Of the two major nearby powers, the South Vietnamese are the most deeply committed in Cambodia.

In his June 3 speech, President Nixon said that 43,000 South Vietnamese took part in the operations in Cambodia.

About 35,000 of them are still in Cambodia, and the Saigon government has announced that it is not limited in its activities in Cambodia by the June 30 deadline the American President has set for his troops.

Thailand:

The introduction of Thai troops is expected at any moment.

The two western provinces of Cambodia once were under Thailand's rule, and Bangkok long supported an anti-Sihanouk guerrilla movement, the Khmer Serei. For a time the Khmer Serei was armed and financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The first contingent of Thai troops to be committed to Cambodia will most likely be Khmer Serei, Thais of Khmer ancestry. About 3,000 already have been promised.

continued

8 JUN 1970

It's Nixon's War, Hanoi Reds Feel

STATINTL

By ROBERT S. BOYD

Special to The Star

HANOI — In North Vietnamese eyes, Richard Nixon is even worse than Lyndon Johnson was.

Although it was Johnson who approved the bombing of North Vietnam, Nixon is considered even more "treacherous," "stubborn" and "cruel."

In fact, the Communists believe Nixon invented the Vietnam war.

In the Museum of the Revolution in Hanoi, which covers the 40-year struggle against French and then American intervention, there is an interesting exhibit devoted to Nixon.

It is dated 1953, and it shows him smiling and chatting with the former French puppet emperor, Bao Dai.

The caption asserts that this was when Nixon — then a freshman vice president — conceived his policy of "using Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese."

Touring in 1954

Another display shows Nixon visiting Hanoi in the spring of 1954, before the French defeat. He toured Dien Bien Phu on that trip.

The exhibit recalls Nixon's April 1954 speech suggesting America aid to the French — a proposal President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected.

In other words, Hanoi dates Nixon's "Vietnamization" plan of 1970 back 17 years — even before the French collapse.

That's how long they say the President has been trying to make South Vietnam into an American "colony" by means of Vietnamese troops.

Nixon's "Vietnamization" plan is crueler than Johnson's "Americanization" of the war, said Luu Quy Ky, secretary general of the North Vietnamese Journalists Association.

'Blood of Others'

"The cruelty lies in the fact that if Nixon uses the blood of other people, he will not be as economical with it as with American blood," Ky said.

Nixon also is more deceptive than Johnson, according to the North Vietnamese. Vietnam-

Robert S. Boyd, chief of the Washington Bureau of Knight Newspapers, recently traveled in North Vietnam for two weeks. This account, written after his departure, is copyrighted by Knight Newspapers, Inc., and was syndicated by The Chicago Daily News Service.

ization is only a ruse to lull the American public, they argue. While cutting down U.S. casualties and costs, Nixon is actually prolonging and extending the war, they say.

The harshest indictment of Nixon I heard in my two weeks in North Vietnam came from Hoang Tung, a smiling, deceptively mild-mannered intellectual who is editor-in-chief of the official Communist party newspaper, Nhan Dan.

"Nixon has accelerated his own defeat — his political defeat at home and the defeat of his policies in Indochina," Tung said.

"Why? "Because he has done things contrary to common sense, things that even President Johnson dared not do."

Laos, Cambodia Fighting

Specifically, Tung cited what he called Nixon's "escalation" of the war in Laos, the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia (which Hanoi claims was a CIA plot although there is no such indication), and the invasion of Cambodia.

Nixon even succeeded in making a Communist ally out of Cambodia's pleasure-loving Prince Sihanouk, Tung scoffed.

"we couldn't do that," he said. "But your Nixon did."

The editor said Nixon undertook the Cambodian operation only days after Secretary of State William P. Rogers told Congress it wouldn't be done, and after a Senate committee voted against helping the Lon Nol government in Cambodia.

"Nixon acted in defiance of the legislature," Tung said. "His acts bring much dissent. He is more unpopular than Kennedy or Johnson."

NEWARK, N.J.
NEWS

JUN 7 1970
E - 267,289
S - 423,331

Moscow's Worry

Moscow's foreign affairs experts are having difficulty these days deciding whether Indochina is menaced more by U.S. or Red Chinese "imperialism."

Criticism of the American-South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia has given way to warnings to all Southeast Asian states to beware Chinese meddling in their internal affairs. Cambodia itself was singled out for a special Red alert.

Moscow might have been expected to attribute Sihanouk's overthrow to machinations of the CIA. For rarely has there been a political upheaval in the area without Washington's not-so-secret agents being implicated. Not so, this time.

Peking is held responsible for meddling so clumsily that "rightist Cambodian forces" were driven to ousting Sihanouk.

Moscow's concern is appreciable. Understandably so. Red China has sublimated its internal squabbles to new and bolder ventures abroad. The New Left is Maoist—not Stalinist, Leninist or Moscovite—and the fount is Peking, not Moscow.

Thai troop movements hint at partition of Cambodia

Daily World Foreign Department Premier Prepass Charusathira of Thailand announced in Bangkok on Friday that all Thai troops on the Cambodian border had been placed on the alert because "Communist troops" were beginning to infiltrate from Cambodia into two Thai border provinces.

The Thai government began distributing circulars to the men of its armed forces who belong to the nation's 400,000-strong Cambodian (Khmer) minority, informing them that they can "volunteer" for duty in Cambodia.

Asian observers view these developments, together with the Saigon regime announcement that its troops will remain in Cambodia "indefinitely," as a move toward the de facto partition of Cambodia between the Saigon regime and Thailand. The most likely dividing line would be the Mekong River, which separates Cambodia into east and west.

Thailand had agreed last month to send large amounts of military and naval equipment to the hard-pressed Lon Nol regime in Phnom Penh. The Thai arms shipments will include 20 fully-armed river gunboats, 50,000 sets of "defense support equipment"—uniforms, boots, raincoats, mess-kits, canteens and mosquito nets—plus stocks of arms and ammunition.

CIA-trained troops

When troops from Thailand's Cambodian minority enter Cambodia, they may join up with Cambodian minority forces from South Vietnam, thousands of whom are being used as shock troops in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to man Special Forces camps along the South

Vietnam-Cambodian border. These CIA-trained organized and equipped troops now make up the leading element of Lon Nol's army.


The U.S. influence, particularly that of the CIA and Special Forces, is heaviest of all in Thailand, where a U.S. military mission has been working since 1950, and where both military and police units are completely U.S. trained and equipped.

Many of the so-called "volunteers" from the Cambodian minority in Thailand will undoubtedly be members of the former Free Cambodia (Khmer Serei) movement established by Thai intelligence under CIA direction. The Khmer Serei's cover was blown when Thai officers were captured last summer in western Cambodia bringing arms and supplies to these alleged "guerrilla" groups.

Cambodian liberation forces yesterday strengthened their hold on Setbo, a village 10 miles south of Phnom Penh as the Lon Nol regime ordered massive air and artillery strikes on the area. U.S. and Saigon troops in eastern Cambodia are still searching in vain for the well-publicized "Central Office for South Vietnam" (COSVN), which was supposed to be directing National Liberation Front operations in South Vietnam from Cambodia.

COSVN was given as the major objective of the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, but President Nixon did not mention it once in his Wednesday night address to the nation. And though Nixon asserted the Cambodian invasion had saved American lives, the official U.S. casualty figures show a total of 750 GIs killed in May in Cambodia and South Vietnam, the highest toll in nine months.

SE officials
33



THE U.S. CANNOT WIN IN CAM BODIA

RALFIGH, N.C.
NEWS & OBSERVER

M - 130,652

S - 148,247

JUN 6 1970

The Byrd Provision

West Virginia Sen. Robert Byrd's addition to the Cooper-Church amendment just about cancels the amendment itself. To a proviso cutting off funds for American ground or air operations in Cambodia after June 30, Byrd would add a clause empowering the chief executive to take "such action as may be necessary to protect the lives of U. S. forces in South Vietnam or to facilitate the withdrawal of U. S. forces from South Vietnam."

That language appears to authorize anything from another Cambodia invasion to a foray into Red China. And it isn't very cheering to learn that Nixon is vitally interested in the Byrd provision — along with another to allow U. S. funding of Thai troops to "help beleaguered government forces" in Cambodia, as The Associated Press puts it.

Presumably, Nixon's fondness for the Byrd proviso originates in his belief that his commander-in-chief powers should not be encroached upon. But another potential reason nags at the mind: U. S. shoring up of Cambodia's Lon Nol regime.

The vigorous administration effort to popularize the Cambodian invasion has, strangely enough, virtually ignored Cambodia's internal difficulties. Yet, a connection is hinted at by several things. Most noticeable is the fact that our decision to invade came soon after the Lon Nol faction toppled Sihanouk. We had already shipped weapons to the new government, which has since slaughtered large numbers of

innocent civilians and undertaken a campaign of political repression.

There have been fascinating sidelights to these developments. For instance, around May 19 it was reported that a study by Communist intelligence agents had concluded that the U. S. and the CIA had nothing to do with Lon Nol's ascent to power. The report came from "a Communist source," and Communist sources are not in the habit of broadcasting their intelligence to the world. More recently the CIA — not known for its public revelations, either — accused Lon Nol of selling rice to the Viet Cong some five years ago.

One can make of all this what one pleases. Maybe there isn't a thought in the President's mind of trying to keep another Southeast Asian political regime in power. But the fear that we could be heading in that direction is easily raised by Nixon's enthusiasm for the Byrd provision, by his announcement that air strikes in Cambodia may continue after our troops leave, by South Vietnam's determination to stay on, and by the various strange circumstances surrounding Lon Nol's victory and the subsequent U. S. invasion. It is perilously simple for a limited exercise in troop protection to become a long-term attempt at regime preservation. The Byrd provision, which is reminiscent of the Tonkin Resolution, needs considerable rewriting. If it doesn't get that, it deserves defeat.

E 5210

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

June 4, 1970

Year after year, we attempted to raise the market level in our "prestige" sales following the low market levels set in Europe. We were surprisingly successful in this for many years but the weight of free imports was just too much for us and we failed in 1967 and the years since . . . this in spite of the superior quality of American raised mink!

Moreover, the Scandinavian approach has been primarily to concentrate on the first buyer, that is the dealers and brokers. Their very limited advertising in the fashion magazines has not, in my opinion, been of the proper quality to sustain the image of mink as a prestige and luxury item.

This Scandinavian approach to our market only made sense in a short term, quick profit, complete disregard for the future, policy. With this cynical approach to the mink market, is it any surprise that they now turn to newer fields such as Europe where they will undoubtedly repeat their destructive policies.

Both the fashion acceptance erosion and the U.S. business decline has acted to reduce mink pelt consumption in the United States. This decline in luxury purchases has not yet been reflected in Europe. Their general business has remained at a high level and 1969 was a banner year in the European fur business. Since the European fur market was very strong the Scandinavians found a ready sale at home for their pelts and consequently sold less to the United States.

The American mink ranching situation is deadly serious; in fact the industry now faces the possibility of extinction.

The number of ranchers has been reduced from 7200 in 1962 to 2400 in 1969.

Pelt prices have now reached disaster levels. After suffering the price break due to the flood of imports in 1967, the market is now further depressed by slowing business, restricted credit and a major decline in the stock market. Average gross auction price received for pelt sales from 1960 through 1966 was slightly over \$18.00 per pelt; in 1967, '68, and '69 the average was \$14.75, a drop of 18%. Preliminary figures for the first three months of 1970, show a gross average of \$12.75, a drop of 30.4% from the first quarter of 1969.

It is most important to realize that these gross sales prices do not represent net to the rancher. Sales costs must be deducted. For example, the gross average sales price for mutation pelts for the first three months of 1970 are reported to be \$11.41 per pelt. After the auction commission of 5 1/4%, Association deduction of 2 1/4% and \$1.75 per pelt tanning costs (56% were dressed), the true average net return to the rancher was \$9.53. These prices are definitely confiscatory. Almost every American mink rancher is operating at a loss at current market levels.

Mink ranchers receive their money when the pelts are sold after a year of costly operation. This means that they have to finance a whole year's operation in advance. The usual credit sources have been the auction companies, production credit and local banks. All of these sources have understandably been tightening up. Just recently another major blow was delivered to mink ranching's future when the New York Auction Company announced that they will not make their traditional livestock loans to ranchers this year. The seriousness of this is apparent when it is realized that their livestock loans have averaged between four and five million dollars a year.

Since final announcement of this credit policy was made just recently, affected ranchers had already invested five months' cost into a new crop. This refusal of credit will drive even more ranchers out of business and some will be forced to turn them loose or pelt their animals now when the pelts are worthless.

The low market has eaten up the mink rancher's working capital and these contin-

ually dropping prices along with the drying up of credit sources has set mink farming on a ruinous course.

In our experiences, from 1960 on, in trying to gain some relief from excessive imports we have consistently been rebuffed on the basis that we must demonstrate actual injury rather than prospective harm. It seems that a corpse must be shown to prove sickness. Well, we now have plenty of dead mink ranches to exhibit but still have no relief.

Unless substantial help is extended quickly, the American Mink Ranching Industry will go bankrupt and disappear from the American business scene.

Gentlemen, please don't permit it to be said that the mink ranching industry died because of the lack of protective legislation.

Mink Ranchers are vulnerable from almost every angle:

1. They gamble a whole year's investment before coming to market.

2. They are completely open to world competition without any import control or government price support.

3. They have no patent protection for their new genetic color inventions even though horticulturists can patent new plants.

4. There is inadequate protection against imported pelts being passed off as United States products.

5. Mink is a fashion item and mink is a luxury commodity and, therefore, extremely susceptible to changes in business conditions; under current conditions the mink ranching industry is in a depression.

6. Mink equipment and particularly housing of the animals is not adaptable to other uses. Across the country hundreds and hundreds of mink ranchers have their life savings invested in mink shelters, pens and nest boxes (one for each mink); and when they are forced to quit, there is no recovery value in this equipment. Lucky is the rancher who can realize five cents on each dollar invested!

WALTER TAYLOR.

FED-UP PROFESSOR

HON. WM. JENNINGS BRYAN DORN

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 4, 1970

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, while in Charleston, S.C., I read a splendid and timely editorial in the News and Courier which I commend to my colleagues and to the people of our country who have supported and provided the greatest free educational system in the history of the world:

FED-UP PROFESSOR

It is decidedly encouraging, after a year of chaos on so many college campuses, to find a professor who describes himself as a "liberal" striking out against what he describes as "the tyranny of spoiled brats." Prof. K. Ross Toole, 40, father of seven children, is professor of history at the University of Montana at Missoula.

Universities in California, in the East and points in between sorely need more men of Prof. Toole's caliber. "I'm," he writes in an article in The Washington Post, "sick of the 'young generation,' hippies, Yuppies, militants and nonsense . . . I am tired of being blamed, maimed and contrite. I am tired of tolerance and the reaching out (which is always my function) for understanding. I am sick of total irrationality of the campus 'rebel,' whose bearded visage, dirty hair, body odor and 'tactics' are childish but brutal, naive but dangerous and the essence of arrogant tyranny, the tyranny of spoiled brats."

This is strong stuff, to be sure, especially coming from a man who classifies himself as a "liberal." There are far too many so-called liberal professors on college campuses who not only sympathize with student rebels but support their lawless activities.

Prof. Toole says it is time to call a halt. It's time, he says, "to live in an adult world where we belong and time to put these people in their places. We owe the 'younger generation' what all 'older generations' have owed younger generations—love, protection to a point and respect when they deserve it. We do not owe them our souls, our privacy, our whole lives, and above all, we do not owe them immunity from our mistakes, or their own."

Since when, asks Prof. Toole, have children ruled this country? "By virtue of what right," he asks, "by what accomplishment should thousands of teen-agers, wet behind the ears and utterly without the benefit of having lived long enough to have either judgment or wisdom, become the sages of our time?"

Prof. Toole does not spare himself or his colleagues. "We (professors and faculties in particular), in a paroxysm of self-abnegation and apology, go along, abdicate, apologize as if we had personally created the ills of the world—and thus lend ourselves to chaos. We are the led, not the leaders. And we are fools."

What to do about it? Prof. Toole endorses a simple remedy. "Facilities," he says, "should stop playing chicken . . . demonstrators should be met not by police but with expulsions. The power to expel (strangely unused) has been the legitimate recourse of universities since 1209 . . . Expulsion is merely the assertion of an old, accepted and necessary right of the administration of any institution. The failure of university administrators to use it is one of the mysteries of our permissive age—and the blame must fall largely on faculties because they have consistently pressured administrators not to act."

Prof. Toole also describes himself as "a square." If he is, there are plenty more people in this nation who share his views. It is too bad that most of them do not seem to be as articulate as the Missoula professor.

A parent of the sort of college student Prof. Toole says he is "sick of" has the power to exercise an alternative to the professor's proposed use of expulsion. The parent can simply tell his offspring that if he wants to go to college for the purpose of destroying and fomenting rebellion, he can pay his own way. It will be interesting to see how many parents will begin withdrawing financial support from children who insist on being campus militants. Parents, as well as faculties, should stop playing chicken.

A CITIZEN LOOKS AT THE WAR

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 4, 1970

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, the fantasy of the "silent majority" has been dissolved in the wake of the events of this past May. I have received a tremendous number of letters and wires on the subject of the war in Indochina and these letters, Mr. Speaker, demonstrate more than just a passing interest in the war.

An excellent example of an insightful and penetrating look at this conflict was sent to me by J. William Pezick of Berkeley, Calif.

June 4, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

of experience he had, a man was credited with 1 year of high school. Two of the trainees were not high school graduates.

A 4-week initial phase was devoted to orientation and basic instruction in math, physics, chemistry, and communications. The classes were taught by a high school teacher and a chemist, who worked part time, and the program's regular instructor, Gordon Perley. (Perley, 34, has been in the waste water treatment field for 12 years and has been a licensed stationary engineer, qualified to handle power equipment, for the past 4 years. He and other full-time instructors in other cities were taught how to teach the courses through a series of seminars held around the Nation last year under the direction of the U.S. Office of Education.)

A good deal of the instruction in the first phase was by movies and slides. The trainees also toured a number of water treatment plants and learned the fundamentals of handling chlorine.

The second phase lasted 21 weeks and the course of instruction became somewhat less tightly structured as the men spent only 1 day a week in class and 4 in on-the-job training at four different plants. They now studied their basic courses in some depth. And they learned about the tanks, pumps, meters, valves, and mixers in a treatment plant and actually performed some of the tasks in the treatment of water wastes, under the expert guidance of skilled foremen.

After the second phase they graduated from the apprentice ranks. Each was classed as an Operator I, the first step on the career ladder, was tested, and received a raise in pay.

During the third and final phase, they have been spending all 5 days a week in on-the-job training, with Perley exercising general supervision in the four plants. To reach Operator II status, each man will be required to have 1 year's experience.

One of the trainees is Walter Davis, 45, a high school dropout. Unlike most of the recruits, he was not a new hire. He had been a janitor for the St. Louis Sewer District for 2 years, earning \$2.67 an hour, when he entered the program. He is now an Operator I and plans to make waste water treatment plant operation a career.

"At first you're kind of frightened, especially with the math, and with so much equipment to get acquainted with," he said. "But when you get into it, it's not as hard as you think."

SHORTER COURSE URGED

He was not bothered by the classroom training as high school dropouts often are. "It's better than just on-the-job training, where they just explain it and you get too much to remember," he said. "We got the basic principles (in class) and when you go on the job, you know what to expect and to look for. It makes it much easier."

He said he liked the training and the work "very much." He added: "They say they're short of people in this particular trade. So it's steady work and there's no telling how far you can go. People think it's a dirty job but usually it isn't. It's got great possibilities and really looks promising for the future. Once you get the training you can get a job anywhere."

The program was deliberately designed nationally to upgrade in-plant employees like Davis. The idea was that moving such men upward out of routine jobs would help create a more flexible career ladder within local civil service structures. Moving men upward also opens entry-level jobs to the hard-core unemployed.

"It's a good thorough course," said Perley. "But 44 weeks is long and I'd like to see it shortened. We need more manpower and we need it now. I'd like to see the classes cut down from 320 hours to about 160. It's worth a try. We could use 20 to 30 more trained men right now (in the St. Louis system)."

FACT SHEETS OF COMMITTEE OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 4, 1970

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars is comprised of students and faculty who believe in the necessity of relating the professional study of Asia to current ethical and political problems. Founded in 1968, the committee now has chapters at every major university center for the study of Asia in the United States.

The Harvard chapter of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars has revised and updated its packet of fact sheets. I think my colleagues in the House would be most interested in the information presented by CCAS and at this point I insert the fact sheets in the RECORD:

A REBUTTAL TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S APRIL 30 SPEECH

(A fact sheet issued by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, Harvard University.)

In an attempt to justify his decisions, President Nixon "explains" the situation in Cambodia and tells us what we will do.

"For the past five years . . . North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries . . . Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries four weeks ago."

In fact, on March 18 a right wing coup in Cambodia replaced Prince Sihanouk (the man who had kept Cambodia neutral and spared her the agonies of the war) with General Lon Nol, whose troops began attacking Vietnamese Communist forces. When the Vietnamese Communists began fighting back, they were driving away from the Vietnamese border, toward Phnom Penh, where rightist Lon Nol has his headquarters.

"The aid we will provide will be limited to the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality."

Cambodian neutrality was destroyed in mid-March when General Lon Nol, in anticipation of U.S. backing, overthrew the neutralist government of Prince Sihanouk and turned Cambodia into a battlefield for foreign powers.

"Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and their military supplies destroyed, we will withdraw."

Even if the U.S. withdraws its combat forces from Cambodia, the Saigon regime has indicated that it has no similar intention regarding withdrawal of its own forces. The South Vietnamese Army is reliant upon the U.S. for everything from spare parts to transportation to advisers to tactical combat support. By creating a situation in which the South Vietnamese could invade Cambodia, Nixon has opened a wider Indochina war and jeopardized the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam.

"I warn the North Vietnamese that if they continue to escalate the fighting when the United States is withdrawing its forces, I shall meet my responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces to take the action that I consider necessary to defend the security of our American men."

Since the North Vietnamese "escalation" of which Nixon speaks is self-defense, he seems to be telling them that he reserves the right to employ U.S. forces in any way he sees fit, but if they fight back, he will escalate even further.

"We have stopped the bombing of North Vietnam."

Yes, but four air raids were flown during the week following Nixon's speech and the

Secretary of Defense has threatened that more raids will be launched if the North Vietnamese attempt to interfere with the daily U.S. violations of North Vietnamese air space.

"... the future of South Vietnam (should) be determined not by North Vietnam, not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves."

These are strange words from a country that actively supported a regime (Diem's) which obstructed the holding of elections for all of Vietnam in 1956, and since then has virtually dictated the political life of the southern half of Vietnam. Not only would the Thieu regime fall if it did not have our support, it would never have come to power had we not been there.

"American policy since then [1954] has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people . . . from 1965-69, we did not have any diplomatic mission whatever [there]."

It was not due to voluntary disengagement that we had no diplomatic mission in Cambodia from 1965-69. Prince Sihanouk refused all U.S. military and civilian aid after 1963, and broke off diplomatic relations entirely in 1965 when it appeared that the CIA was attempting to overthrow him. Since then, the CIA has continued to recruit, train, and pay elements of the Khmer Serel, a right-wing group opposed to Sihanouk.

The President's final remarks reveal what seems to be the real reasons for his decision:

"If when the chips are down the U.S. acts like a pitiful giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world."

The fear that we will be regarded as weak and spineless if we withdraw from Southeast Asia is contrary to the opinions expressed by the majority of the world diplomatic community. Many countries, rather than seeing us now as a staunch defender of peace and freedom, consider us stubborn and senseless in our continued attempts to win a clear-cut victory. As a leading Japanese official said recently, "What we are concerned about in Vietnam is not your good faith, but your good judgement." The most prominent result of our actions seems to have been to alienate our allies and bring untold horror and suffering to hundreds of thousands of American and Vietnamese soldiers and families.

"A Republican Senator [Aiken, Vermont] has said that this action means my party has lost all chance of winning the November elections. Others are saying today that this move against the enemy sanctuaries will make me a one-term President. No one is more aware than I of the political consequences of the action I have taken. It is tempting to take the easy political path. . . ."

This tone of martyrdom is distasteful. He insists on attempting to strengthen his arguments by calling attention to the difficulty of the decisions he must make. The difficulty of a decision however is no insurance of its correctness. Unless his decision can be justified on other terms, his emotional appeal merely clouds the issue.

One does not "withdraw" by attacking. One does not stop a war from "dragging on interminably" by widening it. One does not "keep casualties down" by sending troops into battle.

CAMBODIA

(A fact sheet issued by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, Harvard University.)

Area: 70,000 square miles.
Population: 8½ million; 85% Cambodian, 8% Vietnamese, 6% Chinese.

Government: Neutralist Kingdom until Army coup of March, 1970.

Capital: Phnom Penh (pop. 450,000).

Armed forces: The Cambodian Army

June 4, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

CAMBODIA THROUGH ASIAN EYES

HON. DON EDWARDS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 4, 1970

STATINT

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, viewed through Asian eyes, the present military role of the United States in Indochina has its historical precedent in Japan's militarist expansion. According to Tokuma Utsunomiya, member of the Japanese House of Representatives, it was under the banner of anticommunism that the Japanese militarists expanded their battlefronts throughout Asia, on the pretext of severing, enemy supply lines and destroying enemy rear bases, a policy which eventually led to the Pacific war. While the analogy is not exact, it is uncomfortably close to what is taking place in Indochina today—close enough to provide a clear warning to us. Such a warning from Asians who are friendly to the United States is contained in the following declaration unanimously adopted by the 110-member Afro-Asian Problems Research Group of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. After the declaration, I would like to insert in the RECORD Mr. Utsunomiya's observations on President Nixon's intervention in Cambodia.

The material referred to follows:

DECLARATION ON CAMBODIA

The series of actions undertaken recently by the United States against Cambodia is very similar in nature to the mistakes made by the militarists of our country in the process leading from the China Incident to the outbreak of the Pacific War. Because Japan's militarists possessed overwhelmingly superior military forces, they believed that problems could be solved by military might and they launched one large-scale military campaign after another. This endless expansion of hostilities finally led to the Pacific War and brought our country to the verge of extinction. The greatest mistake lay in the belief in the possibility of military victory over nationalism.

The sole aim of Japan, as a friend of the United States, in participating in the Asian Conference on Cambodia, should be to give sincere advice to the United States on the basis of the experiences which Japan gained at the sacrifice of several million lives. Further, more than anything else, Japan must advise the United States that it is Asian nationalism—even before Communist expansionism—that the United States is facing in Indochina and that there can be no military solution there. Further, Japan must advise the United States that the continuation of military action beyond the present stage and the expansion of hostilities would simply force into the arms of Communism the great masses of the peoples of Asia in whom nationalism has just been awakened, would intensify the confrontation between Communist China and the free countries of the world and would give rise to an irrevocably serious situation in Asia.

Further, the schism in the public opinion within the United States is deep and many political leaders of good sense in the United States, such as Senators William Fulbright and Mike Mansfield, are worried that if the military escalation is allowed to continue blindly the United States could disintegrate from within.

If Japan loses this opportunity of showing her true friendship to the United States, Japan would be betraying the confidence in

quirement that each man should receive 1 pound of beef daily.

More recently, our Nation's astronauts before leaving on their epic journeys into space enjoyed a hearty breakfast featuring beef steak.

Whatever your household custom for dining might be or whatever your favorite cut of beef, no doubt the entire family will be happy with "Beef for Father's Day."

SOVIET UNION UPSTAGES THE WEST IN NIGERIA

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 4, 1970

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, Col. Irving Salomon, the distinguished head of our San Diego County World Affairs Council, has an extensive set of credentials in foreign affairs. His activities include being a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations and chairman and vice chairman of the American delegation to the UNESCO conferences in Paris and Geneva. He has traveled extensively in Africa and is recognized for his expertise in Soviet and African affairs. I know my House colleagues will find his analysis of Soviet opportunism in Nigeria of great interest and am pleased to share his recent article from the San Diego Union:

SOVIET UNION UPSTAGES THE WEST IN NIGERIA

(By Irving Salomon)

The Soviet Union is prone to seize any opportunity whenever a major nation of the West becomes persona non grata and where there is a chance to enhance its future position.

No greater international opportunist for extending influence exists in the world today than Russia. Whenever there are impatient stirrings among the citizenship of an undeveloped country and wherever there is disenchantment with a former colonial nation or with any major power, Russia can be counted upon to step in.

A case in point is Nigeria which is attempting to recover from its years of warfare with the Biafrans. While the conflict was still in progress, Gen. Yakubu Gowon made the statement that he was going to avoid the danger of economic domination by any one country or group of countries, and to seek a balance of foreign interests. That gave the Soviet Union just the cue.

This condition was made possible for Russian opportunism by the fact that the British press coverage favored Biafra and the British refused to give Nigeria the bombers or big guns they requested.

France also has been distinctly at a disadvantage because of the widespread ill feeling toward it due to its support of Biafra. Under these circumstances, and as could be expected, the Soviet Union came forth with MIGs and Ilyushins as well as a couple dozen 122mm guns. This material was accompanied by a flood of Russian propaganda.

It was particularly publicized for the U.S.S.R. when Gen. Gowon called in the Soviet ambassador, Alexander Iosifovich Romanov, just after the war, to express his personal thanks.

The Russians also took careful note that the United States lost its stance in Nigeria because of its careful non-commitment in

the Biafran struggle. So with Britain, France and the United States of America cashiered, Russia could cash in—easily—and today has the strongest position.

Nigeria's economic development was interrupted by the war, but it has many interesting investment opportunities for the United States and other Western nations. How the Russian influence will affect American potential investors is a question.

It will be interesting to watch what the Soviet Union will do both politically and economically with the foothold it has established.

SPIRO MAY SAVE AMERICA

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 4, 1970

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, an editorial commentary in the Wednesday, May 27 Greek Press of Chicago, is interesting in its emphasis and timing coming, as it does from a publication whose publishers and editors have been keen observers of the public career of Vice President Spiro Agnew. The editorial, in my opinion, merits attention and, therefore, I am pleased to insert it in the RECORD at this point:

SPIRO MAY SAVE AMERICA

These days of intensive communist efforts aiming at the creation of confusion and leading to anarchy with an ultimate goal the destruction of the American Society, voices like Spiro T. Agnew's assume a crucial significance.

If any one man in America today can save the country from deluge this man is Vice President Spiro T. Agnew.

Because Spiro is a man, he stands up and calls a spade a spade without mincing words.

He said the other day in Texas: "I have sworn I will uphold the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Those who would tear our country apart or try to bring down its government are enemies, whether here or abroad, whether destroying libraries and classrooms on a college campus, or firing at American troops from a rice paddy in Southeast Asia."

This is the crux of our troubles today. The minute we identify our enemies we have diagnosed our disease. The cure is easy. Because the body of America is strong. And it is strong because we have men in our Society like Spiro.

Spiro's critics want him to "cool it." And who are his critics?

"The loudest complaints," Spiro tells us, "come from those really illiberal, self-appointed guardians of our destiny who would like to run the country without ever submitting to the elective process as we in public office must do."

These are the so-called "liberals" who tell our students that "until you people are prepared to kill your parents you aren't ready for the revolution . . . The American school system will be ended in two years. We are going to bring it down. Quit becoming students. Become criminals. We have to disrupt every institution and break every law."

These are the dirty young rebels who invoke the Constitution in order to destroy it.

"That happens to be my Constitution too," Agnew reminds them. "It guarantees my free speech as much as it does their freedom."

We pray God blesses America and Spiro T. Agnew. Because if the Constitution guarantees our Freedom, Spiro guarantees the preservation of our Constitution.

STATINTL

Nixon's hollow alibi

President Nixon's televised alibi Wednesday night asked the American people again to accept the same old premises that Indochina events daily refute. These fabrications now have less credibility than the claim of Lester Maddox to be a humanist.

Contrary to Washington's official version, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique in Phnom Penh was installed in power behind the back of the Cambodian people by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and is sustained only by invading U.S. and puppet Saigon and Thai troops. Representing it as a legitimate government is a lie.

Contrary to Washington's official version, this gang of traitors merely followed Washington's instructions by "requesting" military and economic assistance, which, naturally, the magnanimous Nixon government pretended to dispatch with haste out of the purity of its heart and its devotion to "freedom" and the right of peoples to "self-determination."

Contrary to Washington's official version, the U.S. satellite government of Thailand, totally dependent on Washington's handouts and completely subservient to Washington's dictation, went through the motion of "offering" to send "volunteers" to support the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak mob, as if there had been no previously thought-out plan to arm, equip and transport units of the Thai regular armed forces to Cambodia, trained by U.S. Green Beret officers, to implement the racist Nixon Doctrine of using Asians to kill Asians.

The stark fact is that the entire Cambodian fiasco was conceived, planned and carried out by the Washington administration after months — even years — of efforts to oust Prince Sihanouk and convert Cambodia into a tool of U.S. neo-colonialism.

These formalities after the fact are nothing more than the Nixon Administration's efforts to build a facade of legality for its blatant and crude violation of every principle of international law.

A good and wise President of the United State, Abraham Lincoln, is credited with having said that "you can fool all of the people some of the time and some of the people all the time, but you can't fool all the people all the time."

By disregarding and trying to disprove Lincoln, Nixon and his advisers have foundered. Outside the United States, people regard Nixon's assertions with disgust and derision. Here at home the Nixon government has maneuvered itself into a crisis of confidence.

4 June 1970

A Special Supplement:

CAMBODIA

Noam Chomsky

I

In 1947, commenting on the rising tide of "anti-Communist" hysteria in the United States, John K. Fairbank made the following perceptive observations:

Our fear of Communism, partly as an expression of our general fear of the future, will continue to inspire us to aggressive anti-

Communist policies in Asia and elsewhere, [and] the American people will be led to think and may honestly believe that the support of anti-Communist governments in Asia will somehow defend the American way of life. This line of American policy will lead to American aid to establish regimes which attempt to suppress the popular movements in Indonesia, Indochina, the Philippines, and China.... Thus, after setting out to fight Communism in Asia, the American people will be obliged in the end to fight the peoples of Asia.

This American aggression abroad will be associated with an increasing trend toward anti-Communist authoritarianism within the United States, which its victims will call fascism and which may eventually make it impossible to have discussions like this one today. This American fascism will come, if it comes, because American liberals have joined the American public in a fear of Communism from abroad rather than fascism at home as the chief totalitarian menace.¹

These remarks have proved to be followed, must be understood as accurate. The events of the past few further step in the internationalization weeks reveal, once again, how the of the Vietnam war. However, the American policy of "anti-Communist coup should also be seen in the ism"—to be more precise, the effort to context of developments internal to prevent the development of indigenous Cambodia over the past several years. movements that might extricate their These factors are, of course, inter-societies from the integrated world related. system dominated by American capital—

Since early 1964 the United States draws the American government, step has been conducting its war in Indo-by fateful step, into an endless war china from sanctuaries scattered from against the people of Asia, and, as an Thailand to Okinawa. The bombard-ment of Laos, which appears to have

inevitable concomitant, toward harsh repression and defiance of law at home.

The invasion of Cambodia by the United States and its Saigon subsidiary comes as no surprise, in the light of recent events in Southeast Asia. Since 1968, the United States has steadily escalated the war in Laos, both on the ground, as the CIA-sponsored Clandestine Army swept through the Plain of Jars in late 1969, and from the air. When the report of the Symington subcommittee on Laos was finally released on April 20, the Washington *Post* carried the front-page headline: *US ESCALATES WAR IN LAOS, HILL DISCLOSES*. The headline was accurate; other evidence, to which I shall return in a later article, shows that the subcommittee hearings seriously understate the scale, and the grim effects, of the American escalation. This American escalation provoked a response by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam, who now control more of Laos than ever before, and led to devastation and population removal on a vast scale.

The destabilizing event in Cambodia—assiduously ignored by President Nixon in his speech of April 30 announcing the American invasion²—was the right-wing coup of March 18 which overthrew Prince Sihanouk and drove him into an alliance with the Cambodian left and the mass popular movements of Laos and Vietnam, which are dominated by left-wing forces. The coup, and the events that

begun in May, 1964, and the intensive bombardment of North and South Vietnam that followed in February, 1965, make use of bases in Thailand, South Vietnam, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Guam, not to speak of the naval units that control the surrounding oceans. The control center for the bombing of North Vietnam and Northern Laos is in Thailand, presumably, at Udorn airbase. In 1968, the bombing of Laos greatly increased in intensity, when aircraft formerly employed against North Vietnam were shifted to the bombardment of Laos. In 1969, the bombing of Northern Laos was again greatly intensified as infiltration fell off on the so-called "Ho Chi Minh Trail." Most of this area has long been under Pathet Lao control.

As a glance at the map makes clear, the bombing of Northern Laos takes

place in a region far removed from the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" and has no direct connection to the war in South Vietnam. It is, in fact, directed against civilian targets and has resulted in almost total destruction of most settled areas and forced evacuation of much of the population. Where people remain, they live, for the most part, in caves and tunnels. According to American Embassy figures, the population remaining in the Pathet Lao zones is over a million, well over a third of the population of Laos. There may be as many as three-quarters of a million refugees in the government-controlled areas. The planes that attack Northern Laos are based in Thailand, whereas the bombing of Southern Laos (including the "Ho Chi Minh Trail") originates from Danang, Pleiku, and the Seventh Fleet. Now the Thai bases are also being used to bomb Cambodia.³

The American escalation of the war in Laos provoked a response by the Communist forces, which now control more of Laos than ever before. (I shall

ST. CLOUD, MINN.

TIMES

JUN 4 1970

E - 24,208

Other Editors

THE WORLD'S NIGHTMARE

There were never more than suspicions, generated by patterns of the past, that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had anything to do with the deposing of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia last March 18. The possibility of CIA participation was promptly discounted by American and neutral sources, and now it is reported from Phnom Penh that communist East Bloc intelligence agents have concluded the CIA played no part in the coup.

This is gratifying, but why should the CIA be so automatically suspect throughout the world? A recent commentary by the eminent British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, bears on the subject:

"For the world as a whole, the CIA has now become the bogey that communism has been for America. Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it. Our phobia about the CIA is, no doubt, as fantastically excessive as America's phobia about world communism; but in this case, too, there is just enough convincing evidence to make the phobia genuine. In fact, the roles of Russia and America have been reversed in the world's eyes. Today America has become the world's nightmare."

Is that what has happened to the American dream? This may be only one man's opinion but it is the opinion of a leading world citizen whose profession is the evaluation and analysis of historic events. Professor Toynbee, who has lived in America, in the Middle West, and who has a good understanding of America, believes that "the most terrifying feature" of

American life today is America's failure to deal with its domestic problems, and he rightly thinks the fate of the world will be profoundly affected by whether America manages to deal with them.

Isn't it about time that Americans assumed the responsibilities that go with pre-eminent world power, and start exercising the constructive leadership of which they are capable?

—St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Fraud upon fraud

On April 30 President Nixon, in announcing the invasion of Cambodia, said the target of the assault was the "headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam."

In order to give an appearance of truth to this fiction, the Pentagon's public relations operatives gave a name, the "Central Office of South Vietnam," and an acronym, "COSVN," to the mirage.

This goal has proved to be a fraud.

Press dispatches indicate that what Nixon called the "key control center" for all "Communist" operations did not exist.

A week later, on May 8, in an attempt to pacify massive revulsion in the U.S. at his invasion order, Nixon said that South Vietnam forces would leave Cambodia about June 30 when U.S. forces are scheduled to leave. This, too, has proved to be a fraud.

The Saigon killers, Thieu and Ky, have said repeatedly since then that they have no intention of getting out by June 30; and the Pentagon has indicated it will support their continued invasion with U.S. air power.

Furthermore, several thousand Cambodian mercenaries, who are directed and paid by the CIA, have been ordered into the invasion area. They are nominally under Saigon command but, actually, under the CIA.

Wednesday night, Nixon will attempt on TV to disperse the growing anger and resistance among the people to his invasion order which has already cost more than 200 additional GI dead.

It will be an attempt to cover the real purposes of the invasion which is to widen U.S. domination over Southeast Asia by the mercenaries of Saigon, of Phnom Penh, of Bangkok, paid for by U.S. tax dollars, and backed up by U.S. GIs.

E - 267,289
S - 423,331

JUN 2 1970

Marasco Tells of Cambodia Spy Network

By RICHARD BILOTTI
Evening News Staff Writer

Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco, appearing in a filmed interview tonight on NBC-TV's "First Tuesday," says he took part in a treaty-breaking spy network which many times reached into neutral Cambodia.

Marasco, who was accused last July by the Army of murdering an alleged Vietnamese triple agent, refused to answer—because of security reasons—whether he did kill the agent, who was considered to be a threat to the security of American operation. However, Marasco did give a "hypothetical" answer to justify the killing of such a spy.

In the interview, conducted by NBC's Sander Vanocur, Marasco reviews the events which lead to the disappearance of the agent and why he thinks he and seven other Green Berets were charged with conspiring to murder. The charges were later dropped by the Army.

Marasco says he was in charge of an intelligence operation "right on the Cambodian border in the Mekong Delta," which included three Americans and "at one point we had approximately 20 agents, indigenous agents, both Cambodian and Vietnamese."

He says his operations took him in the "vicinity of Phnom Penh," Cambodia's capital, and they included keeping a close watch on the activities of Cambodian Prince Sihanouk.

Sihanouk Important

He notes that it was important to watch Sihanouk to find out if he had any contact with the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong, and added that his intelligence sources found the prince had such contacts.

Marasco, who is now an insurance salesman in Bloomfield,



ROBERT F. MARASCO

speculates about the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk:

"I don't doubt that there was some other thing involved in his being deposed. Possibly his generals were strong enough and had enough support to do it on their own, but as I said, I don't doubt that other people had something to do with it."

Marasco says it is likely that both the American and South Vietnamese intelligence organizations were involved. "I'm sure that the CIA and the South Vietnamese counterpart of the CIA had intelligence agents inside of Cambodia. Any good intelligence network would," he says.

Marasco said he operated in the area under the fictitious name of Capt. Martin because "if I were captured, (the Army) could deny that there was anyone on the Army records named Capt. Martin. If they captured me, captured me as a spy, I do not come under the Geneva Convention as a spy, and the Army could deny that a Capt. Martin existed."

He notes that even the South Vietnamese did not know he was

running an intelligence operation and that it was necessary to keep the information from them because running such an independent spy network "is not in keeping with our treaties with the South Vietnamese government."

Problems Reported

He recalls that at the end of April or the beginning of May in 1969 his intelligence network began to have problems.

"I couldn't quite understand it. People who had been agents for a long time were quitting; people who were very good; who were getting well paid, all of a sudden we got many people that just quit. I couldn't understand that," he states.

Chuyen, the agent who was allegedly shot, was identified in a photo with a Viet Cong general, and after heavy interrogation both in Saigon and at Green Beret headquarters in Nha Trang he was pinpointed as a triple agent, Marasco states. Marasco describes Chuyen as a "well-paid principal agent who did not do the work himself" but controlled a network of lesser intelligence gatherers.

To Vanocur's question: "Did you kill this agent?" Marasco replies:

"That has been classified for security purposes by the Army and therefore I can't answer that."

He then says he couldn't answer "pointblank" what the CIA's "determination" was as to what should be done, but states:

"Hypothetically, you might say that if that situation did exist, you had to consider the three alternatives. First of all, putting him on ice and in some way it was determined that the capability to do that was not available, and that letting him go was too dangerous, then logically, although they could not officially sanction assassination, disposal of him, unofficially it was probably the best course of action."

Threatened Operations

Marasco notes that Chuyen was a danger to his operations because "the fact that we were bringing into Cambodia, which was a neutral country, of sup-

posedly a neutral country, would not have helped the international situation in the Paris peace talks or with some of the demonstrators back home. It would have been great to hit the newspapers. We did not want the fact that we were running that kind of an operation plastered all over the newspapers. It would have ruined our operation, it would have created a problem, a problem for the American situation in Vietnam as a whole."

Marasco states that if the matter had gone to trial the U.S. government, the CIA and the command in Saigon would have been "embarrassed."

"When I say the command in Saigon I'm referring to General (Creighton) Abrams and people on his staff who are other generals, lower ranking generals than General Abrams, who did not know that a unit" such as his existed.

Marasco says that "General Abrams is a tanker, an armor officer, and I don't know, maybe he's still in a World War II frame of mind: Put the tanks on line and charge. He has given all of the elite units a great deal of trouble. But I still don't, to this day, understand why he was so all-fired anxious to put us in bed."

2 JUN 1970

Beret Exposure

NEW YORK — Former Capt. Robert F. Marasco says that if the Army had not dropped murder charges against him and seven other Green Berets in the death of a South Vietnamese triple agent, the trial would have exposed what he termed the "incompetency" of the U.S. Command in Saigon.

Marasco, in a taped interview to be shown tonight on NBC-TV, said his intelligence operation, which he stated involved two teams of native spies working in the Parrot's - Peak section of Cambodia, was a violation of agreements with South Vietnam requiring cooperation in intelligence work.

In addition, Marasco said, he was told that Gen. Creighton Abrams and his top intelligence generals in Saigon did not even know of the existence of his unit.

"I would say offhand that the United States government would have been embarrassed, the CIA would have been embarrassed, the incompetency of the command in Saigon would have become very obvious," Marasco said.

STATINTL

WENATCHEE, WASH.
WORLD

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400210001

E - 22,650
S - 22,762

JUN 2 1970

Father awaits word from Cambodia

Eastsider still missing

By RAY SCHIRICK

The last letter that John D. Morrow, East Wenatchee, received from his son sounded much like any letter that a father might get from a son in Vietnam.

But this letter was different in two ways.

First, the son, Michael Morrow, 24, was not in Vietnam as a combatant. In fact, he is a conscientious objector, who went there as a correspondent for Dispatch News Service, a news agency that he helped found and which distributed the Pulitzer prize-winning story on the My Lai massacre.

Second, it was the last letter home before Morrow was reported missing in the Cambodian-South Vietnamese area. He is one of 12 correspondents reported missing in Cambodia in recent weeks.

The plight of Morrow, who disappeared May 7, and the others, has attracted world-wide efforts to locate them.

No definite word has yet been received, despite pleas to United Nations Secretary-General U Thant and the deposed Cambodian head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, reported in exile in Peking.

Most likely, they are considered prisoners of the Viet Cong.

However, the father here says he doesn't know for sure.

"One of three groups has Mike," says the elder Morrow, "the Viet Cong, the Cambodians or the C.I.A. (U.S. Counter-Intelligence Agency)."

Why C.I.A.?

It would mean, in effect, the South Vietnamese, said the father.

Young Morrow (he'll be 25 next July 24) has been a controversial figure during a rocket-like career that has had ups and downs.

Like some other missing U.S. journalists in Vietnam, he has been critical of our military involvement in Indochina.



MICHAEL MORROW
Missing Correspondent

In his own country, he has refused to report for induction into the armed forces.

When he returned to North America last fall to marry, he came not to East Wenatchee, but to Vancouver, B.C. There he married the Vietnamese girl he had met at University of Taipei on the island of Formosa.

He didn't come into the United States, because of a possible federal indictment for evading the draft.

The elder Morrow is critical of U.S. Selective Service's handling of his son's case.

"To bring a man out of the war zone, where he is performing a service for his country, isn't consistent with the best interests of the United States," said the father.

"I paid \$1,200 to fly him home in 1968 for a physical examination for Selective Service. U.S. authorities in Saigon refused his request for a physical examination there.

"The same day that Mike passed the physical, he was classified 1-A. His request for

conscientious objector status was refused."

One reason for Mike's becoming a conscientious objector was his feeling that the U.S. shouldn't be fighting in Indochina.

"He felt it was an illegal and immoral war," said his father.

After refusing to report for induction, Mike returned to Saigon, informing the local draft board here of his war zone address.

Why did Mike Morrow go to the Far East in the first place?

It was perhaps a combination of interest in newspapering and the Far East.

Newspapering may be in Mike's blood, says his father. His grandfather, a former state senator from King County, at one time was editor of the Seattle Argus. He also had the first newspaper in Ballard. Later he had a ranch and also was a job printer.

Mike's father wasn't a newspaperman.

The family moved here in connection with the father's job, representing English Electric Co., Ltd., which supplied electrical equipment for Grant County Public Utility District's Priest Rapids Dam.


The family had lived in Renton before coming to East Wenatchee.

Mike, after graduating from Eastmont High School (he was co-salutatorian and vice president of the senior class), went to Dartmouth College, majoring in Far Eastern affairs.

"The Far East was 'cracking' then," said his father. "The Orient apparently was becoming a very important factor in future considerations of world affairs. Mike was interested."

His final quarter at Dartmouth, Mike was excused to go to the Orient to learn conversational Chinese.

At the University of Taipei on Formosa, his future wife, Christine, a sociology major, was his tutor in Chinese. He



CHRISTINE MORROW
His Wife

tutored her in English.

Christine was born in Hanoi in North Vietnam. Her family migrated south to Saigon when the country became divided.

Mike's wife has become a U.S. citizen. She was sponsored by the elder Morrow here.

Today she lives in Saigon. She has been trying to gain information about Mike's whereabouts without much success.

She talks regularly by phone with Mike's parents here.

Recently, a South Vietnamese army unit reported finding Mike's press credentials. They were found in a plastic bag containing enemy documents, in a house where three enemy soldiers were killed in a gun battle on May 14, the South Vietnamese said.

Has the Morrow family thought of going to the war zone?

A brother, Peter, "speaks a little of going over there," said John Morrow. Peter, who speaks Chinese, graduates from the University of Washington this spring.

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400210001-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400210001-7
 June 1, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

foretaste of what would happen if NDEA-type programs were allowed to decline and, perhaps, be discontinued altogether.

My colleagues and I in higher education have been frankly worried by the thought that in the effort to find new means of financing necessary programs, old activities of proven worth may fall by the wayside, or receive insufficient attention and support. If there is to be new legislation of some kind, perhaps to create a Foundation for Higher Education as proposed by President Nixon, my colleagues and I want to be very sure that NDEA-type activities, and others related to them, do receive quite explicit authorization and assured financing both in the interim and in the longer run. We take some encouragement from the letter sent by Mr. Moynihan of the White House to President Pusey of Harvard on April twenty-seventh. But we must appeal to the Congress to transform the hope generated by that letter into a reality.

QUESTIONS ON INVASION OF CAMBODIA: I. NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL VIOLATIONS

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 1, 1970

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, there is a great deal in the record of U.S. involvement in Cambodia that departs from the President's assertion that American policy has been to respect the neutrality of Cambodia and pursue a policy of nonviolation of Cambodian territory by United States or South Vietnamese troops.

The following are replies to question-and-answer material distributed on May 1 by the administration in regard to the Cambodian invasion as well as statements made by the President in his speech of April 30.

These and other questions have been taken from "Cambodia: The Administration's Version and the Historical Record," prepared by George McT. Kahin, professor of government and director of the Southeast Asia program, Cornell University:

CAMBODIA: THE ADMINISTRATION'S VERSION AND THE HISTORICAL RECORD

(By George McT. Kahin)

This paper contains replies to prepared question and answer materials distributed by the Administration on May 1 in regard to the Cambodian invasion—as well as to certain statements made by the President on his April 30 speech.

1. THE ADMINISTRATION'S CLAIM OF U.S. RESPECT FOR CAMBODIA'S NEUTRALITY

Central to President Nixon's argument is the following statement in the introductory part of his April 30 speech. Going back to the Geneva Agreements of 1954 he stated: "American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people."

In the White House's subsequently released (May 1) "Background Information on Cambodia" among the various hypothetical questions raised was one which reads: "Why do we have to support the Lon Nol government? Wasn't Sihanouk the legal ruler and wasn't he pushed out by a coup?"

The answer provided by the White House states: "The question of who rules in Cambodia is a matter for the Cambodians to decide. We had absolutely nothing to do with the change."

The historical record

It is to be hoped that the U.S. was not party to the overthrow of Sihanouk, but it is understandable why the many years of American clandestine activity in Cambodia makes Sihanouk think otherwise and may raise some doubt in the minds of anyone familiar with the pertinent historical record.

There is a great deal in that record that departs radically from the President's assertion that it has been American policy to "scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people."

In fact for the most of the last 15 years the U.S. has opposed Cambodian neutrality and applied various kinds of pressure to get it to assume an anti-Communist stance in alignment with American policy objectives.

Following Cambodia's refusal to accept the security mantle incorporated in the SEATO protocol, American aid was halted. The Saigon and Bangkok governments imposed an economic blockade, and border violations were visited upon Cambodia from two of the United States' SEATO allies, Thailand and South Vietnam.

(It was just after this that the Cambodians responded by opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and agreed to accept aid from China.)

Greater pressure was mounted against Sihanouk's government beginning in mid-1958 with a South Vietnamese invasion of Stung Treng province in which the United States refused to act effectively on Cambodia's urgent request that it restrain Saigon.

(A week later Cambodia began discussions with China for establishment of diplomatic relations.)

Upon being recalled to Washington, the American Ambassador to Phnom Penh then discovered that plans were being made to remove Sihanouk from power. The U.S. did not immediately take such steps, but soon thereafter the anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serel (Free Cambodian Movement) was organized which received encouragement and support from the CIA as well as backing from Thailand and South Vietnam.

At the beginning of 1959 the abortive "Bangkok Plot" was exposed, one aimed at overthrowing Sihanouk and involving military operations by the Khmer Serel from bases in Thailand. Several foreign ambassadors in Phnom Penh warned Sihanouk at the time to take preventive action, and investigations satisfied the Cambodian government (and a good many others) that the American CIA was directly involved and that Marshall Sarit of Thailand and the Saigon government also backed the effort.

By 1966 a campaign supported by CIA to pressure Sihanouk through support of the opposition Khmer Serel tied down a substantial part of the Cambodian army. Khmer Krom (members of South Vietnam's Cambodian minority) were recruited at high rates of pay and provided with extensive U.S. Special Forces training to carry out attacks into Cambodia from bases in both South Vietnam and Southeast Thailand. Border incursions by these forces in 1967 reached at least 12 miles into Cambodia.

2. THE ADMINISTRATION'S CLAIM OF NONVIOLATION OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY

Referring to Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, President Nixon stated on April 30: "For five years neither the U.S. nor South Vietnam moved against those enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation."

The historical record

In July 1965 the International Control Commission (I.C.C.) reported on evidence of border crossings into Cambodia by South Vietnamese forces, stating that there were 375 such incidents in 1964 and 385 in the first five months of 1965 alone. The commission unanimously concluded that "None of

those incidents were provoked by the Royal Government of Cambodia."

From that time on there were repeated reports of border incursions and air attacks against border areas inside Cambodia chiefly by South Vietnamese but also by American forces. A few examples follow:

On May 3, 1965, five days after South Vietnamese planes bombed a village two miles inside Cambodia, Sihanouk, lodging responsibility with the U.S., broke off diplomatic relations with Washington. (NYT May 4, 1965)

On October 13, 1965, New York Times Southeast Asia correspondent Seymour Topping reported that: "South Vietnamese patrols probe the border and reconnoitering aircraft frequently fly over the frontier, sometimes bombing suspected Vietcong targets on Cambodian territory. Cambodians say that more than 30 of their villagers have been killed in these attacks over the last two years." (NYT October 14, 1965)

On September 21, 1965, American helicopters launched rocket attack against a Cambodian military post. (NYT, September 22, 24; October 15, 1966)

On January 22, 1968, the U.S. acknowledged that a U.S.-South Vietnamese patrol had made a limited intrusion into Cambodia following fire from Vietnamese communist units on the Cambodian side. (NYT January 23, 1968)

In April 1969, U.S. air and artillery attacks were launched against communist bases inside Cambodia. (NYT April 26, 1969)

On May 8, 1969, U.S. B-52 bombers raided communist supply dumps and camps within Cambodia. (NYT May 9, 1969)

October–December, 1969, Sihanouk protested continuing U.S. bombing of Cambodian border areas.

PRESS EDUCATION FUNDING

HON. PHILIP J. PHILBIN

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 1, 1970

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I am in very strong support of efforts in the House to increase the education appropriation bill.

My reservation is that in some areas the bill has not fully covered all the necessary ground, particularly with respect to funding since much more money is needed.

I was glad to see, however, that the Appropriations Committee this year is reporting out a separate, appropriation bill for education to help school districts, State departments of education, and others involved in the Nation's educational system, to make more orderly plans for the next school year, and another bill dealing with health funds.

It is pleasing to know that the committee has put some fresh emphasis on the urgent need for educational research and experimentation to find better methods of training and teaching our children and youth, and to try to find out which ones are working, and which ones are not, so that in the process of providing all possible necessary Federal aid, we can also keep a record of intended results. A broad study of learning potentials and performances is essential to proper planning.

Many of the objectives of the bill are praiseworthy. These include aid to ed-

Key Americans to Stay in Cambodia

By Jack Anderson

A few key Americans will remain in Cambodia, keeping as inconspicuous as possible, after President Nixon's July 1 deadline for a U.S. pullout. Here's what is happening behind the scenes:

1. The U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, is expanding into more spacious quarters on Mao Tse-tung Boulevard. Since the embassy was reopened last August, the staff slowly has built up from three to 25 people. A secret radio-teletype system has been installed, and three teletype operators are kept busy beeping coded messages into Manila for transmittal to Washington.

2. My assistants Les Whitten writes from Phnom Penh that the Central Intelligence Agency has now established "a shadowy presence" in Cambodia. President Nixon has assured skeptical congressional leaders at secret briefings that the CIA had absolutely nothing to do with the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and that no CIA agents were operating inside Cambodia at that time.

But now the CIA has pushed its nose under the tent.

3. An officer high in the U.S. chain of command acknowledged to Whitten that American advisers will move "in and out" of the South Vietnamese divisions that stay in Cambodia—"unless we're specifically countermanded." The officer felt, clearly, that none of the existing orders would prohibit American advisers from slipping back into Cambodia any time they might be needed by the South Vietnamese.

The need for better communications between Phnom Penh and Washington had become critical before the war spread into Cambodia. Lloyd Rives, the American charge d'affaires, had been sending his messages over a makeshift Cambodian land line and radio circuit.

Communications Break

Storms broke it down twice, once for six hours and again for 18 hours, and the bony Rives was out in the winds trying to jiggle the wires into working with a stick. During the crucial period of Sihanouk's ouster, the communications broke down again.

Rives asked British Ambassador Harold A. N. Brown, a stuffy, silver-haired diplomat of the old school, to transmit a message to London for forwarding to Washington. The American wanted to let the State Department know at least that he was on the job.

The distinguished Britisher, who had courted Sihanouk and was grumpy over his fall, rewrote the American message and incorporated it into the British report. The breach of grace was more serious than the diplomatic damage. The sense of the U.S. message was preserved, but the style was highly "Englishized."

The exasperated Rives appealed for his own communications equipment, and shortly, a gigantic American C-130 hunkered down at Phnom Penh's airport and disgorged two heavy-duty generators.

Intelligence Mixup

The intelligence that goes out over the new radio-teletype system is a mixed bag of miscellany: political interpretations from Rives and his ad-

visers, military information from the Air Force colonel attached to the delegation, the latest rumors circulating in diplomatic circles, and reports from correspondents who stop off in Phnom Penh and spill their stories over whisky provided by the U.S. press officer James Carrigan.

All reports, secret intelligence and barroom gossip alike, are sent out in code.

The available intelligence is somewhat limited, since the Cambodian Foreign Ministry has restricted all diplomatic personnel to Phnom Penh.

U.S. Army and Navy attaches are expected momentarily in Phnom Penh to assist in collecting military information. What they pick up around town, however, isn't likely to be too reliable.

The Cambodians have demonstrated a whimsical tendency to romanticize the achievements of their willing but unready army and to exaggerate the Communist menace. One Vietcong, who might be spotted in an area, is likely to be multiplied by 100 or even 1,000 by the time the report reaches Phnom Penh.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0004002100

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
NEWSDAY

E - 427,270

MAY 28 1970

Whom to Believe: Nixon or State

By I. F. Stone

The race is on between protest and disaster. Despite the first four martyr "bums" of Nixon-Agnewism at Kent State, the college shutdown their deaths precipitated, the outpouring of student and other protesters here last weekend, the campus lobbyists beginning to flood the halls of Congress, the Senate resolutions to limit or end Indochinese military operations, and the smoldering near-revolt within the Nixon administration itself, we are still on the brink.


We are in the first stages of a new and wider war from which withdrawal will be difficult. The military hold the reins and can precipitate new provocations and stage new alarms. The only hope is that the students can create such a plague for peace, swarming like locusts into the halls of Congress, that they stop all other business and make an end to the war the No. 1 concern it ought to be. Washington must no longer be the privileged sanctuary of the warmakers. The slogan of the striking students ought to be: Suspend Classes and Educate the Country. I see no other visible and adequate means to stop the slide into a conflict that may sweep very suddenly beyond the confines of Indochina if the man who gambled on Cambodia ends by gambling on the use of nuclear weapons.

As usual the country is not being told the truth about why we went into Cambodia. In his war address of April 30, Nixon pictured the attack across the border as a preemptive exercise to hit an "enemy building up to launch massive attacks on our forces and those of South Vietnam." It was described as a swift preventive action from which we would soon withdraw and which was not part of any broader intervention in Cambodian affairs.

But thanks to the indiscretion of one congressman, we now have the private—and more candid—version given members of Congress at special State Department briefings. This puts the origins and purpose of the Cambodian action in a very different light. The congressman is Rep. Hamilton Fish (R-N.Y.), a right-winger who has long questioned the logic of our heavy commitment in so peripheral an area as Southeast Asia. In a letter to constituents released May 13, Mr. Fish summarizes a private briefing by Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson for selected members of Congress.

Nixon said we moved across the border to nip enemy plans for an imminent attack. But from Richardson's briefing, Mr. Fish reports, "It was clear that the present military thrust into Cambodia hinged largely on the reportedly surprise overthrow of Prince Sihanouk." Nixon said in his April 30 speech that for five years "neither the U.S. nor South Vietnam moved against those enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation." But Richardson gave the congressmen a different story. He told them "U.S. intelligence had known for years of those enclaves from which attacks on South Vietnam have been launched" but we had never attacked them because "it was feared that Sihanouk would counter any invasion by allowing NVA (North Vietnamese Army) forces to enlarge their occupied areas."

"Department?"



"He Started to Blow Retreat, Then It Turned

Sihanouk was trying to maintain a precarious neutrality by playing one side against the other. Nixon was deceitful when he said in the April 30 speech that our policy since the Geneva conference of 1954 "has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people" and adding—as proof of our virtue—that since last August we have had a diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh "of fewer than 15" and that for the previous four years "we did not have any diplomatic mission whatever." The truth is that Sihanouk ousted our mission and broke relations in 1965 because he claimed the CIA had been plotting against him for years and even tried twice to kill him.

"For the past five years," Nixon said with bland hypocrisy, "we have provided no military assistance and no economic assistance whatever to Cambodia." He did not explain that Sihanouk threw out our military mission because he said it had been trying to turn his armed forces against him, and gave up economic aid, too, rather than have it used as a cover for U.S. agents trying to overthrow him. This was not a figment of Sihanouk's imagination.

As far back as 1958, in a police raid on the villa of one of his generals, Sihanouk found a letter from President Eisenhower pledging full support to a projected coup and to a reversal of Cambodian neutrality. When Sihanouk resumed relations last August, in his desperate attempt to balance the two sides, his condition was that the U.S. mission be kept small. He didn't want too many CIA agents roaming around.

That was poor Sihanouk's mistake. Cambodian

continued

STATINTL

Cambodia's Ousted Prince Writes, Directs, Stars and Wins His Own Festival's Prizes, But No More

By GORDON HITCHENS

(Author is a U. S. film buff and frequent festival trotter—Ed.)

The recent American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia has a curious and little-known consequence so far as international cinema is concerned: the termination, at least for the present, of the filmmaking career of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The charming dapper "Little Prince"—the title of one of 10 feature films he has directed, starring himself—was recently deposed in absentia by his own military, a coup predicted in another film he made, "Shadow Over Angkor," shown at the Moscow film festival in July, 1969.

Prince Sihanouk had walked a tightrope of neutrality for years in Cambodia, but he was ousted from office by his own army officers while abroad six weeks ago. Since then, he has been in the Chinese, People's Republic and on May Day there was feted by Mao Tse-tung (Time, May 11, 1970). Later he formed a Cambodian government-in-exile in Peking and "may be tempted to install it somewhere in liberated Cambodia. That could result in the formation of a Cambodian force to take up arms against the government of Premier Lon Nol." (The New York Times, May 10, 1970).

Like most other nations of Southeast Asia, Cambodia has been making films for many years that are little known beyond their area. The films are heavily influenced stylistically by the foreign cinemas even when they employ regional themes.

The Khmer (the principal ethnic and linguistic group of Cambodia) cinema emphasizing Cambodian nationalism began with Prince Sihanouk, who became directly and personally involved by writing, directing and performing in his own full-length dramatic films. His "The Enchanted Forest" won a Moscow prize in 1967, and he was a dashing figure at festivals. The films were popular within Cambodia, as was the Prince, and they played for weeks on end. Some 20 theaters in Phnom Penh, the capital, and 60 within the remainder of the country, serve the film-going needs of Cambodia's population of 4,500,000. All income from the Prince's films was returned to the national treasury. But now the Prince's films are now suppressed, with the prints possibly destroyed, under the present regime.

As an avid producer of films as well as head of state, Prince Sihanouk set up an international film festival in Phnom Penh. The Minister of Public Education and Fine Arts, Vann Molyvann, was president of the festival, which held its second, and presumably last, festival in December. Prizes were given for 35m features and shorts, with 16m documentaries handled by a side event. The festival's highest honor, the Golden Aspara Award for Best Picture, went to the Prince as producer and actor in his own "Twilight." (Should have been called the Golden Raised Eyebrow—Ed.) A gala ball in the royal palace, hosted by the Prince, closed the festival. His "Little Prince" had won at the previous Phnom Penh festival and was exported to the Soviet Union and other nations.

Princess Costars

Princess Monique, the wife of Prince Sihanouk, shared his interest in filmmaking. In "Rose of Bokor," she appears as a Cambodian girl who falls in love with Japanese Colonel Hasegawa, played by the Prince, during the Japanese occupation of Cambodia in World War II. The film was his eighth, made last year, and was based on historical incidents. During the Japanese occupation, the Prince was King of Cambodia. Japan pressed the King to renounce its treaty ties to France. Cambodia did so and proclaimed independence. After Japan's surrender, French authority was re-established for a time. But Cambodia was totally independent by 1953, and its King became Prince Sihanouk. The film reflects a certain gratitude toward the Japanese.

"Twilight" is a tragic love story. The Prince acts the role of a middle-aged, sickly aristocrat in retirement, deserted by his wife who had run off with a film actor. The melancholy noble is drawn from his introspection by the Love of a comely Indian widow. Separation and suicide bring the film to a sad conclusion. "Twilight" was among the features seen in New Delhi in December, at the Indian Festival.

"Shadow Over Angkor" was based on actual events, an abortive anti-Prince conspiracy in 1959. Princess Monique again appears, as Italian, playing an American agent. As usual, the Prince produced,

wrote and starred. It has been screened at various festivals, including Moscow in 1969 and the African-Asian festival in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in October, 1968.

"Shadow Over Angkor" is remarkable and totally unique as the film document of a nation regarding its foreign policy and its fears of take-over by a neighboring power, aided by the C. I. A. It is a strange film to have been created by anyone, particularly this versatile Prince, dramatizing the national predicament of Cambodia.

Some lines from this unprecedented film illustrate its political tone. The Prince, playing a naval commodore, is wary of an impending coup among his officers: "The American and Saigon Imperialists have been threatening our territory and islands . . . We must find the root of evil in order to save our country . . . Fight against the neocolonialism of the United States and their satellites." The chief conspirator tells his mistress: "Agents of the American Central Intelligence Agency always have enough money. The United States is an exceedingly rich country. Our troops will have ultra-modern weapons and the officers will have villas, cars and more. You will own a luxurious Cadillac and you will have no reasons to blush with shame even when compared with the Queen of Siam." An effeminate western diplomat stooging for the Americans greets the conspirators with many gifts: "On behalf of the free world, which is ready to clasp Cambodia to its bosom, and on behalf of the United States of America, whose representative attached to Your Excellency I am, I convey to you our warm congratulations and invite you into the

complete as received

M - 127,079

S - MAY 24 1970

U.S. in Cambodia: 12 Years of Incursions

By Don Hill

Virginia-Pilot Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON.

"CAMBODIA, a small country of seven million people, has been a neutral nation since the Geneva agreement of 1954—an agreement, incidentally, which was signed by the government of North Vietnam.

"American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people..."



So said President Richard Nixon in a television address to the nation April 30, in which he announced the U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

A scholar at Cornell University has prepared a point by point paper showing that—since 1958 at least—what President Nixon said just isn't so.

The United States has repeatedly, almost casually violated Cambodia's neutrality.

The paper was put together by Professor George McT. Kahin, professor of government at Cornell University and director of Cornell's Southeast Asia Program. It was made public in a press release earlier this month by the offices of Senator George McGovern, Mark O. Hatfield, Charles E. Goodell, and Harold E. Hughes.

Almost nobody noticed.

The Kahin study was mentioned in passing in *The Washington Post* and in *The Evening Star*. It was ignored in *The New York Times*, whose own reports in the past document most of Kahin's points.

One almost continuous arm of U.S. incursions in Cambodia was the Khmer Serai, an organization which this column has erroneously referred to in the past as a secret society. It was in fact an open political movement dedicated to the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Sihanouk from 1960 built a wide base of political support. At the time of his deposition, he was the last truly popular non-communist leader in Indochina.

Kahin wrote, "It is to be hoped that the United States was not party to the overthrow of Sihanouk, but it is understandable why the many years of American clandestine activity in Cambodia makes Sihanouk think otherwise."

Students in the Cornell Southeast Asia Program prepared a chronology of events in Cambodia. They included these entries:

1958: South Vietnamese Army units invade Cambodia border areas. Cambodia appeals to United States to restrain Saigon but United States refuses. Cambodia proposes diplomatic relations with China. United States considers cutting off aid as anti-Sihanouk move. Khmer Serai movement organized, reportedly with Central Intelligence Agency, Thai and Vietnamese aid.

1959: Bangkok plot exposed. Plot called for anti-Sihanouk invasion from Thailand by foreign-support Khmer Serai forces and creation of new opposition political party. U.S., Thailand, and South Vietnam implicated in plot. Eisenhower denies U.S. involvement.

1963: Anti-Sihanouk activity by Khmer Serai resumes at new intensity; includes virulent propaganda from CIA furnished transmitters in Thailand and South Vietnam. Sihanouk cancels U.S. aid agreements. Pentagon reacts by calling for intervention in Cambodia.

1964: Continuing border violations from South Vietnam, including at least one attack mid-March by South Vietnamese unit with American adviser.

1965: Cambodia severs diplomatic re-

ST. LOUIS, MO.

POST-DISPATCH

MAY 24 1970

E - 333,224

S - 558,018

'The World's Nightmare'

There were never more than suspicions, generated by patterns of the past, that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had anything to do with the deposing of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia last March 18. The possibility of CIA participation was promptly discounted by American and neutral sources, and now it is reported from Phnom Penh that Communist East Bloc intelligence agents have concluded the CIA played no part in the coup.

This is gratifying, but why should the CIA be so automatically suspect throughout the world? A recent commentary by the eminent British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, bears on the subject:

For the world as a whole, the CIA has now become the bogey that Communism has been for America. Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it. Our phobia about the CIA is, no doubt, as fantastically excessive as America's phobia about world Communism; but in this case, too, there is just enough convincing evidence to make the phobia genuine. In fact, the roles of Russia and America have been reversed in the world's eyes. Today America has become the world's nightmare.

Is that what has happened to the American dream? This may be only one man's opinion but it is the opinion of a leading world citizen whose profession is the evaluation and analysis of historic events. Professor Toynbee, who has lived in America, in the Middle West, and who has a good understanding of America, believes that "the most terrifying feature" of American life today is America's failure to deal with its domestic problems, and he rightly thinks the fate of the world will be profoundly affected by whether America manages to deal with them.

Isn't it about time that Americans assumed the responsibilities that go with pre-eminent world power, and start exercising the constructive leadership of which they are capable?

21 MAY 1970

STATINTL

Aron on U.S.

A look at American turmoil from French intellectual peak

By David Holmstrom
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

New York

Raymond Aron describes himself playfully as a "nonconformist conservative." Over the last quarter of a century many of his fellow Frenchmen have found other, less gentle names for him.

But from a lonely, intellectual pinnacle he has become France's most persistent and enduring social critic, the great public weigher of the advantages and disadvantages of any political ideology as it functions in the hands of mere humans.

"I do not believe in paradise on earth," he says in a kind of final summation.

The author of at least a dozen books, a former colleague of existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, and now a professor, the unpredictable Mr. Aron recently visited the United States to address the annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee.

Dressed in a double-breasted suit and conservative tie, Mr. Aron was interviewed for more than an hour. Throughout he was alternately irresistible, puzzling, evasive, specific, enthusiastic, and bored. The following remarks are edited from the interview:

How do most Frenchmen regard the domestic problems of the United States today?

"Some time ago I would say that most Frenchmen looked at your troubles with a mixture of indifference and half-satisfaction that the United States was not immune from the troubles which affect almost every nation in the world.

Now there is some degree of disquiet because even anti-American Frenchmen are conscious that the minimum of order which exists in the world today has as its condition not only a powerful United States, but a United States able to act.

Before I left to come here I was asked to speak on my return about the United States's ability to avoid complete disintegration. The question is: Is America about to get an internal revolution? I don't have an answer, but I am optimistic."

How would you compare the student revolt of May, 1968, in France to the student unrest in America?

I would say that the great disadvantage of the French was to have everything at the same time in one strike: We had a sort of general revolt everywhere on everything. And in a certain way it serves as an immunization now. It would be difficult again to start the same rebellion.

But I don't believe that the moral crisis

is as deep in France as it is in the United States. Of course, the French economy is not as brilliant or efficient as the American economy, but the moral crisis here stems from several main problems: Vietnam, urban problems, the blacks, and the refusal to accept traditional values by your young people. All these moral questions are more serious here than in France.

What advice would you give to an American student who came to you out of frustration and said he was becoming convinced that provoking violence was the only way to bring about change?

I would start like any old man by telling him that during the 1930's I was young and frustrated because World War II was coming. So I would know his feelings. But I would ask him what he wants to achieve by violence? Does he want to destroy the functioning of the economic system? By doing it he will not improve the lot of the blacks, he will not improve the situation in the cities, and if he wants to create civil war in America to stop the war in Vietnam, it would be a very costly method.

We know by the experience of the 20th century that modern society is extremely complex and requires coordination and authority. If you destroy society because you are not satisfied with certain aspects of it, then after a few years you rebuild a system of authority which is normally worse than the previous one.

If the student believes modern society is bad in itself because it is competitive, he should go into the desert. If the student says to me, 'I hate everything so much that I prefer destruction to any effort toward improvement,' then I will tell him he is crazy. But sometimes the crazy people are creating something new in history.

Do you see a victory or a defeat for the United States in the Vietnam War?

The confusion in the American discussion about victory and defeat comes from the fact that you have the tendency to confuse the results of military battles with the political results of the war. You believe that victory is military victory, which has nothing to do with the political concept of victory.

After all in World War II, Roosevelt wanted to have a military victory over Germany. He did not ask himself very clearly what would be the political result of this total military victory.

In the case of Vietnam the result of all the battles against North Vietnam are pure-

STATINTL

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 505,173

S - 913,045

MAY 21 1970

Now We're a 'Paper Tiger'

Mao Tse-tung's latest oratorical outburst, in addition to asking the people of the world to "unite and defeat" the United States in its international endeavors, also instructively points out that this nation constitutes a "paper tiger."

The purpose of the Red Chinese leader's address, broadcast in English, presumably was to arouse support for Norodom Sihanouk, deposed leader of Cambodia.

Sihanouk has obligingly set up an exile government in Peking, which makes him Mao's protege and, no doubt, puppet, if and when he returns to Phnom Penh.

So Mao undoubtedly felt obliged to say a few kind words for the strange royal bird he found on his doorstep and now the words have been delivered.

The "fighting spirit" of the regal playboy and jazz buff is "warmly supported" by the ancient Mao—a spirit never before noticed.

That spirit left his little 40,000-man army so pathetically undermanned and underequipped it was never able to clear North Viet-

namese and Vietcong intruders from the home country, even when they used it for years as a base.

Cambodia was, if we remember, noted for its "neutrality."

Now Sihanouk, in Peking eyes, has become a real tiger with a real "union" government and the United States is a "paper" tiger. Those troops rooting out confused and fleeing Red Viets must be shooting paper bullets.

It is noteworthy that at the same time Mao was broadcasting his ill informed message in Peking, Communist sources elsewhere were reported to have cleared the U. S.—even the CIA—of any complicity in the ~~coup that overthrew~~ Sihanouk.

We never would have believed any Communist high command paid that much attention to the simple facts of a matter, however. Mao's response to the situation seems far more typical—and his accusations of "aggression" and "imperialism" are comfortably routine and old hat.

But he IS an expert on paper tigers (ask the man who owns one). That worries us.

TROY, N.Y.
TIMES RECORD
MAY 21 1970
E - 42,181

We're Cleared

The anti-war element that enjoyed a field day condemning the United States role in the ouster of Prince Sihanouk as ruler of Cambodia must find a new arrow for its bow. The United States has been cleared of participation in that coup by no less than the Communists themselves.

When vindication comes from the people who stand to lose most because of the coup, it must be factual. It probably is disconcerting to the anti-war element which seems to prefer the accusations from the outside. The anti-war element has endeavored to bolster its position by airing the charges the CIA instigated the coup.

While the "at home" element was thus engaged it has been significant that foreign countries were strangely silent. Soviet Russia had little to say, indicating the possession of pertinent information that Red China either did not have or chose to disregard.

It is possible that Communist vindication was not intended for general distribution but rather for a restricted circle. It also may be the case where Cambodian Communists refuse to follow the lines established at Peking.

What does count heavily is that the United States has been cleared. Those who have used the accusation to support their action must cast about for something new.

May 20, 1970

this debate as between Democrats and Republicans.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit, I would be very anxious to see made clear in the debate—perhaps the language makes clear—that in the process of withdrawal from Cambodia, the President does have the presidential power to protect those troops as they are going out. We all want that. That is one of the other things that I see is perfectly feasible. I am sure we can work it out.

Mr. MANSFIELD. There is no argument about that.

Mr. SCOTT. I do not see why.

Mr. CHURCH. The President is Commander in Chief. We do not question it. But Congress has powers, too, and it is time for Congress to exercise them. If we are going to come out of this war, there is only one way to do it, and that is for Congress and the President, standing together, to assume a joint responsibility for a plan which will bring us out. This amendment is drawn in that spirit and with that intention. However it may be construed in the course of the debate, that is the spirit and intention of the amendment.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Ohio (Mr. Young) is recognized for 30 minutes under the previous order.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND DIVISION IN THE COUNTRY

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, at the outset, may I express my admiration for the fine statement made this morning by the distinguished majority leader (Mr. Mansfield) and the statement made by the distinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr. Church), and also the statement made by the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Scott), and the other Senators who spoke here.

Mr. President, very definitely it is my intention to vote in favor of the Cooper-Church amendment.

Mr. President, when President Eisenhower left the White House on January 20, 1961, we Americans had 685 military advisers in Vietnam. On that sad day in 1963 when President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, we had more than 16,000 military advisers in Vietnam. Then, under President Johnson, that number of 16,000 military advisers under President Kennedy, and 685 on the day that President Eisenhower left the White House, had grown into an armed force of more than 500,000 in South Vietnam.

From that time on we have had military advisers in all of Southeast Asia and probably as many as 3 million combat troops fighting in Vietnam during that period.

They talk about Vietnamization. From 1961 we have been trying Vietnamization.

For more than 10 years we in the United States have been paying, in blood and in billions of dollars, for Vietnamization of Vietnam; and the United States has no mandate from Almighty God to police the entire world.

Mr. President, within the next few days we shall have an opportunity to take the first step toward restoring the con-

stitutional authority of Congress in foreign policy and waging war.

At the same time the Senate can move to introduce an element of sanity to U.S. policy in Indochina. This dual opportunity is presented to us in the pending amendment sponsored by the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cooper) and the distinguished senior Senator from Idaho (Mr. Church), who spoke just this morning in this Chamber and who has all along been taking a solid, sound position in support of sanity in our policy in Southeast Asia.

The Cooper-Church amendment is the first of several which will at long last give Senators and Congressmen, as representatives of the American people, the chance to declare whether they favor continuation, extension, and expansion of the Indochina war, or whether they wish to bring an end to our involvement in an immoral, undeclared war in Southeast Asia within the next 13 months. Because I favor the latter course, I shall vote for the Cooper-Church amendment.

This is not only an immoral and undeclared war, but it is the most unpopular war and longest war the United States has ever fought. It has cost a tremendous toll of killed in action and wounded.

Many lives of the wounded have been saved, but a tremendous number of the wounded have been maimed for life. An Ohio youngster I know had one leg off below the knee and the other leg off above the knee and lost both arms in combat. I served for 37 months in World War II, most of that time in combat overseas and I know that in World War II, or in any previous war, that would have been a mortal wound and he would have died within a matter of minutes. Now helicopters evacuate the wounded from the battlefield and, with the great advance in surgery, such lives are saved. We are going to have problems for years and years with those who have been pitifully maimed for life.

Mr. President, the Cooper-Church amendment simply binds President Nixon to his promise. We believe he intends to keep his promise, but we in the Senate have the right to speak out on this issue. It binds him to withdraw all American troops from Cambodia by next June 30. Furthermore, it would assure that those troops will not be sent back into combat in Cambodia without the approval of Congress.

Mr. President, it has been stated that President Nixon rejected the advice of his Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State in ordering the invasion into Cambodia by men of our Armed Forces. I do not know about that. I am not privy to what goes on in the White House. But I do know that the President yielded to the CIA, the leaders of the military-industrial complex and the generals—including the Attorney General from Wall Street. The result is that thousands of American ground combat troops have been sent into battle in another distant Southeast Asian land. That decision was a tragic mistake involving grave risks.

The folly and failure of this latest adventure into Indochina are becoming increasingly evident. I note in an article

before me that when President Nixon ordered American forces into Cambodia on May 1, he told the American people the mission was to destroy the central office for South Vietnam—COSUN—that is the Communist's jungle pentagon. President Nixon, in his demagogic television address to the American people announcing that the invasion of Cambodia had taken place said U.S. troops were wiping out the Cambodian sanctuaries and that the main objective was to destroy the "headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam located in Cambodia" and that our troops would penetrate not to exceed 21 miles into Cambodia and that this entry into Cambodia and the operation would be completed by July 1.

That headquarters, known as COSVN, has not, in fact, been attacked by American or South Vietnamese forces, though that was the purpose, it was said, of this adventure across the border of a nation, Cambodia, whose neutrality we had guaranteed.

But it appears now, that this headquarters has not been found and destroyed, and that American military intelligence and the CIA are guilty of the most serious blunder since the time they assured General MacArthur that if he invaded North Korea the Chinese would not cross the Yalu and enter the Korean conflict. General MacArthur disregarded his instructions from President Truman, advanced into North Korea close to its northerly border and the Chinese Army crossed the Yalu and hurled our forces back into South Korea with great slaughter. This was an equally horrendous blunder. Our CIA and military intelligence were again proven wrong. Now the public relations men at the Pentagon—and they have 300 or more personnel doing nothing but that—and Defense Secretary Laird glibly say that COSVN or the military headquarters directing the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces is mobile and has been moved somewhere in Cambodia.

We did not hear about this mobile headquarters until we suddenly invaded, and then it eluded our forces.

As a result of our invasion of Cambodia there has been a strengthened resolve on the part of North Vietnam and an increased willingness to help on the part of China and the Soviet Union. Now they are finally getting together; and no doubt these great superpowers will be more than happy to replace every weapon and every round of ammunition captured by the United States in the Cambodian sanctuaries. If we force the North Vietnamese to seek closer alliance with the Chinese and to become dependent upon the Chinese, we will have created a situation which could doom all of Southeast Asia to another 20 years of war.

The most serious consequence of the decision to invade Cambodia has been the terrible division within our own country. Students on our college campuses and thoughtful citizens of all ages felt that they had been betrayed by their leaders. They feel that way now. Four young students at Kent State University in my home State of Ohio, who were

STATINTL

Mr. Agnew and the Revolt of the Clerks

Mr. Agnew put on another stunning performance the other day when he was being interviewed for Metromedia News. The Vice President set forth the interesting new idea that he is really locked in combat with the "criminally insane," whom he is seeking merely to isolate so that the rest of us can get on with the nation's business. He contrived to compare the undeclared war in Indochina not just to the undeclared Korean War, but also to other chapters in our history which he thought might illuminate our current venture and presumably make it more acceptable: "President Taft sent troops to Nicaragua . . . President Wilson sent troops into Vera Cruz, Mexico." When he was asked about our possible complicity in the ouster of Prince Sihanouk, he had an intriguing little gem of a reply: "I'm positive that that did not happen, and the reason I'm so sure is that we didn't have any CIA people in the country, and we had a very, very small mission there, and that mission had only been there for a short time." Finally, there was—as there has increasingly come to be in these affairs—an awful lot of "me" and "I." For Mr. Agnew, as any scrutiny of his texts will show, appears to be extremely pleased with and interested in his own reputation, and there are few subjects he would sooner expatiate on than his place in the administration and in the controversies that swirl around it.

We say around it—Mr. Agnew has shown considerably less delight in discussing his place in the controversies that now swirl within the administration. And the point was nicely made in the course of this interview when the Vice President was asked about the President's call for calmer talk. Mr. Agnew came forth at once with a plan for a negotiated truce between himself and persons outside the administration, declaring that he did not "unilaterally" plan "to withdraw," and that the first step should be taken "on the editorial pages of some eastern newspapers." This is not, to be sure, the first such improbable peace feeler Mr. Agnew has offered—if we remember right, he once even offered to forgive The Washington Post specifically and receive it into his fold if we would only see the light and repent. But whether he is coming on in his commander's uniform or his confessor's robes and whether he is suggesting multilateral or bilateral negotiations with his critics outside government, Vice President Agnew persists in missing the point. He has done no harm—and can do none—to "eastern newspapers." He may be furious with them (and vice versa), but that is not whom the quarrel is between, and they are not the proper parties to a settlement. The harm Mr. Agnew has done in dishing out so much hurt and insult—to the young, to the blacks, among others—is harm to the confidence many of its own

members can have in its good faith and good intentions. He has undermined their own capacity to believe in what they are doing and to convey it to the public with any certainty. The settlement that must be negotiated is one between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Agnew: that is where the trouble lies.

When you consider how much well-publicized time and thought the Nixon administration has given to making government orderly and effective and seeing to it that all views within are heard, you must concede that there is an enormous irony in the revolt of the clerks (and some of their bosses) that is now taking place. Neither foreign service officers nor the bureaucracy at HEW have exactly been known in the past for a tendency to rebellion or outspokenness; and yet they, along with a full complement of political appointees, have abruptly emerged in full view with their protests. One wants to be careful in judging what is unique about all this: under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson we surely had legitimate complaint about excessively powerful White House staffs, clogged channels of communication, vest-pocket decision making, and the rest. Nor is the frequency or scope of presidential contact with the minions necessarily a guide to where power or wisdom or good (or bad) influence lies. That is why the White House's effort to counter the current criticism with a bunch of statistics on who met with whom how often is irrelevant, as is the ostentatious excising of a few inflamed lines from a Vice Presidential speech or a sudden conciliatory gesture here and there. What is wanted by the troubled officials and staffers within the administration is evidence that government is being led by men who wish to govern—not by men who wish only to win, whether it is another election or the last say in a public exchange of hate.

Mr. Nixon has it well within his power to pacify his government and to conciliate the Congress in some measure without sacrificing either policy or procedure he regards as indispensable to the wise conduct of his office. He can do that by asserting the kind of leadership those who work in his government are now asking. And that, in turn, requires that he reject the counsel of those who view the present terrible turmoil in our country as (exclusively) a political opportunity to be capitalized upon or—when the going gets rough—a cause of fear. There are within his administration men who view the social and racial chaos as a challenge to govern, not as a challenge to make a quick return. Mr. Agnew, manifestly, is not among them. And until the President has made an advantageous (to him) settlement with Mr. Agnew, he will find it hardgoing settling the other disputes that plague his administration just now. Basically, Mr. Agnew is not a lawyer. The lawyer is President Nixon, for whom he speaks.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400210001-7
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

form miraculous repairs on injuries that tend to be more devastating than ever before. But having been saved by the best field medicine in history and given initial treatment in first-rate military facilities, one out of every seven U.S. servicemen wounded in Vietnam is fated to pass into the bleak backwaters of our Veterans Administration hospitals.

With 166 separate institutions, the VA hospital system is the biggest in the world. The 800,000 patients it treats in a year, mainly men wounded in earlier wars, range from cardiac to psychiatric cases. It is disgracefully understaffed, with standards far below those of an average community hospital. Many wards remain closed for want of personnel and the rest are strained with overcrowding. Facilities for long-term treatment and rehabilitation, indispensable for the kind of paralytic injuries especially common in this war of land mines and booby traps, are generally inferior. At Miami's VA hospital, while sophisticated new equipment sits idle for lack of trained personnel, patients may wait hours for needed blood transfusions. At the VA's showplace hospital in Washington, D.C. a single registered nurse may minister to as many as 80 patients at a time. At the Wadsworth VA Hospital in Los Angeles, doctors who work there describe ward conditions as "medieval" and "filthy."

Veterans Administration Director Donald E. Johnson insists publicly that veterans receive "care second to none." The evidence is overwhelmingly against him. A five-month inquiry by a Senate subcommittee chaired by California's Alan Cranston has documented gross inadequacies and laid the main blame directly on a series of cutbacks in the VA medical budget. This sum presently amounts to roughly \$1.6 billion a year, somewhat less than the cost of one month's fighting in Vietnam. Additional appropriations of \$122 million for next year await probable congressional approval and could help ease the immediate crisis. But within the next 12 months 16,000 more men from Vietnam are expected to come under the Veterans Administration's care.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I had said I would yield to the Senator from Idaho. Then, I would be happy to yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Missouri for the very thoughtful and hard-hitting address he has made this morning. I must say that he has taken all of the arguments and reduced them to a succinct statement of his position.

What it comes down to, as he has emphasized, is that it is this war that hurts the United States, hurts us abroad and hurts us at home; and the crisis that has come to this country is the result of our interminable involvement in this war which offers no conclusive results, and tears apart the fabric of our own society.

There are limits to what a democratic country can do when it comes to war; it cannot persist indefinitely in a war that can neither be stopped nor won; it cannot keep forcing young people to fight when so many of them believe the war to be wrongful, without sowing the seeds of sedition in our own land.

That is what is happening to us now and it has a far greater bearing on the future of the Republic than anything that is now or ever has been at stake for us in Indochina.

I think of all the arguments that have been voiced against the pending amendment, the most incredible was that taken to the press galleries a few days ago, when the two commanders of the largest veterans organizations of the country condemned the sponsors of this amendment in terms that impugned their patriotism and alleged that the amendment would be greeted with joy and jubilation in Moscow and Peking. The facts are just the opposite. It is the Cambodian operation itself, not this amendment, that has brought joy to Peking.

A distinguished commentator, Mr. Stanley Karnow, wrote in the Washington Post of Monday, May 11, 1970, that the Chinese Government greeted with enthusiasm the decision of the President to enter Cambodia. The political repercussions pose a far larger danger to the United States in the long run, a much greater potential threat to American security, than anything that is involved in the present war in Vietnam.

For example, there is evidence that China and Russia are laying their quarrel aside, a quarrel that had split the Communist world into two warring camps. What a price to pay. Next, there is evidence that the Chinese, for the first time in years, are reestablishing their leadership over the Communist movement in Asia. Of course, as the Senator knows, the Chinese leadership has been by far the more aggressive in the competition between Peking and Moscow.

I say to the Senator that he has brought back into balance the question which faces us. It would be in line with his remarks if the article by Mr. Karnow, to which I referred, entitled "Nixon's Expansion of the War Seems To Delight Chinese," might appear here in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

NIXON'S EXPANSION OF THE WAR SEEMS TO DELIGHT CHINESE
(By Stanley Karnow)

HONG KONG, CHINA.—Experts here have finally figured out Mao Tse-tung's whereabouts during his recent long absence from public view. He was secretly ensconced in the White House, advising President Nixon to send American troops into Cambodia.

The circumstantial evidence to support that intelligence is reflected in the fact that nobody has been displaying greater delight at the widening war in Indochina than the Chinese Communists.

Mao and his associates are not crazy. On the contrary, they are tough, shrewd and, despite their apparent adherence to rigid doctrines, extraordinarily flexible.

Most of all, they are patient enough to have played a cautious waiting game in the hope that Mr. Nixon would accommodate them by stumbling into Cambodia.

For the conflict now spreading throughout the Indochinese peninsula serves their cause in several ways. And, barring the unlikely prospect of its spilling over into China itself, this welcome development is costing them next to nothing.

In terms of their own strategic ambitions, the Chinese have three inter-related objectives in Southeast Asia.

First and foremost, they want to oust American military power, partly because they are concerned with their security and partly

because a U.S. presence thwarts their other aims in the area.

Second, they want to curb the influence in the region of the Soviet Union, which they also see as a potential military threat as well as an ideological rival.

Third, they want a future Southeast Asia composed of frail states that pose no challenge to Chinese hegemony but, as in centuries past, pay tribute to the rule of the "Middle Kingdom" in Peking.

The American involvement in Vietnam, they perceive with obvious pleasure, has bogged down the United States in a situation it cannot win and refuses to lose. Therefore, they calculate, an extension of the conflict will only drain U.S. resources further.

Besides stirring dissent in the United States and thus fulfilling their dogma that the "masses" inevitably rise against their "fascist masters" the Indochina mess also appears to the Chinese to be an opportunity to "isolate" America internationally.

By no coincidence, consequently, they have invited a French cabinet minister to visit China this summer for the first time since France recognized Peking in 1954. Moreover, they are improving their ties with Britain and Yugoslavia, and progressing toward diplomatic relations with Canada and Italy.

In the meantime, just as Mao wished, the specter of a bigger Indochina war is weakening the Soviet position in the area as the Russians waver between trying to promote the moderation they really prefer and backing Communist escalation in order to assert their revolutionary credentials.

One sign of Soviet confusion has been apparent in the Kremlin's delay in recognizing Prince Sihanouk's Peking sponsored government-in-exile. As a result, Moscow has clearly lost ground to the Chinese in Hanoi.

Meanwhile, with no indication from Washington that they can expect to gain anything from 25 years of struggle, the Vietnamese Communists are settling down to "protracted war."

Again, this suits Peking's long-range dreams, since it augurs an exhausted Vietnam that the Chinese are convinced they can eventually dominate.

In an unusually candid talk with an American some time ago, a Hanoi official stress this point. "You think you are blocking China by fighting us," he said, "but in fact, you are destroying a barrier to Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia if you destroy us."

Mao himself emphasized a similar point when, a few years back, a Japanese visitor to Peking apologized to him for Japan's aggression against China in the 1930s.

"The Japanese invasion inspired the Chinese people to rise and fight," Mao reportedly told his visitor. "Our army grew by a million men, and our support grew to include one hundred million people."

"So, instead of your apologizing to me, perhaps I should thank you."

It would be tragic if Mao repeated those same lines to an American visitor in Peking years hence. The way things are going, that possibility is not inconceivable.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my colleague for his kind and generous remarks with respect to the thoughts I have expressed this morning. In effect, I am following his leadership in this matter, along with that of my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) and also, as coendorers of the amendment, the able majority leader, and the ranking Republican of the Senate who also is the ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I could go into more military detail

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DENVER, COLO.

NAT'L REGISTER

MAY 17 1970

WEEKLY - 611,413

Churchmen Urge New Approaches to Peace

"If war is ever to be outlawed and replaced by more humane and enlightened institutions to regulate conflict between nations, institutions rooted in the universal common good, it will be because the citizens of this and other nations have rejected the tenets of exaggerated nationalism and insisted on principles of nonviolent political and civic action in both the domestic and international spheres." — American Catholics bishops' pastoral letter, November, 1968.

Pope Paul VI has added his voice to the rising chorus of protest by Church leaders throughout the world deploring recent military actions by the United States and North Vietnam that have widened the official battlefield in Southeast Asia to include Cambodia and Laos.

As spiritual leader of the world's 600 million Catholics, the Pope joined forces with an anti-war statement issued from Oslo a few days earlier by leaders of the World Council of Churches, representing 235 Protestant and Orthodox Churches.

THE POPE said the world was threatened by conflicting ideologies, by an "infatuation" with war, and by "the lack of a firm reference to superior moral principles." The Pontiff's words endorsed, in effect, the WCC statement, which deplored "all talk of victory and all appeals to ideology as justification for this increase of slaughter. We condemn all actions which make a just peace harder to negotiate."

The WCC statement, which urged its members throughout the world to appeal to their governmental leaders for "a negotiated peace," criticized President Nixon for approving the military invasion of Cambodia and for displaying "a callousness toward Indo-China lives as he claims to be protecting the lives of American troops."

On the homefront, reaction by religious leaders to the President's command decision was equally cool. In New York, the National Council of Churches, representing 30 Christian denominations, declared its moral indignation: "Military measures are self-defeating when political solutions are imperative," the NCC statement said. "We oppose any escalation of military effort. We ask rather **Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400210001-7**

ter ... by seeking a wholly new approach to withdrawal and settlement by international agreement."

A STATEMENT issued under the auspices of the International Affairs Commission of the U.S. Catholic Conference, raised the question of whether the Cambodia invasion "does not" risk defining the role of this nation increasingly in terms of the use of violent power."

"How else," the statement asked, "can one judge the use of government power to marshal the human, technological, financial and raw materials of a nation in a concerted and massive effort to kill persons and destroy property of another nation?"

THE DOMINANT note of criticism emphasizes the fundamental error of relying on military methods to solve conflicts that are essentially ideological and political. The criticism is aimed at a policy that proclaims that "we are seeking peace, but will not pursue it by peaceful means."

The Cambodian crisis, which eventually drew U.S. troops across the border of the avowedly neutral country, is a clear lesson in the futility of force to achieve peace in Southeast Asia.

On April 20, in a televised speech, President Nixon told the nation he was "confident" his Vietnamization program was strong enough to permit the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 U.S. troops. Ten days later, he again took to television to explain the sudden appearance of a military crisis which caused him to order thousands of American soldiers into Cambodia.

What happened?

TWO MONTHS AGO, Cambodia's leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was overthrown by an unexpected military coup. Sihanouk, a critic of U. S. involvement in South Vietnam, had maintained an official policy of neutrality in the war; his poorly equipped army posed no threat to Vietnamese Communists in Cambodia. After Sihanouk's ouster, a new government, headed by General Lon Nol, launched a strong

Continued

anti-Communist military campaign.

In light of Sihanouk's lack of cooperation with U. S. forces and General Nol's avid anti-Communism, there were even charges that American C.I.A. agents had helped the new government into power.

Shortly after the Nol regime took over, Cambodian troops began battling the Viet Cong. The Cambodians suffered heavy casualties, forcing General Nol last month to call for help from the U. S. — in the form of arms and supplies, but not soldiers. Interviewed after the U. S. invasion, the General said he had not been consulted on the use of American troops.

The chain of events is a case in point: A changed political climate creating the demand for additional military involvement.

THE EFFECT of the President's 10-day turnabout — from his promise of troop withdrawal and the expected slow-down of fighting to his sudden decision to send a massive strike-force into Cambodia — has drawn heated and widespread criticism, which the President himself predicted would follow his decisive action.

At the time of his announcement, he cited the hazards to his political future, but he appeared confident nonetheless that the majority of Americans would come around to his support. Indeed, a Gallup poll, conducted immediately after the Cambodian announcement, showed 51 per cent of those who heard the President approved his action.

Judged from the viewpoint of military expediency, it was without doubt sound strategy. But the protesters among religious leaders argue that, from a moral viewpoint, it is indefensible. The American bishops, for example, cite the "just war" theory in their 1966 peace statement. The just-war principle (which traces its venerable beginnings back to St. Ambrose and St. Augustine in the 4th and 5th Centuries) states that a war is justifiable *only* if it meets certain basic conditions, among which are: The war must be declared by just authority, it must be entered for a just cause, it must employ just means, and it must have reasonable expectation of success.

BUT CONSIDER the Cambodian situation in light of the just-war theory:

- The military action was *not* authorized by the Cambodian government or by a consensus of the American people or by their elected representatives.

- The *just cause* was professed to be the protection of American fighting men from a suspected enemy build-up in Cambodia. Subsequent news reports from U. S. troops

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in Cambodia, however, did not reveal evidence of a recent build-up.

- The *just means* is confronted by a breach of international ethics and the unilateral invasion of a professedly neutral nation.

- The "reasonable *expectation of success*" of the invasion — which was aimed at destroying Viet Cong supply lines — involved an obvious retaliation from Hanoi. It came immediately, in the form of frantic Viet Cong thrusts through Laos in an attempt to build new lines of supply and communications to the imperiled Communist troops.

BUT PERHAPS these recent events — and the strident protests they stirred around the world — will help refocus national attention on questions of morality and honesty, rather than on the "success" of military strategies.

Will America's leaders begin to *listen* to these voices of protest? Will the tragic student uprisings help them see that the primary role of a peacemaker is to remain open, to try to hear and understand what the opposition is saying, no matter how "wrong" they may appear to be?

Will the American people soon awaken to the dangers of relying on the "invincible" military machinery to give them security and "peace" in a world torn by suffering and strife?

The world's religious leaders, galvanized into action by well-founded fear of global war, have suggested the abandonment of military security in favor of Christian risk-taking. The times, they say, demand new approaches, new resolve, new hopes.

AND SO WE JOIN our voice with churchmen who have called upon governments to risk a new venture — withdrawal of troops and ending the war through "settlement by international arrangement." An opportunity — perhaps the last — has been presented to the United States by the United Nations Secretary General U Thant.

Thant, urging "the parties involved" to take "urgent, decisive measures toward peace," warned of new threats "not only for the peoples of Indo-China but for the whole of mankind." He called for an international conference, suggesting that a new, unspecified search for a solution such as those held in 1954 and 1962 should be undertaken immediately, "whatever their form."

We appeal to the nation's Catholics — bishops, clergy, Religious and laity, who now comprise nearly a quarter of the total U. S. population — to lend their strong support to this hopeful peacemaking ven-

ture. We urge you to communicate to your President, to your fellow Americans, to your government and to your fellow Americans the urgency of this appeal.

This is precisely the path to peace indicated by the Second Vatican Council's *Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*: "... unless enmities and hatred are put away, and firm, honest agreements concerning world peace reached ... humanity will perhaps be brought to that dismal hour in which it will experience no peace other than the dreadful peace of death."

16 MAY 1970

Hands off Cuba!

Like a vampire, the appetite of the CIA for blood is insatiable. Unsatisfied with the havoc it brought Cambodia and Southeast Asia, the CIA has its eyes on Cuba again. The kidnapping of eleven Cuban fishermen by that CIA creature Alpha 66, is the latest outrage.

Capping crime with gall, the CIA 'stooges demand that Cuba exchange eight bandits the republican forces captured during the latest foray for the kidnapped fishermen.

Several weeks ago we warned that the CIA would step up its criminal attacks against Cuba in an effort to sabotage an epic-making ten million ton sugar harvest. That campaign is clearly underway.

Americans should be forewarned. We cannot afford to forget the almost fatal events that resulted twice in the past decade when the CIA tried to murder the new Socialist land.

Who can forget the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961? The thundering defeat U.S. imperialism justly suffered echoed around the world. It was also the first time its bloody program for Latin America was smashed.

Scarcely a year later the entire world trembled on the brink during the missile-crisis.

Now we see the menace of a third criminal effort, the overhanging pall of another Caribbean crisis.

It is not at all accidental that the CIA's claws are cut off each time they reach out for Cuba. For that brave socialist nation is not only strong in its own right it has the support of the entire socialist world, of all progressive humanity, and of most governments the world over.

It is significant, too, that these new efforts to create trouble on our very doorstep come on the heels of declarations by many U.S. commercial interests as well as by such figures as Senator Fulbright, seeking to establish normal relations with our Caribbean neighbor. It would of course be of mutual advantage commercially. More than that, it would be morally just and it would advance the cause of world peace.

13 MAY 1970

Kosygin wires 'sympathy and support' to Sihanouk

Daily World Foreign Department

Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin gave the full "sympathy and support" of the Soviet Union to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian chief of state, and Sihanouk's recently-formed Cambodian government-in-exile, in a telegram made public yesterday in Moscow.

Kosygin said in his telegram to Sihanouk: "The Soviet Union greets the formation of the United National Front of Cambodia, the strengthening of the United National Front of Cambodia, the strengthening of the united anti-imperialist front of the peoples of Indochina, and the measures taken to organize the struggle of the patriotic forces of Cambodia against American aggression.

"The Soviet people are profoundly indignant at the U.S. aggression in Cambodia, which is a cynical flouting of the Geneva Agreements. This struggle you are waging, together with the patriotic forces of the country against the aggressor, for the freedom, independence and neutrality of Cambodia, will continue to enlist sympathy and support in the Soviet Union."

The Kosygin telegram was seen as a move possibly preceding full diplomatic recognition.

Kosygin had said last week that the Soviet Union recognizes "only that (Cambodian) government which practices neutrality."

Also significant was the implicit Soviet approval for the April 24-25 "Indochina summit" meeting attended by Premier Chou

En-Lai of People's China.

The Soviet Union yesterday rejected as "ludicrous" the British move to reconvene the 1954 Geneva Conference. The Soviet news agency, Tass, said the British proposal was "only a screen covering actual support of the American aggression and refusal of Britain to dissociate from it."

"It is ludicrous to propose the convocation of a new conference after the U.S. has arrogantly violated the 1954 Geneva Agreement that serves as the basis of Cambodia's status," Tass said.

The puppet Saigon regime yesterday announced a blockade of the Cambodian coast, in the Gulf of Thailand, along a 75-mile stretch between Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) and the South Vietnam border.

The blockade was announced from the Mekong River town of Neak Luong in Cambodia by Saigon Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky. Ky said that Saigon navy vessels would stop and search all foreign ships trying to enter Cambodia's territorial waters. The U.S. command in Saigon reluctantly admitted there were U.S. Seventh Fleet units operating "in the same area," but denied that the U.S. was participating in the blockade.

The Saigon naval armada which drove up the Mekong River to the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh, pushed on yesterday to Kompong Cham, 50 miles north,

site of one of the first pro-Sihanouk uprisings in March after the Lon Nol regime seized power.

The U.S. has insisted that its so-called "advisers," who are directing the operation, remained at Neak Luong, 21 miles inside Cambodia, at the "limit of penetration" proclaimed by Nixon, while the Saigon puppet navy went alone up the remaining 45 miles to Phnom Penh.

But yesterday the U.S. military command innocently reported that "some" U.S. military and naval personnel might have hidden in the holds of the Saigon naval craft for a kind of joyride up to Phnom Penh.

Meanwhile, the new Saigon puppet envoy to Phnom Penh lodged a protest with the Lon Nol regime after Cambodian students beat to death a Saigon naval officer and badly injured two others Monday night.

In Washington, a bill passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which would: 1) bar U.S. forces from Cambodia after July 1; 2) prohibit use of U.S. advisers in Cambodia; 3) prohibit use of CIA mercenaries (KKK troops) and other U.S.-paid agents; 4) prohibit U.S. air or naval support for the Lon Nol regime.

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont) said the bill, to be debated today or tomorrow, would be followed by a vote to repeal the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution.

May 11, 1970

AFTER 169 DAYS, NO ACTION FROM THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO ENFORCE LAW AND ORDER IN THE FITZGERALD CASE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, 169 days have passed since I first wrote to the Justice Department on November 22, 1969, requesting an immediate investigation of possible violation of the Criminal Code in the firing of A. E. Fitzgerald by the Air Force.

I have received no substantive reply to my request. At best the routine acknowledgments—the latest of which was on February 18, almost 3 months ago—have served only to postpone the enforcement of the criminal laws.

It is a crime to threaten, influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in connection with a congressional investigation. It is a crime to injure a witness on account of his testimony to a committee of the Congress.

After A. E. Fitzgerald testified before my Subcommittee on Economy in Government—at our request and with specific Air Force approval—that there was a \$2-billion overrun on the C-5A, he was in turn ostracized, lied about, investigated, and fired.

Such action under the code is a prima facie case that a witness has been injured because of his testimony.

When will the Justice Department include the Pentagon in its crusade for law and order?

When will the Justice Department begin to enforce the law equally?

When will the Justice Department end its double standard which appears to permit persons in high places to break the law with impunity when it suits their purposes.

Will another 169 days pass before the Justice Department acts?

SEC DRAGGING FEET 1 YEAR ON LOCKHEED INVESTIGATION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, today I have written a letter to SEC Chairman Hamer Budge demanding an immediate report on an investigation asked for a year ago into reports high Pentagon officials had suppressed information on the Lockheed C-5A overruns to protect Lockheed's position in the stock market.

The full text of the letter to Chairman Budge follows:

On May 1, 1969 I requested the SEC to determine whether Government employees violated our securities laws by withholding unfavorable financial information in connection with the Lockheed C-5A contract. A year has transpired with no results yet reported to the Congress.

My letter to you followed disclosures in a House Government Operations Committee hearing that high Pentagon officials had suppressed information on the Lockheed C-5A overruns on the grounds that public knowledge of the cost difficulties "might put Lockheed's position in the common (stock) market in jeopardy." While this vital information was being hidden from the public, Lockheed was selling \$125 million in convertible debentures to investors. Today, these debentures have a market value of less than \$44 million. At the same time, high officials in Lockheed were selling sizeable quantities of their stock in the company.

During hearings before the Senate Banking Committee last April 16, you promised that the results of the investigation would be made available to the Commission within "the next week or ten days" and to the Congress within a week or two after that. The latest possible date for reporting to Congress is thus May 10 as indicated in your testimony. This date has come and gone with still no report.

I realize that an investigation of this sort is complicated and requires time. Nonetheless, the commission has had over a year to study the case. I would hate to think the Commission is dragging its feet on the investigation or is concealing information about the Lockheed situation which the Congress should have.

I urge you to report immediately to Congress your findings on the Lockheed investigation. I am sure you would not want to undermine confidence in the SEC by suppressing or delaying a potentially damaging report. The Congress needs the facts on the Lockheed contract and in my view, we have been overly patient in waiting for the SEC to complete its investigation.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 199—JOINT RESOLUTION TO CORRECT A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN PUBLIC LAW 91-230 TO FURTHER AMEND THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I introduce a joint resolution for the purpose of correcting a typographical error in a recently enacted public law, and ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 199) was read the first time by title, and the second time as length, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, effective April 13, 1970, clause (A) in clause (1) of section 5(c) of the Act of September 23, 1950 (Public Law 815, Eighty-first Congress) is amended by striking out "at least 10 per centum" and inserting in lieu thereof "at least 6 per centum".

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the joint resolution?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PELL. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. Will the Senator explain briefly what is the nature of the mistake in the original resolution passed which it is desired by the present resolution to right?

Mr. PELL. I will be delighted to explain.

Mr. President, during the course of our consideration of the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1969, which was signed into law on April 13, 1970, as Public Law 91-230, our committee was plagued by typographical errors on the part of the Government Printing Office. We have been tolerant of typographical errors because we know accidents and mistakes occur on occasion.

The gravity of this situation has just now been brought to my attention because of a serious typographical error

which has become law. In connection with the amendments to Public Law 815 a Senate amendment was designed to add an alternate to the 6-percent minimum eligibility under Public Law 815 of the 81st Congress, which provides for school construction in federally affected areas. The conference report, Report No. 91-237, on page 41, clearly shows that eligibility under clause (1) (A) of subsection (c) of section 5 of Public Law 815 is 6 percent. That is the same minimum eligibility as it is under present law. There was no intention to change the present 6-percent eligibility.

However, in Public Law 91-230, on page 37 of the printed public law, the figure in that same clause (1) (A) is 10 percent. This is a change in the basic eligibility of Public Law 815; the Congress of the United States never intended to make that change; that 10-percent figure was never before the Congress. This is simply an error on the part of the Government Printing Office.

Prior to the enactment of the joint resolution I would hope that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would acknowledge that this change in eligibility for Public Law 815 is only a typographical error and would continue to administer Public Law 815 as if the printed law is 6 rather than 10 percent. I have requested that the General Counsel's office at HEW review the printed public law for the purpose of finding all of the errors so that we may enact another joint resolution to rectify other less urgent errors.

This resolution now before us simply corrects a typographical error in the public law. It has been cleared with the members of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the leadership on both sides. It is necessary to act on this resolution immediately because many schools' eligibility for assistance for construction funds may be drawn into question because of this error.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. PELL. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator warmly for his explanation. I certainly have no objection to the immediate consideration and passage of the joint resolution.

Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator from Florida.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the joint resolution?

There being no objection, the joint resolution was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

SENATE RESOLUTION 405—SUBMISSION OF SENATE RESOLUTION—DECLARATION OF PEACE FOR INDOCHINA

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the time has come for us to substitute new policies for old in Southeast Asia.

Once again we have lost our way in the jungles and swamps of Southeast Asia. The action taken in the last 2 weeks has deepened our involvement, widened the

... BUT U.S. PRESENCE GROWS

Continental Air Services, a subsidiary of Continental Airlines and, like Air America (NewsWEEK, April 6), a CIA contractor, is setting up a charter service to fly U.S. military equipment into Cambodia. And an American contracting firm is installing a new million-watt radio station in Phnom Penh so the Lon Nol government can counter powerful stations in Peking and Hanoi which have been broadcasting statements by the ousted Prince Sihanouk. ✓

9 MAY 1970

STATINTL

Substantial U.S. backing of Nol government expected *Involvement without large ground forces forecast*

By George W. Ashworth
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

If the Lon Nol government survives in Cambodia, indications here are that American support of that government will build to substantial proportions.

Some sources here are predicting the virtual "Laotization" of the war in Cambodia—U.S. involvement without massive ground forces.

In his April 30 speech to this nation, President Nixon said, "With other nations, we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army of 40,000 needs and can use for its defense."

The President continued, "But the aid we will provide will be limited for the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other."

'Trick of the decade'

Making the easygoing, predominantly Buddhist Cambodians belligerents on one side or the other would be the trick of the decade. The Americans, most sources believe, will be doing extremely well indeed, if they can enable the Cambodians to develop even a moderate ability to defend themselves against the highly motivated and trained North Vietnamese.

The President, of course, hopes to have the help of other Southeast Asian countries. This is in line with the oft-enunciated Nixon doctrine, which is a follow-on to a position paper known as the Foreign Internal Defense Policy developed by the Senior Interdepartmental Group under the Johnson administration. The group, now dissolved, was superseded by the rejuvenated National Security Council. One of the NSC's first efforts was to study and reshape the Johnson policy into the new Nixon doctrine.

Inherent in the original concept and the subsequently developed and promulgated doctrine was the idea that the U.S. should not go it alone, rather that it should seek the help of other nations in any endeavor to help a faltering government fight Communist national wars of liberation.

That is precisely what the Nixon administration is trying to do in the case of Cambodia, although it is unclear now whether other nations have the will and the resources to come to Cambodia's assistance.

U.S. officials decidedly do not want to go it alone in Cambodia. They are attempting to draw other nations into involvement can be expected to continue, but with

success uncertain. Certainly, the South Vietnamese could help in some slight ways. However the mutual antipathy of the Cambodians and Vietnamese would be a hindrance, as would the still freshly remembered killings of the Vietnamese in Cambodia.

Situation assessed

Perhaps the best hope at present is that the Indonesians will be able to provide advisers and some combat troops as a last resort.

As sources here assess the Indonesian situation, the multination parley on Cambodia (expected to be held in Jakarta May 16-17) will possibly—if not probably—fail to yield any solutions. Subsequently, the

stand of Indonesian Minister Adam Malik will be weakened, and the way will be opened for the Indonesian military, now champing at the bit, to blossom forth with their aid proposals for Cambodia.

Another possibility would be Malay police or some other small form of aid. The Thais possibly would be willing to help, but they are beset by a steadily growing insurgency in their northeastern frontiers that shows signs of growing rather than diminishing now, as the Chinese demonstrate the moral willingness to keep the pressure on and the physical readiness to push their road across Laos toward Thailand.

U.S. in prime role

Thus, at this moment, when the efficacy of the Nixon doctrine might be proved, there are many hindrances and stumbling blocks that will force the U.S. into a prime role, if not the only one, in the matter of Cambodian assistance.

The President has pledged to get U.S. troops out of Cambodia by July 1 and to penetrate no more than 19 miles inside frontiers. During the interim, it is quite possible that the joint Vietnamese and American operations will relieve pressure upon the Cambodian Government.

That was, of course, a strong secondary reason for the decision to move into Cambodia. Hopefully, it will not have the effect of driving the North Vietnamese into Phnom Penh, which would leave the U.S. making plans for the salvation of a government that had fallen.

Given the survival of the Cambodian regime, sources here assess immediate prospects of direct aid this way:

- The Cambodians will be given small

9 MAY 1970

Saigon leak sinks naval plan to invade Cambodia

Daily World Foreign Department

A huge Saigon puppet-U.S. joint naval invasion force remained stalled in South Vietnam's part of the Mekong River on Friday after it was learned that the Saigon Foreign Minister, Tran Van Lam, had prematurely revealed the plans for this new invasion of Cambodia.

Lam told the press on Thursday that the naval strike force was to sail into Cambodia and seize control of the 45 mile stretch of the Mekong between the South Vietnamese border and Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital. More than 100 gunboats and other craft comprise the strike force.

The naval operation would have given the U.S. and Saigon direct contact with the Phnom Penh regime of pro-U.S. General Lon Nol. The U.S. has already airlifted large quantities of arms to Phnom Penh. More than 4,000 Cambodian mercenaries trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence

Agency have been flown to the Cambodian capital and made part of Lon Nol's army.

Cambodia's KKK

The CIA mercenaries, from South Vietnam's Cambodian minority, are called Khmer Kampuchea Krom, or "Cambodians from Lower Cambodia" — KKK for short. The KKK troops were the main element on Lon Nol's side in the battle for a Mekong River crossing point about 28 miles southeast of Phnom Penh. The KKK used tanks and armored cars against Cambodian liberation forces.

Saigon puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu said on Friday that he has set no deadline for the withdrawal of his invading troops from Cambodia. "We have set no time limit for their withdrawal," Thieu said, "and at any time we must, we will seek the agreement of the Cambodian government to go back."

Both the U.S. and Saigon allege

that they informed the Lon Nol regime of their plans to invade Cambodia, although Nol seems to have been taken by surprise by the assault. U.S. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey was forced to admit to newsmen last week that the U.S. had not notified the United Nations Security Council of the invasion.

In a related development, a University of Montana professor who recently returned from an extensive tour of Eastern Cambodia called the U.S. charge that the area is a "Viet Cong" sanctuary "a complete fabrication."

Dr. E.W. Pfeiffer, a zoology professor, surveyed the so-called "Fishhook" area of Cambodia 50-60 miles northwest of Saigon together with Dr. Arthur Westing of the Harvard Botanical Museum. Pfeiffer said: "I can categorically state this is a complete fabrication. The President's performance is incredible to someone who has just come out of the area."

E 4072

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

May 7, 1970

amend the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. In this regard, I submit comments by Willard Edwards in the May 2, 1970, Chicago Tribune:

CRASH PROGRAMS CAN BOOMERANG
(By Willard Edwards)

WASHINGTON, May 1.—Congress, happily convinced that it has found a cause of universal appeal, is hell-bent on crash programs designed to end pollution of the environment.

To suggest caution at this point is like advising a suspicious approach to motherhood, but some thoughtful members have noted the dangers of legislation rushed to passage under emotional pressures.

Harsh and stringent laws, however worthy their goal, can boomerang.

This lesson is now being hammered home in the case of the federal coal mine health and safety act which went into effect April 1. In one month of the law's operations, 272 small mines have been closed down. Their operators were willing to comply with the act but found it impossible.

Small mines, as Sen. Gordon Allott [R., Colo.] noted, are often the chief energy source of small towns which depend on local coal for powering of electric plants. Nationwide, an electric power shortage, threatening blackouts in many areas, has already been predicted.

Like pollution, coal mine hazards were unanimously condemned. They aroused the same revulsion and the same haste [after long years of neglect] to do something quickly. The House approved the act last year by a 389-to-4 vote and the Senate was unanimous, 73 to 0.

The act provided for the closing of unsafe mines, restricted permissible coal dust levels, and required the installation of many safety devices. Stiff daily fines were imposed for noncompliance.

Those who cautioned that the measure went far beyond President Nixon's call for health and safety standards were shouted down. Any amendment criticized as softening the law's impact was rejected.

House leader of those insisting on a "tough" law was Rep. John H. Dent [D., Pa.]. Congress now sees irony in Dent's angry blasts at enforcement of the law by the United States bureau of mines. He has assailed "high-handed and capricious" enforcement of the law by the bureau and announced a full-scale investigation.

What happened, it now appears, is that the bureau decided to enforce the law as it was written. When it found violations of the act, it ordered corrections under penalty of stiff fines, accumulating daily. Seeking to comply, operators found they could not.

Example: The law required automatic couplers for mine cars. Cited for lacking this safety device, operators found there were none on the market.

Example: The new law specified that no more than 3 milligrams of dust per cubic meter [a microscopic quantity] would be permitted in mines. A device for measuring coal dust was required in every mine. There are no devices available for such measurements.

Sen. Allott told the secretary of the interior, Walter J. Hickel, "It is now apparent that some provisions of the act are, at least presently, unworkable."

He had no sympathy for those who had resisted a more painstaking study of the impact of the act and who were now protesting enforcement of it. If the law had not been rigidly enforced, he said, they would be assailing the bureau of mines, thus achieving the "ultimate in hypocrisy."

Allott called upon Hickel to report on the effects of the act. After receiving the report, he will introduce legislation to rectify "the grossly inequitable and unworkable portions."

Congress will thus be called upon to do the job it neglected last year in its rush to get a law—any kind of law—on the books. The same hysteria is surfacing in the anti-pollution campaign.

**CAMBODIA RELATIONS REVEALS
NIXON'S BLUNDER**

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 7, 1970

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, in light of recent U.S. action in Cambodia, more information about the history of United States-Cambodian relations is desirable. The following "Fact sheet on Cambodia" clearly reveals Nixon's blunder:

FACTSHEET ON CAMBODIA

**FROM 1945-1950: POSTWAR SETTLEMENT—A
FRENCH-CONTROLLED CAMBODIA**

1945: Authority over Cambodia returned to France. Collaborationist Premier Son Ngoc Thanh wins national referendum in independence move. Thanh arrested, supporters flee to Thailand and form dissident nationalist movement (Khmer Issarak).

1946: Cambodia becomes "autonomous state within French Union"; French retain veto power and control of army, police, finances and judiciary. An anti-French party wins elections, but King Sihanouk favors gradual achievement of negotiated independence.

1949: French sign treaty stating will transfer de jure independence to Kingdom of Cambodia providing control over its own army and police except in time of war; but French officially stipulate a continuing state of war.

1950: U.S. establishes diplomatic relations. Nationalist activity increases as total independence proves hollow reality. "Liberation government" named by Vietminh for Cambodia.

FROM 1950-1956: CAMBODIA BECOMES INDEPENDENT—SIHANOUK ANNOUNCES NEUTRAL FOREIGN POLICY

1950: Sihanouk takes stronger nationalist stance in face of increased Vietminh activity in Cambodia.

1952: Increasing anti-government activity from both communists and non-communists. Sihanouk takes emergency powers.

1953: Sihanouk's "royal crusade for independence" seeks U.S. aid to pressure French. U.S. refuses. Continued French presence causes many non-communist elements to join insurgents. Sihanouk enters voluntary exile and declares intent to lead "holy war for independence."

1953: (October-December) French finally agree to independence in effort to prevent two-front war in Indochina. Sihanouk begins efforts to oust Vietminh forces; U.S. offers aid.

1954: Geneva Conference agreement provides for evacuation of Vietminh from Cambodia. Under Sept. 1954 SEATO treaty (ratified by U.S. Senate Feb. 1955) Cambodia designated a protected state. U.S. promises further aid.

1954: (December) Sihanouk announces Cambodia will remain unaligned and will conduct a neutral foreign policy.

1955: Sihanouk abdicates throne; competes in national elections. His party wins overwhelming victory. Bandung conference understanding between Sihanouk and Communist China for peaceful co-existence and no foreign bases in Cambodia. Sihanouk renounces SEATO protection.

1956: Thailand and South Vietnam im-

pose economic blockade of Cambodia in retaliation for Sihanouk signature of aid agreement with China; U.S. suspends aid. Subsequent negotiations result in lifting of the blockade.

**FROM 1957 TO 1960 UNITED STATES OPPOSES
SIHANOUK CHINA POLICY—FOREIGN ELEMENTS WORK AGAINST SIHANOUK**

1958: South Vietnamese army units invade Cambodia border areas. Cambodia appeals to U.S. to restrain Saigon but U.S. refuses. Cambodia proposes diplomatic relations with China. U.S. considers cutting off aid as anti-Sihanouk move. Khmer Serel (Free Cambodia) movement organized, reportedly with CIA, Thai and Vietnamese aid. Thai begin anti-Cambodian campaign; Cambodia suspends diplomatic relations with Thailand.

1959: Bangkok Plot exposed. Plot called for anti-Sihanouk invasion from Thailand by foreign-supported Khmer Serel forces and creation of new opposition political party. U.S., Thailand and South Vietnam implicated in plot. Eisenhower denies U.S. involvement; Thailand and South Vietnam cease provocative actions. Diplomatic relations with Thailand restored.

1960: National referendum gives near unanimous support to Sihanouk policies. (Non-communist opposition elements compromised by implication in Bangkok Plot). Sihanouk made Chief of State for life.

FROM 1960 TO 1964: SIHANOUK SEEKS GUARANTEE OF NEUTRAL CAMBODIA—OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE CONTINUES

1960: Sihanouk calls for international conference on Laos.

1961: At Geneva Conference on Laos, Sihanouk proposes that neutralization of Laos be extended to Cambodia. Saigon persecution of Cambodian minority in Vietnam results in refugees fleeing to Cambodia. Thai accuse Cambodia of giving sanctuary to communist elements which seek to subvert rest of SEA; Cambodia breaks diplomatic relations with Thailand.

1962: Sihanouk calls for new conference in Geneva, this time to extend "international protection" to Cambodia; U.S. noncommittal. Sihanouk offers to accept international control in return for recognition of existing borders. South Vietnamese oppose, carry out continued border violations.

1963: Cambodia protest at continued Saigon repression of Vietnamese Buddhists and discrimination against Cambodian minority in Vietnam; diplomatic relations broken. Anti-Sihanouk activity by Khmer Serel resumes at new intensity; includes virulent propaganda from CIA furnished transmitters in Thailand and South Vietnam. Sihanouk cancels U.S. aid agreements; Pentagon reacts by calling for intervention in Cambodia.

1964: Continuing border violations from South Vietnam (including at least on attack (in mid-March) by South Vietnamese unit with American adviser). USSR and France ask U.S. support for declaration of Cambodian neutrality. U.S. refuses unless Cambodia first resolves its differences with its neighbors.

1964: (April) Cambodia recalls its diplomatic mission from Washington. U.S. delegate in UN denies Cambodian charges about continuing U.S. involvement in border violations and states that U.S. is convinced "Vietnam has no aggressive designs toward Cambodia."

1964: (Autumn) North Vietnam infiltrates first large force of regular troops through Cambodia into Mekong Delta. U.S. requests negotiations with Cambodia.

**FROM 1964 TO 1967: UNITED STATES-CAMBODIA
RENEW DISCUSSIONS—BORDER VIOLATIONS
CONTINUE**

1964: (December) U.S. and Cambodia open talks in Cambodia; disagree over question of border determinations. Cambodia wants rec-

STATINTL

STATINTL

U.S. throws more troops into Cambodia

Daily World Foreign Department

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, ousted Cambodian chief of state, who in Peking announced formation of a government in exile backed by the recently formed United National Front of Cambodia, said the Front includes Communists as well as other political groups.

The U.S. and the Saigon puppet regime yesterday launched three new offensives into Cambodia, bringing to more than 50,000 the number of U.S. and Saigon troops there.

An armada of U.S. Navy river gunboats went up the Mekong River into Cambodia, while along a 200-mile front in Cambodia's eastern provinces, heavy U.S. air and ground operations continued.

U.S. and foreign newsmen remarked on the low number of U.S. casualties produced by such a huge invasion — 18 dead and nearly 60 wounded. Some of those killed were victims of their own troops' gunfire or air crashes unrelated to any hostile action.

The U.S. invaders are still hunting — apparently somewhat desperately now — for the alleged "Central Office for South Vietnam" (COSVN), of a claimed "Vietcong" setup. Destruction of COSVN was the major reason given for the invasion.

"What's COSVN?" a puzzled U.S. Army lieutenant in Cambodia asked Tuesday, as he looked at some captured office equipment. "It's just a bunch of typewriters."

The U.S. and the Cambodian regime of puppet Lon Nol confirmed earlier reports that several thousand Cambodian mercenaries trained by the CIA have been integrated into the Lon Nol armed forces.

The Cambodian mercenaries are called "Khmer Kampuchea Krom" (Cambodians from Lower Cambodia), or KKK. The KKK troops are from the Lower Mekong area in South Vietnam. They were trained by the CIA to man Special Forces camps in South Vietnam.

More than 4,000 KKK mercenaries were brought into Cambodia in the last few days by helicopter and air transport. Nearly all are in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital.

Lon Nol said Tuesday that his regime "welcomed" the U.S. invasion.

In Paris yesterday, both the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam boycotted the 66th session of the peace talks. A DRV spokesman said this action was taken "to express their firm protest against the extremely grave acts of the U.S. in Indochina."

Nguyen Thanh Le, the DRV spokesman, read the formal DRV-PRG statement, which accused the U.S. of violating its commitment to cease the air war against the DRV and of expanding the Vietnam war into Cambodia.

"If the Nixon administration continues its bombardments against the territory of the DRV, it must bear full responsibility for all the serious consequences arising from its acts," the joint DRV-PRG statement said. The DRV said the next meeting of the talks should be held on May 14, but the U.S. delegate, Philip Habib, refused to say whether the U.S. would attend. Habib, after a brief talk with reporters, started making preparations to leave for Washington on a trip he alleged had been planned some time ago.

DAILY WORLD
7 MAY 1970**NIXON AND MILITARY MUST BE DEFEATED**

President Nixon was asked by a reporter if he thought his act in dispatching American troops to Cambodia met with the approval of the American people. Nixon said straight out that it really did not matter whether the people approved or disapproved. What mattered was whether the adventure (CIA engineered coup in Cambodia) would be successful.

It is official notice that the will of the people is being ignored and replaced by authoritarian rule of a would-be Fuehrer. It underlies the meaning of Nixon's request for a silent majority and Agnew's role in attempting to obtain this silence by demagoguery and intimidation. It is part and parcel of our rotting capitalist system where every vestige of truth and human need is being converted to distortion and genocide by a desperate ruling class.

Exposing and defeating Nixon and his backers constitutes the number one task before all of us today.

—G.G., Jamaica, N.Y.

BAYONNE, N.J.
FACTS

MAY 6 1970
WEEKLY - 7,043



Interesting World:

Cambodia: Up the Down Escalation

ABBY BERG

Now it's Cambodia.

Another sleight-of-hand step into the quicksand of no-return.

Another day, another war.

Another glib assurance by yet another "I'll stop the war in Vietnam if you elect me" president that we are merely engaging in "limited preventive action" to protect our interests.

Substitute Cambodia for Vietnam and you've got a whole new ball game with the same old cast.

CURTAIN GOING UP on the hottest new horror play on the international scene. Hurry, hurry, hurry! All you wheelers and dealers with tired blood, get your war contracts at the armaments box office while they last!

The chillingly similar plot once again has been plotted and inspired by those famed master collaborators of intrigue, the CIA and the Pentagon.

On cue, the star, Richard Milhaus Nixon, dramatically placates the Our Leader Ubbert Alles gullible majority with "it'll only hurt for a little while" placebos.

Via his featured spokesman, Secretary Rogers, the public is promised (terrific acting style taken from the creative, suspenseful White House standard skit of "Promises, Promises") that the American presence in weak, defenseless Cambodia--is time-tabled to run for a maximum eight weeks.

Without ands, ifs, or buts, "eight weeks" was the unequivocal carrot-before-the-stick official statement.

Then, as we are solemnly told, out of the depth of blank eyes and deadpan face, win, lose or draw, we'll get out of Cambodia.

What a performance!

JUST WHO IS KIDDING WHOM?

By what rules of warfare does one side so obligingly tip its hand to the other?

Since when does an invader announce to the world at large, through the total coverage exposure of national television, the exact length of time it will be on the lookout for the enemy?

Suppose the bad enemy doesn't show. Then what?

Do we yahoos go yoo-hooing into the hills and muck of Asian swamps and countryside and jungles inviting the little Red Hoods to come out, come out, wherever they are?

STATINTL

We're still plying that bitter bit in Vietnam. It's near seven battered and bloody years we're fooling around with that shell-game war. And nobody in power knows, or wants to know, whether the nut is under the shell, or whether the nut is holding the shell. Just so long as the face is saved; forget about the endless bodies lost.

Anyway, to return to Cambodia and Sec. Rogers' information "leak" of U.S. plans--thus conveniently apprised of the American position and intent to a T--if we are to believe the State Department--what is to prevent the wily Vietcong from hiding in the bushes until the American troops, as advertised, leave, and then suddenly materializing to reassume and resupply their lurching grounds?

Nope, I can't buy that transparent bill of goods the Administration is selling.

IN A CRISES--LORN ROUNDUP of senatorial views immediately following Pres. Nixon's stunning announcement, the influential Southern Sen. Stennis calmly allowed as-how after we cleaned up Communist safety areas in Cambodia--we'll probably have to do some mopping in Laos and "several other places, as well."

Sure, I mean, why not?

While we're Mr. Cleaning it, why be only half-safe?

Let's do a real bangup job of it. Let's really protect all our far-flung commercial interests with positive preventive action.

We're not weak sisters. We've got a strong President who's just beginning to come out from under all that reason--all that frothy public relations "bring us together" stuff. He'll show the whole darn world that nobody's gonna push Nixon around, not even the press.

So while we're at it, let's shoot for the top: Red China!

If those Commies think they can threaten us with the Domino Theory--lets give 'em a taste of their own medicine with our own Domino tactics. Let's get them before they get us! Right?

There's only one little annoying question. Where are we gonna hide America when the atom bombs start falling?

that responsibility and authority should rest in the hands of the President. I do not believe you can have a lot full of generals. We here in Congress are not equipped to direct tactical matters. You can make serious errors by going in various directions at the same time.

It would be wisdom for us to reject all of these amendments or take the Findley amendment, which is the one that seems to be more consistent with what the President has in mind of saving American lives in that area.

In approaching questions like this we should not bend to public opinion and to hysteria and to excitement but we should do our duty. It is not important whether we come back to Congress next time, but it is important whether our country will do what we should do in the field of international affairs. When we are called on by a small nation to assist them under a treaty which we set up with the idea of bringing about world peace, we should assist them. It is important that we do that, but it is not important that we come back here next time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. DENT).

(Mr. DENT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that for about 9 years I have made no statements on this floor concerning the Vietnam war. I felt, like all of you, a great many distressing moments. However, I belong neither to the far left nor the righteous right nor the muddled middle. I only belong to the people of this country, insofar as I am capable of serving them. I went along with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I made a mistake because I was told it was only to support the hand of this Government and the SEATO nations. That was not the case. However, having been stuck with that decision, I stayed with it. My father told me when I was a boy that when you are fooled once it is the other man's fault, if fooled the second time, it is your fault. I will not be fooled again.

I am opposed to sending American troops into Cambodia and will vote against any Defense Department request for funds that would be diverted for use in Cambodia. We Members adopted a seldom-used strategy, in that those opposed to the Cambodian invasion moved to stop further action on the Defense Department appropriation bill until the President explains his action in moving troops into Cambodia.

I remember my father's advice many years ago when he said, "when you start to explain it's bad already."

Many questions must be answered by the President, how can he justify what can be termed an invasion into Cambodia because it is a sanctuary for the Vietcong and North Vietnam when we did not invade North Vietnam, when it is the principal sanctuary of all enemy action. There is some question as to whether or not Cambodia can publicly approve American troops on its neutral soil.

It might be a good idea for the President and his advisers to reread Napoleon's march into Moscow, and his disastrous retreat. By moving into Cambodia

we have opened ourselves up for future similar decisions as related to Laos, Thailand, and Burma—each of the areas have enemy action.

What is most dangerous is the President's view and belief that we must recommit ourselves to being the police action for the world and attempt to put out every brush fire, especially so in the unstable political and military situations in Southeast Asia and the Orient in general.

I personally do not intend to vote any money over and above what we need to extricate ourselves from a slow strangulation in Vietnam.

This vote will be taken after the authorization, when the appropriation bill is before us.

Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DENT. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

(Mr. HELSTOSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Leggett and Reid amendments.

Mr. Chairman, the major disturbing and dissent-inspiring issue now before the American public is the extension of the undeclared war in the Far East to Cambodia.

It well appears that President Nixon may have jumped the United States into a raging fire that could bring undeclared foes of our Nation into a declared and warlike status to end the hopes of achieving peace in all areas of the world.

In my opinion it is a gamble that should not have been taken.

I do not want to appear unduly critical of President Nixon's action and decision on Cambodia because I realize that he knows far more about the situation than any Member of Congress because of his own choosing—keeping us in the dark and not letting us know fully what is going on.

But I must question his decision and action into moving into Cambodia because of some recent events.

A key one was President Nixon's recent appearance before the American public over the airwaves when he lulled us into a hope that our involvement in Vietnam was nearing an end through his announced plans for withdrawing of 150,000 more American troops. Americans breathed somewhat easier after that announcement. They were shocked by what followed a few days later—an expansion of the war.

This exhibition on the part of the President might well be called cruel and inhumane. What prompted him to order an expansion of the war? Only the President can answer, and he is being far too vague for Members of Congress and the public at large.

President Nixon's Cambodian action has brought to me more public dissent than at any time in my 5 years in Congress. At this moment I have received more than 900 telegrams and letters critical of the President's action and just 15 messages supporting it. I have received many telephone calls at my office and home expressing dissent. There has been a steady flow of visitors to my

office to place before me their opposition. These people of all ages have been orderly dissenters. It would seem that the silent majority is making itself heard, and I do hope that the President and his advisers are getting the message.

Another recent event that is disturbing to many is the overturn of the government in Cambodia. The head of state took a trip and during it was deposed and sent into involuntary exile at least for the moment. A regime, supposedly friendly to us, took over and now we are embarked on a new excursion into war. Did the Central Intelligence Agency direct or participate in the action.

The question is pertinent for it was more than rumored that a few years ago, the same CIA was an active participant in the overthrow of a South Vietnamese government that led us into great difficulties.

As some of President Nixon's predecessors might advise him the CIA is far from totally reliable in international situations. From the leaks that do come from this super-security agency it appears its failures outweigh its successes.

Thus, the President must be asked did he rely on the CIA in arriving at his decision? Or, did he rely on the advice of the military some of which believe only in the bloody conquest of a foe? Or, was it a combination of the two—the many times faulty CIA and the military? The public is entitled to the answer.

In seeking a full explanation from President Nixon, we must also ask why he apparently ignored advice from key members of his cabinet and others in the inner-circle of his administration who recommended against the invasion of Cambodia. Who, it must be asked, is Mr. Nixon's alter ego who shares the Presidential decisionmaking to the exclusion of other officers and confidantes and Members of Congress? We should know. The public should know.

Then, I have reason to believe that the President and his staff knew of the advice given by the minority leader of his body back on January 10, 1968. In a public declaration on that date the minority leader raised the point on the possible invasion of Cambodia by the United States and stated that no such step should be taken before consultation with Congress.

The minority leader's advice obviously went unheeded. Can any Member of this body or the Senate say they were consulted by President Nixon before he plunged us into Cambodia? I expect not.

We must provide President Nixon with a public forum to answer these and other questions regarding the situation in the Far East. We should not allow him to hide behind a canned address delivered to a nationwide television and radio audience such as took place when he announced hostilities were underway in Cambodia.

Thus, as I did on December 2, 1969, in this body, I again ask the leadership of the Congress to invite the President to appear before a joint session of Congress to discuss—not address—with us the situation in the Far East. In making that request last year, I stated:

It is my humble opinion that the President should place all of the facts in the Vietnam

5 MAY 1970

TUNNEY SEEKS PROBE OF CIA SIHANOUK ROLE

Eureka, Cal., May 4 (UPI) — Rep. John V. Tunney (D., Cal.) has asked the House foreign affairs committee to investigate possible central intelligence agency involvement in the recent overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia.

Tunney, who is seeking the Democratic nomination for the U. S. senate, telegraphed Committee Chairman Thomas Morgan, asking for hearings "to determine the degree of involvement, if any, of the CIA in the recent development in Cambodia."

In a speech here Saturday, Tunney, a member of the foreign affairs committee, said he had no direct knowledge of any CIA involvement in the overthrow of Sihanouk.

Kosygin calls on world to stop Cambodia invasion

Daily World Foreign Department

"Now is the time for action," Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin said yesterday in Moscow, in a statement denouncing the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and renewal of U.S. bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In his first news conference since 1964, Kosygin attacked the U.S. for its "crude violation of international law." He called on all the world's peoples to stop the U.S. aggression in Cambodia.

"By launching war in Cambodia and resuming large-scale bombings of populated localities in the DRV, President Nixon actually nullifies the decision of his predecessor, President Johnson, on the termination from November, 1968, of all air bombings and other actions involving the use of force against the DRV," Kosygin said.

"For Washington to try to explain the decision on the armed assault into Cambodia by alleging that it is necessary to save American lives in South Vietnam — this is a strange logic indeed. If the U.S. government really cared to save from death tens and hundreds of thousands of Americans, there is and has always been a very simple way out, and this is not to send American troops either to Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia, and to send them back home."


The U.S. invasion of Cambodia, Kosygin said, may have the effect of "further aggravating the overall international situation."

He added, "It goes without saying that the Soviet government will draw appropriate conclusions for its policy from such a line of action by the U.S. in Southeast Asia."

He charged that the real aim of the U.S. was to smash the national-liberation movements and subjugate the peoples of Indochina.

"The statement of President Nixon that the U.S. is defending its honor in Cambodia is a mockery of the word honor," Kosygin said.

"To destroy a peaceful country, to burn villages and kill people, is something that I think does not require any comment from me."



ALEXI KOSYGIN
Premier USSR

"Is it possible to talk seriously of the desire of the U.S. President to have fruitful negotiations to solve international problems at a time when the U.S. is grossly trampling under foot the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962, to which it is a party, and is taking ever new actions undermining the mainstays of international security?"

"What is the worth of international agreements in which the U.S. takes part, or is going to take part, if it violates so unceremoniously the commitments it has assumed?"

Kosygin also blamed the CIA for the coup which brought the Lon Nol government into power in Cambodia. He said U.S. aims in Southeast Asia are "imperialist,

aggressive aims alien to the interests of the peoples and therefore they are inevitably doomed to failure."

News men at the conference asked Kosygin whether or not there would be a change in Soviet position toward the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks going on in Vienna.

Kosygin replied: "President Nixon first of all should have thought over his actions before he started the invasion of Cambodia." He said he opposed reconvening the Geneva Conference on Indochina: "Now is not the time for conferences, now is the time for action."

"It would be in order to ask: who gave the U.S. the right to be the judge of what is good and what is bad for other peoples? On what grounds does the U.S. assume the role of international policeman? No one has given it that right and it has no grounds for taking it."

Kosygin then said in view of the present situation there was a pressing need for the unity of all socialist and anti-imperialist forces to defeat the aggression.

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OVERTHROW 5/3 NX
WITH CAMBODIA

BY ROBERT C. MILLER

PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA (UPI)--THE CONSENSUS OF THE CAMBODIAN DIPLOMATIC CORPS IS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NO DIRECT PART IN THE OVERTHROW OF PRINCE Sihanouk's government.

"I'M NO ADMIRER OF YOUR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY," SAID ONE WESTERN ATTACHE, "BUT I JUST CAN'T BELIEVE THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN SO STUPID AS TO HAVE ENGINEERED THIS THING."

ALL THE DIPLOMATS QUESTIONED--EASTERN AND WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES--BELIEVE THE COUP WAS STRICTLY AN INTERNAL AFFAIR WITH BUT ONE OBJECTIVE: TO WREST CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY FROM PRINCE NORODOM Sihanouk.

"I'M CERTAIN THAT THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT HAD NO INTENTION OF GETTING INTO A FIGHT WITH THE VIET CONG," SAID ONE VETERAN DIPLOMAT FAMILIAR WITH THE INTRICACIES OF CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT.

"THEY FIGURED Sihanouk WOULD GO QUIETLY TO THE RIVIERA, LIKE BAO DAI IN VIETNAM, AND NOT CAUSE ANYONE ANY TROUBLE. I'M SURE THE VIET CONG ATTACKS WERE TOTALLY UNEXPECTED AND CAUGHT THE GOVERNMENT WITH ITS SUSPENDERS DANGLING," THE DIPLOMAT SAID.

A COMMUNIST BLOC DIPLOMAT SAID HE BELIEVED THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT MADE ITS BIGGEST MISTAKE IN BELIEVING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RETALIATION FROM THE COMMUNISTS.

A WESTERN DIPLOMAT SAID THE CAMBODIANS ARE STILL POSITIVE THE UNITED STATES WILL SEND HELP.

"MY CAMBODIAN CONTACTS HAVE NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT GREAT QUANTITIES OF AMERICAN AID WILL DESCEND IN BIG AIRPLANES AND THAT EVERY REQUEST THEY MAKE -- EVEN FOR AMERICAN SOLDIERS -- WILL BE GRANTED," HE SAID.

TG205PED

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TUNNEY 5/3 SX

EMERY, CALIF. (UPI)--REP. JOHN V. TUNNEY, D-CALIF., HAS ASKED THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE CIA INVOLVEMENT IN THE RECENT OVERTHROW OF PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK OF CAMBODIA.

TUNNEY, WHO IS SEEKING THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION FOR THE U.S. SENATE, TELEGRAPHED COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN THOMAS MORGAN, ASKING FOR HEARINGS "TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT, IF ANY, OF THE CIA IN THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMBODIA."

IN A SATURDAY NIGHT SPEECH HERE, TUNNEY, A MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SAID HE HAD NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF ANY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN THE OVERTHROW OF SIHANOUK. ✓

"COMMUNIST SANCTUARIES HAVE EXISTED IN CAMBODIA FOR FIVE YEARS," THE CONGRESSMAN SAID. "YET U.S. COMMANDERS WAITED UNTIL PRINCE SIHANOUK WAS OVERTHROWN BEFORE SWEEPING ACROSS THE BORDER. I NOW SUSPECT THE CIA MAY HAVE HAD A HAND IN THE COUP AGAINST SIHANOUK."

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CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

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MAY 2 1970

STATINTL

On to Cambodia

By Milt Freudenheim

Just how vital is it? Not very

Daily News Foreign Service

PARIS — From Europe, President Nixon's military dash into Cambodia looks like a bad mistake, win or lose.

Many Europeans strongly doubt he will keep to his timetable of pulling out U.S. ground forces in six to eight weeks, no matter how sincerely he may intend keeping the Cambodia action short.

As they see it, Mr. Nixon has shown the same politically fatal flaw that plagued President Johnson: He listened to his generals.

The generals convinced him that he could wipe out Communist troop sanctuaries in Cambodia and improve his bargaining position for winning the

war. Or, speaking more modestly, his position for not losing.

But two months from now, if the pattern of previous Vietnam escalations holds up, the Pentagon will be advising to hold on just a bit longer or to throw in just a bit more effort.

IN THE MARVELOUS but unlikely and practically unprecedented case of U.S. success, the elimination of Viet Cong sanctuaries still would be temporary at best.

Until there is a political settlement in Vietnam, the Hanoi and Viet Cong forces can be kept out of Cambodia only if some military force remains on the spot.

What happens to Mr. Nixon's

Vietnamization program if additional territory in Cambodia is added to South Vietnam's security duties? The President can't be hoping to get the miserable Cambodian army whipped into effective shape in eight weeks.

Saigon forces will be stretched to protect their own territory. In Cambodia they will be targets for the all-out anti-Vietnamese hysteria stirred up by Gen. Lon Nol, if he is still in power.

By military logic, the Americans will be called on to stay to preserve whatever gains are accomplished. And on and on.

THE PUSH into the Vietnam-Cambodian border regions may relieve Vietnamese Com-

munist pressure on Lon Nol, European officials suggest.

He is said to be popular with the minority of city types who dominate the capital. Ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk, despite all his erratic, vain-glorious cutups, still enjoys the favor of the peasants who are Cambodia's largest group by far.

The Lon Nol regime is seen in Europe as bad news, even for the United States. The Communist line — bought by many suspicious Europeans — is that the CIA put him in.

Kinder analysts argue that the CIA never would have made this mistake, but that after Sihanouk was thrown out, the United States was stuck with Lon Nol and his embarrassingly friendly, weak regime.

THE AMERICAN goal has been to climb out of the Vietnam quagmire leaving behind an Indochina that was neutral and independent.

Cambodia, now so unhappily pulled into the mess, was the

nearest thing to an independent, neutral country in the neighborhood.

In Europe the big hope is to get Cambodia back somewhere near its former status.

Even an unfriendly but neutral Cambodia could be acceptable for American interests. The fact is that Cambodia — and Laos — are only side issues to the main show in Vietnam.

At the Paris talks table, Cambodia and Laos are part of the propaganda speeches. But the Communists make clear they don't want to expand the table to add Laotians and Cambodians.

Even by the highly questionable domino theory of American interests in Southeast Asia, Cambodia is not a key "domino."

If the gloomy Europeans are proved right, and the Nixon Cambodia policy fails, Americans can calm themselves by recalling that Cambodia really wasn't terribly important all along.

2 MAY 1970

Cambodian plot

Nothing President Nixon said in his TV broadcast Thursday about expansion of the unpopular Vietnam war to Cambodia is true.

The plot to ensnare Cambodia into the U.S. imperialist net goes back to increased U.S. activities in Indochina during and after World War II.

The efforts sometimes took on a laughable aspect. It was rumored, for example, that the trip some years ago of the then Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy (now Onassis) to Cambodia was for the purpose of wooing Prince Sihanouk away from his policy of neutrality and into the U.S. camp and not tourism pure and simple.

Sihanouk was an obstacle to U.S. military aims, and he was finally gotten rid of by a Central Intelligence Agency-organized coup. When the CIA-installed puppets proved to be incapable of holding the fort, the U.S. moved in troops of its South Vietnamese puppet army, with direct U.S. artillery, logistic and air assistance, complete with "advisers," and spearheaded by at least 6,500 U.S. soldiers.

The scheme was carried out with the usual Nixon deceptiveness. While the newspapers informed us of Nixon's "agony" as he pondered whether to send a few thousand captured guns to Cambodia, the real move had already been plotted and was being carried out — open U.S. intervention and expansion of the war to Cambodia. The dominoes are falling, but it is the United States which is knocking them over.

Charge Nixon defies people and constitution

NEW YORK, May 1—The following statement condemning U.S. aggression against Cambodia was issued today on behalf of the National Committee of the Communist Party by James Jackson, international affairs secretary, and Daniel Rubin, national organizational secretary:

In launching his criminal aggression against Cambodia, following the bombardment of Laos, President Nixon is violating the Constitution of the United States and defying the expressed will of the American people. He is violating Cambodia's sovereign rights and is recklessly gambling with moving to a world nuclear war. He tries to cover up the deed and the danger by a series of lies and false promises. That disastrous course must be reversed.

The most massive and militant response by millions of our people must be mounted to the new, criminal expansion of aggression in Cambodia. The mask has been removed. The policy pursued by Nixon is the continuous expansion of the brutal aggression in Vietnam, Laos and now Cambodia. Thousands of U.S. ground troops as well as planes and supporting units have invaded Cambodia together with Saigon puppet troops.

The inevitable result will be intensified fighting throughout the entire area and a grave new threat to world peace. To the 325,000 admitted U.S. casualties will be added new thousands in the stepped-up war. The toll of Vietnamese, and now Cambodians and Laotians, predominantly non-combatant women and children, is of genocidal proportions. Song My's will increase.

In the U.S. the mass of workers, particularly black, Chicano and Puerto Rican, will pay the heavy

costs of the escalating war in lives and broken families. Runaway prices and taxes will increase further. Paychecks and contract settlements will be cut, even as unemployment grows. Programs for schools, hospitals, welfare, etc. will suffer even sharper slashes.

Jingoism, racism and repression will be further stimulated. In our country where racism has been the main tool of reaction for so long, it is not possible for President Nixon to rattle the saber jingoistically in justifying the slaughter of darker peoples in Southeast Asia, treating them as mere pawns of U.S. imperialism, without promoting racism at home.

It was no accident that at the moment U.S. troops were being sent into Cambodia, other federal troops were being sent to Connecticut. They were sent there to intimidate and provoke a mass rally opposing a repression which has especially singled out the Black Panther Party and the black community for victimization.

Such a course requires President Nixon to couple his announcement of expanded aggression with threats not only to university students but even to the Senate and Supreme Court. It requires lying about U.S. involvement to the country in the TV speech ten days before and to the Senate two days before the April 30 announcement. It requires acting contrary both to the will of the people expressed in actions and polls and to the opinion of Congress and, thereby, violating fundamental principles of the Constitution he has sworn to uphold.

The new aggression arises out of a crisis in the policy of so-called "Vietnamization." U.S. ruling imperialist circles have sought to maintain control of South Vietnam which can only be done by mili-

tary means. Having failed to force such a solution at the conference table or in fact on the battlefield, it has sought to exhaust the Vietnamese in a war of attrition.

A rising tide of opposition at home and around the world forced the Nixon Administration to try to achieve the same results by scaling down U.S. ground forces, with puppet troops increasingly taking over the ground fighting and casualties. The attempt is to deceive public opinion and reduce the massive popular opposition, while pursuing the same aims.

Such a policy was bound to fail, for it does not recognize that the Thieu and Lon Nols can achieve no stable popular support because they serve the interests of U.S. imperialism and not those of their own people. "Vietnamization" was, therefore, both immoral and doomed to failure because the Provisional Revolutionary Government represents the popular will for national freedom and the Thieu-Ky regime is nothing but a fascist, dictatorial creature of the CIA.

"Vietnamization" immediately required military buttressing of the Thieu clique to have any hope of success. These steps included stepped up bombing in South Vietnam, increased bombing and military action in Laos and the CIA-engineering coup in Cambodia.

But the CIA coup in Cambodia rapidly suffered the same fatal weakness. The Lon Nol regime, a tool of the CIA, had no popular support and was rapidly collapsing before the wrath of the Cambodian peoples. A new crisis then confronted the military preparations for "Vietnamization"; the next logical step in its pursuit is being taken, military action to save the Lon Nol puppets.

President Nixon acknowledged that the military support had to be U.S. forces and Saigon puppet troops because Lon Nol could mus-

Cambodian liberators making gains

By Wilfred Burchett

Guardian staff correspondent

Well over one-third of the territory of Cambodia is already solidly in the hands of the National United Front (NUF)—a total of 25,000 square miles.

In most of the rest of the country, except for the capital of Phnom Penh and a few other big towns, government control by the military clique headed by Gen. Lon Nol is virtually nonexistent.

The Lon Nol regime, which deposed neutralist head of state Norodom Sihanouk in March, is in deep trouble on every front and may well demand and receive considerable American aid.

The Nixon administration appears to be setting the stage for vastly increased U.S. involvement. The White House statement April 24 that Cambodia has been subjected to an invasion by North Vietnamese troops seems the first move in this direction.

Giving the lie to this myth—the same that was used as a pretext for the U.S. invasion of South Vietnam and the bombings of the North—is the fact that the NUF-controlled areas include the mountains along the border of Thailand in the extreme West, hundreds of miles from frontiers with Vietnam's Elephant mountains, overlooking the coastal areas in the South and most of Stung Treng province that adjoins Laos in the North.

The regions controlled by the NUF include some of the richest—in terms of rice and fish—and most densely populated. Apart from the CIA-trained "Khmer Serei" (Lon Nol's storm troopers recruited mainly from the Cambodian minority in South Vietnam), the Cambodian army is refusing to fight.

Cambodian liberators in control

A French journalist has described on Paris radio and television this weekend how he was captured in the "Parrot's Beak" in Svay Rieng province. He thought his captors were "Vietcong" but they were in fact from the Cambodian liberation army which controlled the whole area where he was captured and through which he was taken to the point he was freed.

Reports in the French press in the past week insist on the decisive role being played in the fighting by the Cambodian resistance forces. This aspect plus the massacres of Cambodian civilians of Vietnamese origin has undoubtedly influenced the French government in its attitude toward the Lon Nol regime.

An official delegation headed by Lon Nol's foreign minister Pho Proueng and the army chief of staff Brig. Gen. Srey Saman was ignored when it arrived at the Paris airport last week. Its request for military aid was rejected. One of the tasks of this delegation was to preside over a meeting in Paris of 14 Cambodian heads of diplomatic missions in Africa and Europe and give instructions that Cambodian students abroad who are almost unanimously for Sihanouk are to be brought under control. The diplomats were also told the Cambodian missions in the socialist world would be cut to the minimum but that diplomatic relations would be established with South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia.

At the Paris conference on Vietnam, delegates of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam vigorously

attacked Nixon's April 20 speech promising new troop withdrawals. Nguyen Minh Vy pointed out for the DRV that even if the 150,000 troops were withdrawn according to Nixon's schedule, there would still be 280,000 U.S. troops and 70,000 from satellite countries in South Vietnam in the spring of 1971. He accused Nixon of wanting to prolong "indefinitely the U.S. occupation of South Vietnam."

Neocolonialist aggression

Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, speaking for the PRG said the speech "only confirmed our opinion when we say that the Nixon administration has in no way abandoned its policy of neocolonialist aggression in South Vietnam."

Both delegates accused the U.S. of having escalated the war in Laos and of having plotted the coup in Phnom Penh to extend the war to Cambodia.

The DRV-PRG position on the expanded U.S. aggression into Laos and Cambodia was summed up by Nguyen Minh Vy at the Paris conference the week earlier. Following are portions of his remarks:

It is more and more evident that the Nixon administration talks peace but makes war; it talks of the respect for the right to self-determination of other nations, but in fact, commits aggression.

Since the end of the first Indochinese war, the United States—in the framework of its global strategy—has been systematically carrying out a policy of intervention into and aggression against the Indochinese countries.

We have on many occasions pointed out the U.S. ambition of turning the Indochinese countries into new-type U.S. colonies and military bases, an ambition which many U.S. officials in the past have spoken about without scruple. And for dozens of years now, the United States has not for a single moment stopped pursuing that scheme of aggression.

Sham independence

The familiar maneuver of the U.S. is to set up a reactionary administration to serve as its stooge under a signboard of sham "independence" or at times "neutrality." Such an administration would be an instrument and at the same time a smokescreen for the U.S. policy of intervention and aggression.

That is the nature and the role of the successive Saigon administrations, from Ngo Dinh Diem in the past to the Thieu-Ky-Khiem at present. That is the nature and the role of the present Vientiane administration headed by Souvanna Phouma in Laos. Despite the efforts made by the Nixon administration to sow confusion on the issue, it must be borne in mind that this administration is quite different from Lao National Union government set up after the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, consecrated by the King of Laos and headed at the time by the same Souvanna Phouma who was then the representative of the neutral party. Since the National Union Government was an obstacle for the implementation of U.S. scheme of aggression in Laos, the U.S. subsequently replaced it by a stooge administration which is the present Vientiane government.

GUARDIAN
2 May 1970

Intrigue by U.S. in Cambodia/2

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent
Second of two articles

Paris

On March 3, 1955, Sihanouk abdicated as king in favour of his father, Norodom Suramarit. He did so in a typical surprise move by sending an envelope to the Phnom Penh radio station, asking the program director to play the enclosed tape in place of the customary midday newscast. It was a recorded speech of abdication. Even to those in circles closest to him, this came as a complete surprise. Shortly afterwards I asked why he had done it. He said: "I wanted to offer proof to our young people, especially our young students that my efforts for the country and nation had nothing to do with the wish to be his Majesty the King, or to my attachment to the throne . . ."

There is no question that he chose to end the monarchy to play a more direct role in the country's affairs, believing it was the only way of ensuring the country's independence from American attempts to replace France in Indochina. (As his father had no other heirs, the monarchy as an institution would end with the death of Sihanouk's parents and for all practical purposes it ended with Sihanouk's abdication.) In the same broadcast Sihanouk announced the formation of the Sangkum, which was to become virtually the exclusive political movement in the country.

(Sihanouk's recent announcement from Peking that he would not seek to regain office as chief of state reveals that he realizes once again that a whole era has come to an end and a new one starting in which, as he expressed it, neither the type of regime which he headed in the past nor that which had overthrown him would have a place. The future belonged to the people, but first there would have to be a struggle for real national liberation, in which Sihanouk pledged himself to take part on the side of the people.)

By the end of 1955, pressure on Cambodia to join SEATO began to reach fantastic proportions. There was direct pressure on Sihanouk from John Foster Dulles himself and for the first time in 1956, Allen, head of the CIA, came to Phnom Penh with

"proofs" of impending "communist aggression," from which SEATO could provide the only protection, Sihanouk replied that the 1954 Geneva Agreements provided for Cambodian neutrality. Dulles knew very well that without Cambodian agreement and U.S. military power solidly implanted in that country up to the borders of South Vietnam, SEATO would be ineffective as an instrument of U.S. domination of the area.

I arrived in Phnom Penh in March 1956 when pressures were building up to their climax. Sihanouk had outraged the State Department by visiting Peking, despite warnings by the U.S. ambassador to Phnom Penh. Work on the road from Sihanoukville, already taking shape as a port, had still not started and the U.S. was threatening to cut off economic aid altogether. South Vietnam and Thailand had closed their frontiers with Cambodia and started an economic blockade. U.S. planes officially taking part in SEATO maneuvers were openly violating Cambodian air space from bases in Thailand. "Khmer Serei" irregulars were making raids into the country from Thailand. The U.S. ambassador recently installed in nearby Bangkok was the same John Peurifoy who had engineered the overthrow of the independent Arbenz government of Guatemala.

U.S. claims innocence

I wrote a series of articles describing the situation as ominously reminiscent of that on the eve of the CIA-sponsored action in Guatemala. Some were picked up and rebroadcast over Peking and Hanoi radio. John Foster Dulles took it upon himself to deny one of these in a letter to the Cambodian foreign ministry on April 17, 1956, in which he expressed "alarm that statements from various sources are giving increasing publicity to allegations according to which the U.S. tried to force Cambodia into joining the SEATO pact by threatening to withdraw U.S. economic aid and that the U.S. had obliged independent and friendly nations such as Vietnam and Thailand to impose measures of economic warfare against Cambodia . . ."

Dulles denounced the allegations as "completely false" and warned they "could damage the friendly relations existing between our two states . . ." He further pointed out that the U.S. ambassador to Cambodia some days earlier had informed the king and queen that "the U.S. has never publicly made any official observations concerning Cambodian neutrality . . ."

Sihanouk immediately published a declaration whose first point stated that it was curious for Dulles to reply to newspaper articles by a letter to the Cambodian foreign ministry. He then dwelt with the matter of "no public or official" U.S. observations on Cambodian neutrality, stating:

"It is a fact that publicly the U.S. has never made any observations about Cambodian neutrality. However, private American 'advice' and

continued

YORK, PA.
GAZETTE & DAILY

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MAY 2 1970

WAR IN INDOCHINA

President Nixon's dire decision to expand the war into Cambodia is but another illustration, perhaps the most dangerous to date, that the only way to extract ourselves from what is fast becoming an Indochina war is to pull our combat troops out of Southeast Asia, all of it, and certainly not extend the war further.

It is possible that sending combat troops into Cambodia is consistent with the President's real Vietnam policy. His announced policy, of course, is something he calls "Vietnamization" — under which he says he intends to withdraw American troops as the burden of fighting shifts to the South Vietnamese American-backed forces. But at no time has Mr. Nixon said what he intends to do if the South Vietnamese he's backing can't carry the ball.

Yet there has never been any reason to believe that this Vietnamese faction can achieve a military victory over their opponents, or a military or political stalemate, but Mr. Nixon still seems to be dreaming of a military victory in Vietnam. This was Lyndon Johnson's dream too.

This is impossible. Six years, close to fifty thousand American lives and our wounded that number now in the hundreds of thousands, tell us so. The way out of Indochina is to abandon our bankrupt Southeast Asian policies. That's the only way to save ourselves from what is now a very costly mistake, one of the very worst we have made.

Mounting an American invasion force into Cambodia is an illegal action, just as the American military presence in Vietnam is an illegal, unconstitutional action. Who on high among us can ask for law and order

when the highest office in the land has no respect for law. No matter how we try to slice it, we have now invaded a neutral nation. Thus we are aggressors. This is now our national shame, brought upon us by long years of folly.

As for Cambodia itself, we think it's safe to predict that our troops will not be in and out of that country as Mr. Nixon tells us. Militarily and politically, Cambodia is now a vacuum which our CIA made out of it, and which we now propose to fill by more atrocious acts similar to the ones we have been perpetrating in Vietnam.

To the north lies Laos; ahead lies Thailand. Everywhere we extend our military and political presence in Southeast Asia we undermine stability and peace and risk our chances of survival. Today, at this very moment, we could be standing on the brink of a total Indochina war, in which we would find ourselves facing the wrath and fury of Asia and its millions.



The plot to push war into Cambodia

STATINTL

By WILFRED BURCHETT
Special for Prensa Latina

PARIS — Norodom Sihanouk's concept of Cambodian neutrality — which has kept Cambodia neutral, independent and relatively peaceful while war raged on the other side of her frontier — has fallen victim to Nixon's "Vietnamization" policy.

Sihanouk's concept of neutrality was based on opposition to U.S. imperialism, friendship towards the countries of socialism, good neighborly relations with the Peoples Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Nixon's insistence on continuing the war in South Vietnam by other means is "Vietnamization" and of striving to maintain in power indefinitely the corrupt fascist regime of Thieu-Khiem-Ky encouraged right-wing elements in Cambodia to try and reverse the trend of Sihanouk's policies and place Cambodia in the U.S. camp.

It was no accident that the sacking of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government embassies in Phnom Penh took place 24 hours after Sihanouk had announced that DRV Premier Pham Van Dong would be visiting Cambodia during the month of May and on the very eve of Sihanouk's departure for Moscow and Peking.

Envied Saigon boddlers

The rightists could not bear the thought of aid from the socialist countries. All their hopes were based on the Yankee dollar.

Elements within the upper strata of the armed forces eyed with envy their opposite numbers in South Vietnam stuffing their pockets and foreign bank accounts with U.S. dollars. Right wing elements among the bourgeoisie wanted an end to nationalization of the banks, of import-export companies and dreamed of the rake-off from dollar aid which they hoped would come pouring in once diplomatic relations with the USA were restored last June.

Had the Americans been sincere at the Paris talks in negotiating political settlement in South Vietnam based on a coal-

ition government and an independent neutral South Vietnam, Sihanouk's position would have been unassailable and the rightists would not have dared emerge from their holes. There would have been immediate prospects for a neutralist block of states including South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for a start and probably Thailand fairly soon. This bloc would represent no threat to legitimate western interests.

Sihanouk's policies would have been vindicated; he would have been honored by his people as the leader whose stubborn defense of Cambodia's independence and neutrality, kept the country out of the war. But U.S. imperialism is not interested in

neutralist prince. Under his leadership, the Cambodian government had:

- 1) Closed down a U.S. military mission when it was discovered that mission members were involved in a plot to overthrow and assassinate Sihanouk.

- 2) Cut off U.S. military aid when it became clear this could not be used in defense against Thailand and the Saigon regime which represented the only military threats for Cambodia.

- 3) Took the extraordinary action of being the first country to halt U.S. economic aid when it became clear this was being used to strangle the country's economic development.

- 4) Took no action when the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh

class trading community which Prince Sirik Matak is said to represent, was to try and secure a big slice of a potential dollar pie. But even when the U.S. embassy was reopened the expected offers of dollar aid failed to materialize while attacks on the frontier villages, including chemical war against the rubber plantations, was intensified.

"People think we're getting the big stick and carrot treatment," one top official told me in Phnom Penh in February. "In fact we're only getting the big stick. No sign of the carrot."

The inference was clear: "Show your change of hearts by concrete acts" was the message Washington was flashing.

It is in this context that the Vietnam embassies and the subsequent removal of Sihanouk must be seen. The presence of Vietnam troops in the border areas was of incidental importance only. The timing and sequence of events makes this clear.

Sihanouk and the Cambodian people know full well that any North Vietnamese or NLF troops in the border areas are there without hostile intent as far as Cambodia is concerned. They were there fighting the common threat to both peoples—a hostile Saigon regime with avowedly expansionist policies towards Cambodia and the U.S.A. obsessed with the idea of filling the "power vacuum" caused by the departure of the French.

It is not the North Vietnam or

continued

GRAND RAPIDS, MICH.
PRESS

E - 133,419

S - 138,539

MAY 1 1970

The Public Pulse

Sees U.S. on Familiar Road To Second Vietnam War

EDITOR OF THE PRESS: While President Nixon placates public opinion with promising rhetoric about the ill-fated "Vietnamization" program, he is foolishly committing the U.S. to the Second War of Indochina. Secret CIA operations in Cambodia and Laos have expanded into covert military entanglements. And, contrary to overly-optimistic reports, the U.S. is becoming further enmeshed in a disastrous war no one wants.

Our combat troops have penetrated Cambodia repeatedly, while the CIA searches for soldiers-of-fortune willing to fight in the jungles for \$1,000 a week. American aircraft are dropping napalm on Cambodians, and artillery continually pounds the countryside. In addition, the Nixon administration has agreed to send military aid to the right-wing Cambodian government.

Thousands of CIA-sponsored "advisers" are directing the clandestine army of Meo general Vang Pao, in the Plain of Jars, Laos. During the past year, Nixon has escalated the air war over Laos to a greater intensity than it once was over North Vietnam. U.S. aircraft based in Thailand, South Vietnam and on carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin fly more than 500 sorties a day, 24 hours a day, although bombing is only marginally effective at best—perhaps counter-productive (as it was over North Vietnam).

The mistaken policies in Southeast Asia are tragic symptoms of a bankrupt foreign policy based upon 1) blind containment of Communism, 2) expanding foreign investment, and 3) military intervention. Instability is automatically responded to militarily.

Until the U.S. adopts a more realistic and flexible foreign policy there seems little hope of abandoning the costly role of world policeman. The 440 U.S. military bases on foreign soil will be jumping-off points for future Vietnams. And a reordering of national priorities, beginning with reduction in military spending, will remain just a lingering dream humanists and ecologists discuss.

President Nixon's escalation of the Second War of Indochina illustrates that there has been no significant change in U.S. foreign policy since 1954, when he advocated direct American involvement in the original war of Indochina.

THOMAS MINNERICK

1 May 1970

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400210001-7

Cambodians gaining new ground

By Wilfred Burchett

Guardian staff correspondent

Peking, China, May 5

Despite the American-Saigon invasion of eastern Cambodia last week, ostensibly launched to crush alleged Vietnamese military sanctuaries, the Cambodian liberation army now controls most of the countryside of this Southeast Asian nation of 6.6 million people.

All seven roads and two railroads leading to and from the capital of Phnom Penh have been cut by forces of the National United Front. Route 1 — the main highway linking Phnom Penh to Saigon in neighboring South Vietnam — was made inoperable May 4 when the liberation army advanced on the town of Neak Luong, 29 miles southeast of the capital.

The rightist regime of dictator Gen. Lon Nol, which assumed power in a CIA-backed coup in March while head of state Norodom Sihanouk was visiting in Europe, is making frenzied preparations to defend the capital. Some 2000 CIA-financed and Green Beret-trained Cambodian mercenaries fighting against the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam were flown into Phnom Penh May 2 to defend the regime.

The invasion of U.S. and Saigon troops to the east has not stemmed the liberation tide, despite widespread havoc perpetrated upon the civilian population in the border areas where "Vietcong sanctuaries" are supposed to be found. U.S. bombing planes are ruthlessly wiping out village after village under the same "kill all, burn all" mandate that obtains in South Vietnam.

President Nixon's pretext for the invasion — to destroy Vietnamese base camps said to be threatening U.S. troops in South Vietnam — is an incredible distortion of reality proven every day as the invaders report no luck in finding the masses of PRG soldiers or headquarters of the PRG command he said were located along the border.

The Parrot's Beak and Fishhook areas which Nixon said were entirely occupied and controlled by troops of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) is a densely populated rice-growing country. The International Control Commission, which was set up to supervise implementation of the Geneva Accords, has investigated these regions many times and has not reported finding "Vietcong sanctuaries."

The "Vietcong" and "North Vietnamese" body counts being reported by the U.S. command are the bodies of Cambodian peasants slaughtered in the reign of military terror ordered by Washington. Likewise, the forces which are isolating Phnom Penh and making gains throughout the country are Cambodian, not Vietnamese. And Gen. Creighton Abrams, U.S. commander in Vietnam, has said that the PRG, which is hardly likely — that the central office of the PRG and National Liberation Front (NLF) is located in Vietnam, not Cambodian soil.

Favorable reports continue to flow into Sihanouk's temporary headquarters here in Peking. Sihanouk initiated the Cambodian liberation struggle a few days after the Lon Nol regime took power and is coordinating activities from China.

The atmosphere of the headquarters is one of confidence and determination to carry on the struggle "10, 15, 20 years or more," according to one of the Cambodian head of state's chief advisors. There are no illusions about a short, sharp victory, but rather complete confidence in the long-range outcome and in the belief that a new, progressive Cambodia will arise out of the chaos created during the first seven weeks of the fascist regime now in Phnom Penh.

Compounding the sense of ultimate victory evident here was the highly successful summit meeting of Indochinese nations which agreed April 25 to form a joint defense against U.S. aggression. The meeting, initiated by Sihanouk, received the backing of China and the USSR. All parties referred to the summit as a "new stage" in the liberation struggle. In a 2000-word final statement, the four nations declared: "The Indo-chinese peoples'...victories have shown that for all their brutal force U.S. imperialists are beaten when they encroach on the sacred right to life of a people united and determined to fight through to the end for the independence and freedom of its fatherland."

Reports of demonstrations within the U.S. protesting the invasion also provide great encouragement to the National United Front forces. Sihanouk and other NUF leaders here are completely informed about antiwar developments in the U.S.

Nixon announced the "U.S.-Saigon invasion of Cambodia in a televised address to the American people the evening of April 30 less than two weeks after he declared the U.S. would withdraw some 150,000 more troops from Vietnam within the next year, leaving a force of over a quarter-million to fight alongside the Saigon army.

Justifying the invasion — which he termed not an invasion at all but an attempt to bring peace to Southeast Asia — Nixon said he was impelled to action because "I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after withdrawal of another 150,000." He charged that the DRV had been invading Cambodia in the last two weeks, a preposterous allegation.

In a news dispatch from Godauha, South Vietnam, May 1, buried in the New York Times, "experienced observers both in and outside the American armed forces" were reported as "voicing puzzlement over President Nixon's statement last night that American troops near the Cambodian border have been endangered by action of enemy troops in Cambodia within the last 10 days. After a flareup, termed a periodic 'high point,' in early April, enemy activity has slacked off, the observers say. Before the (invasion) military analysts of background briefings said the pace of the war had settled back to a low level..."

"This is not an invasion of Cambodia," the President continued. "The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw."

Recognizing the unpopularity of his move Nixon phrased his speech to inspire chauvinist attitudes "We will not be humiliated," he said. "We will not be defeated....If when the world's most powerful nation — the United States of America — is defeated, the world will be a different place."

STATINTL

HAVERHILL, MASS.
GAZETTE

E - 22,571

MAY 1 1970

Cambodia Reaction

Congressional opposition to the entrance of American troops into Cambodia this week was far different from the favorable response made to the Gulf of Tonkin story which put U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

Senators and House members alike were strong in their repudiation of the decision by President Nixon to send military units into Cambodia. Support for the decision was numerically small and comparatively weak.

Public reaction to the spread of the war was practically instantaneous. Telegraph offices were besieged. There were calls to Gazette workers, asking where to send letters and telegrams of protest.

Appearance of the President on television last night will not, we feel, have the same effect on Americans as the words of President Johnson did after Tonkin Gulf, when the full effects of the action he planned could not be foreseen.

Where promises were made during the campaign to get American troops out of Vietnam, and where a withdrawal program was initiated, hope had been raised that U.S. participation in the war was closing.

We must now ask about the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in these Southeast Asia developments. Until a few weeks ago, Cambodian neutrality, however shaky, had been maintained. Then Prince Sihanouk, its ruler, was deposed in a coup, and the war immediately escalated. The CIA has been functioning in Cambodia and Laos for some time. Questions should be asked about its activities by Congressmen, like our own Rep. Michael J. Harrington, who oppose the broadening of the fighting.

Denial of funds, as proposed by Harrington, appears to be the only way for Congress to regain its role in forming national policy.

Cambodian operations succumb to defeat. This deterrent can and should be strengthened, however, by clear instructions from the Commander-in-Chief prohibiting American units or advisers from providing direct logistical or other support to South Vietnamese units that make forays into Cambodia—even where the American personnel remain on the Vietnamese side of the border.

It is, above all, the ounce of prevention. It permits Congress and the President to make the rational choice in Cambodia before any commitments have been made to limit that choice. It would prevent another Vietnamese or Laotian disaster before the disaster is upon us.

The commitment of American troops in a foreign conflict is a responsibility that, under the Constitution, the President shares with the Congress. The enactment of this bill would assure that this responsibility is thus shared. Should the President, as the result of any new developments, conceivably wish to present further proposals for the utilization of American military personnel in Cambodia, he would be required to obtain the specific authorization of Congress before taking such action.

Military aid to Cambodia

The United States now provides no military hardware to Cambodia. Such aid was terminated by Prince Sihanouk in 1963, as part of an effort to reassure North Vietnam and China of Cambodia's neutrality and friendship. The Cambodian army since then has been primarily outfitted with Chinese and Soviet weapons.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Secretary of State Rogers stated that he did not anticipate a request for aid by the Lon Nol government.

Its losing battle with Vietnamese Communist forces has, however, made the new Cambodian regime increasingly desperate for military aid from the United States. This week, Premier Lon Nol sent an urgent appeal to the President requesting arms and equipment. And the State Department has opened exploratory talks on military assistance with Cambodian authorities.

For several reasons, I am strongly opposed to the United States' resuming military aid to Cambodia.

The basic military fact in Cambodia is that the Vietnamese Communist forces within the country are substantially stronger than the forces of the central government.

This military preponderance on the Communist side cannot, I believe, be rectified merely by supplying modern American military equipment to the inadequate Cambodian army. Military aid to Cambodia will only put pressure on Washington to dispatch American advisers to assist Cambodian forces in making use of the equipment they have received. Such aid may, in fact, worsen the plight of the hard-pressed Cambodian forces—if the Communists retaliate by a still swifter advance on the capital.

Moreover, U.S. military aid to Cambodia may be used for purposes not consistent with American objectives. One such likely purpose is the systematic murder of Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia.

Both in Laos and in Vietnam, a massive military aid program failed to shore up faltering local forces, and proved the forerunner of more direct forms of American involvement. The same pattern could easily recur in Cambodia.

Cambodia faces severe economic problems that might justify the granting of U.S. economic aid if requested. Such aid may be provided, however, without taking the hazardous concomitant steps of granting military assistance.

CONCLUSION

It is time we recognize that the Indochina war has not been and cannot ever be won.

It is time we recognize that we cannot build an Asian society at gunpoint.

It is time we recognize that the human, economic and other costs of prolonging our military presence in Indochina clearly outweigh any benefits that could conceivably result from our presence.

It is time we swiftly and completely terminate our involvement in a hopeless and evil war.

It is time we adopt a sane policy in Indochina—not one that at staggering human sacrifice, pursues the chimerical goal of Vietnamization—followed perhaps by Cambodianization.

AMENDMENT No. 604

At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

"Sec. 7. Such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 47. Limitation on Assistance to Cambodia.—No part of any amount authorized to be appropriated under this Act or any other law shall be used to introduce into or maintain in the territory of Cambodia or the airspace thereof, for any purpose and for any period of time, (1) any military personnel of the United States, or (2) any other persons employed by the United States or hired pursuant to contract with the United States, who perform the functions of combat, combat support or logistical support, or who perform the functions of military advisers or military instructors."

OUR INVASION OF CAMBODIA

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, millions of Americans are shocked and saddened that President Nixon yielded to the CIA, generals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to leaders of the military-industrial complex and has ordered the invasion of Cambodia with tanks, warplanes, and fighting men of our Armed Forces termed "military advisers." This to maintain a new ruling group which overturned the neutralist government. Suddenly and without any information given the American people, our tanks, warplanes, and artillery raided neutralist Cambodia, spearheading the attack on the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces opposed to the militarist group which took over in the absence of neutralist Prince Sihanouk.

Furthermore, this sudden raid must have been planned by our CIA and generals directly following the murderous brutality of the Cambodian Armed Forces in killing more than a hundred Vietnamese civilians—men, women, and children—who had been removed from their homes in Cambodia, held at a detention center at Phnom Penh. So now thousands of American rifles and ammunition have been given to this murderous, brutal Cambodian regime and our warplanes, tanks, and military advisers, so called, are spearheading the attack by two regiments of the Saigon regime. Our GI's are now being killed in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, in addition to Vietnam. President Nixon has accelerated and expanded our war to the entire area of the old Indo-Chinese French colonial empire. A top commanding career officer of the Cambodian Army demanded:

We will soon be short of ammunition and we are in no position to hold on alone. Look at our men. Some of these are fresh recruits with only three days' training. What we need is for the great U.S. to send us help as they did for South Vietnam. All we need is 200,000 men for two years.

President Nixon has usurped the functions of Congress. He has disregarded the will and wishes of the American people. Responding to Gen. Earle Wheeler and other militants, to whom it now appears he is giving slavish devotion, he has ordered this invasion or raid by our Armed Forces with two regiments of our puppet Saigon militarist regime without first informing the American people and without informing the Congress.

Unfortunately, more than 50,000 Americans have lost their lives in combat in Vietnam. Now more and more Americans are being killed each day in Laos and Thailand and now Cambodia will be added to that list. Pentagon officials with the expansion of the war from Vietnam throughout Southeast Asia now use the term "Southeast Asia" instead of "Vietnam" when reporting the killed and wounded. Americans should know that nearly 275,000 men of our Armed Forces have been wounded in combat in the undeclared, immoral, unpopular war we have been waging. Many of these wounded will be maimed for life. Their wounds would have been fatal in World War II. Due to the advance of medical science and quick evacuation by our helicopters, lives have been saved at this time but those men have been maimed and will suffer as long as they live. Also, men have been wounded due to "accidents and incidents" and many have died from bubonic plague, malaria fever, and other jungle diseases.

The truth is that the underdeveloped countries of Laos and Cambodia are not worth the life of one American youngster. This jungle and mountainous area more than 10,000 miles distant from the United States is of no importance whatever to the defense of our country.

The question we can ask is: "Has President Nixon changed his mind and does he now believe that the United States has a mandate from almighty God to police Southeast Asia?" It is evident that in November 1968, a majority of Americans believed presidential candidate Richard Nixon when in New Hampshire and elsewhere he said he had a secret plan to end the war. Many Americans, tired of this undeclared war and of the killing believed he would take us out of war. Yet his secret plan is still his secret. We have more war over a far greater territory in Southeast Asia.

Clearly the President no longer feels the need to be frank with the American people. The raid by Vietnamese forces with our military advisers spearheaded by our bombers, helicopters, artillery, and tanks beyond the borders of South Vietnam must have been in preparation for at least 3 or 4 days, but no Member of Congress was consulted or informed as far as any of us know. Does President Nixon listen only to the warhawks in his Cabinet and the leaders of the military-industrial complex and war profiteers?

If the Federal Government had the recall laws and electoral machinery we have in some of our States to recall State officials I believe recall petitions would be circulated to recall Richard Nixon as President of the United States.

Mr. President, could it be possible that

30 APR 1970

STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

U.S. Had No Hand in Sihanouk's Fall

By Jack Anderson

U.S. credibility has sunk so low that millions of Americans no longer trust the official statements about events in Southeast Asia. This column has been deluged with inquiries, for example, pleading for the truth about Cambodia.

Many Americans apparently suspect that the U.S. secretly engineered overthrow of left-leaning Prince Norodom Sihanouk and precipitated the Cambodian crisis. This column has carefully investigated the backstage activities and can state categorically that the U.S. played no part in Sihanouk's ouster.

President Nixon not only hoped to keep Cambodia neutral but was pleased to deal with Sihanouk. At the time of his downfall, ironically, he was appealing to Moscow and Peking to bring pressure on Hanoi to pull North Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia.

Queen Mother Role

His mother, Queen Sisowath Kossomak, at first hailed the anti-communist demonstrations in Cambodia. Not until her son reached her from Peking to warn that the demonstrations had gone too far did she reverse herself.

Then she played a backstage role in precipitating the show-down in the National Assembly. In secret meetings with Cambodian leaders, the Queen Mother expressed her displeasure

over the demonstrations, accused those who opposed her son of treason, and called for a vote of confidence in Sihanouk.

The Assembly, instead, voted Sihanouk out of power. The new leaders strived at first to maintain Cambodian neutrality and even delivered two protests to the U.S. embassy over American shelling and helicopter incursions across the border.

At this time there were only 11 people on the embassy staff. No other U.S. officials, CIA agents or special forces were present in Cambodia. The embassy staff has now been expanded to 16. Four of the newcomers were sent on temporary duty to improve the vital communications between Phnompenh and Washington.

Ever since diplomatic relations with Cambodia were restored last July, the embassy has been instructed to keep a low profile and not to meddle in Cambodian affairs.

Called on Carpet

Uneasy Interior officials were summoned to Capitol Hill the other day to explain why the Interior Department's top brass spent \$117,023 of the taxpayers' money to redecorate their executive suites. They appeared behind closed doors of the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee to answer charges by this column that Secretary of the In-

terior Walter Hickel and other high officials splurged on expensive furniture, rich drapery and thick russet carpets in violation of the law.

Chairwoman Julia Hansen (D-Wash.) whose motherly look hides a steel-trap mind, first called Assistant Secretary Lawrence Dunn on the carpet.

"We are not exactly happy. It is not good for government, period!" she informed Dunn, who squirmed and looked to Budget Director Richard Hite for help.

"We just did not see the need to bring this matter to the committee's attention," Hite said lamely.

But Mrs. Hansen counts out the public's pennies as if they were a grade schooler's milk money. She commented:

"When you get down to putting funds for the pit toilets at Fort Union Trading Post in reserve because of the precarious (financial) position of the government, then it certainly looks like other projects should be curtailed."

'Emergency' Luxuries

Dunn tried to argue that they had not violated the law, which permits "emergency" expenditures without the usual safeguards. There was an "emergency" need, he claimed, to replace the furnishings they inherited from the Democrats. This had seemed quite plush enough to

Mrs. Hansen who intoned coldly:

"Have you established any cost ceilings on funds that may be spent for refurbishing an office?"

"No ma'am, we have not," sighed Hite.

Didn't the Bureau of the Budget insist on this?" she demanded.

"The direct answer is 'no,'" replied Hite.

"I don't like your kind of budget then," she snapped. "If you come up here with justifications that mean one thing to one person and another thing to someone else, we have a bad situation. This committee might just as well sit out in the middle of the Chesapeake and flag rowboats as hold budget hearings."

The Interior officials tried to convince the chairwoman that a Hickel crony from Seattle, who redecorated Hickel's office, had not been illegally hired, because he was in a "professional" category that heretofore had been reserved for physicians and attorneys.

At the end, they conceded that their effort to cover up juggled purchase orders was "erroneous and ill-advised" and that they failed to get the General Services Administration clearances required by law.

Mrs. Hansen extracted a promise from them that any more luxury binges will be brought before her committee in the future.

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29 APR 1970

Reds Driving On Capitol of Lao Province

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — Communist forces this morning launched concerted attacks against the Lao province capital of Attapeu near the Cambodia-Laos border, military sources reported.

Sources said they thought the Communist attacks was aimed at opening new supply lines from Laos into Cambodia.

Communist infantrymen overran a government artillery position and captured a 105-millimeter howitzer on a hill outside the town.

Other forces overran the government command post next to the Attapeu airstrip and other positions a thousand yards outside town, sending Lao infantry troops fleeing into the streets.

Heavy fighting was reported to be continuing around a mountain position 3 miles outside Attapeu.

Attapeu is the capital of Attapeu Province in southeast Laos, close to the tri-border of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam and only 10 miles west of the junction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail with the Sihanouk Trail.

From Attapeu, Communist

trucks can be heard moving along the trails, and government troops occasionally fire mortars at the trucks.

Attapeu is sometimes used by secret army guerrillas operating against the trails. A major part of the trail surveillance is carried out from an American Central Intelligence Agency camp south of Attapeu and close to the Cambodian border.

This camp has not yet been attacked, military sources said.

The Pathet Lao attack against Attapeu possibly is a Communist move to gain a political victory by taking a provincial capital. The Communists hold three of 16 provincial capitals.

If so, this would signify a major political change in Red tactics in Laos. Attapeu is recognized by the Geneva Accords as rightist terrain.

By attacking it, the Communists could be trying for a new political balance—a move signaling further hard fighting in Laos.

Military sources said, however, that the Communist assault at Attapeu may be linked with a drive to enlarge the Red trail network into Cambodia, so the North Vietnamese can move more reinforcements and supplies there to make up for losses caused by the closure of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville to the Viet Cong.

Year of Battle

Sources said Attapeu has been encircled for more than a year by Communist forces. Pathet Lao gunners have shelled its dirt airstrip sporadically, forcing U.S. resupply helicopters to land on the town's only paved street.

"It's been withering on the vine," the sources said. "They could have taken Attapeu any time."

Sources fear the Reds also may try to take Saravane, the capital of Saravane Province north of Attapeu. Like Attapeu, Saravane has been surrounded by Communist forces for over a year. Also like Attapeu, Saravane is on the west flank of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Attapeu, a town of thatched huts on stilts, in normal times had a population of 10,000 people. Most of those remaining are Lave tribesmen.

CIA Camp Is Near

North of the town on the Bolovens Plateau are Central Intelligence Agency hideouts where Americans pay Naheung tribesmen to watch Vietnamese boats on the Mekong River.

American trailwatchers lie on grassy slopes above the Ho Chi Minh Trail, usually with a circle of tribesmen around them for protection from North Vietnamese patrols and attacks by pro-Communist Kasseng tribesmen.

Attapeu and the CIA posts are resupplied by an undercover airline known only as "Boun Oum Airlines," named after its owner, Prince Boun Oum.

The airline is based at the Mekong town of Pakse, which Boun Oum runs like a fiefdom.

Pakse is called a substation by intelligence officers. From there activities against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the south panhandle of Laos are coordinated.

YORK, PA.
GAZETTE & DAILY
APR 29 1970
M - 35,186

ONE MORE TIME?

Maybe we're wrong, we hope so anyway, but the way the Cambodia thing is running we're sure we've been through this movie before. It's only the beginning of the plot, and yet... A right-wing military-minded regime (installed by CIA agents? Probably) a feint by this regime to consolidate its power (feint, yes, because the regime doesn't have the strength or support even to come close;) a yelp from the regime that "outsiders" are attacking and interfering with the peaceful neutrality of the place; and appeal for help from everybody (but mostly the U.S.) End of reel one.

Not a lot of help, heaven forbid, only a parcel of arms for the regime's stouthearted men; but it quickly develops they don't know how to shoot straight, once they get the arms, so they need "advisors;" next it turns out the stouthearted fellows had been overestimated and the wicked enemy woefully underestimated, meaning that a few U.S. combat units will certainly turn the tide; in come the combat units but, alas, not enough; so more and more and more... It's one of those serial movies. Just keeps on going.

One of those strange real made-up movies, too. Made-up, that is, in that, just as in the old tragedies, everything is set going by fakery, trickery and fraud acting upon the good but gullible

natures of people. Staged. The whole business is staged. The point is, for example, that Cambodia was peaceful even as South Vietnam was once peaceful, until the "new regime" took it upon itself to try and clamp an iron rule down on the country. And then the resistance, naturally. And the resistance is termed the "enemy." Which becomes, by some magic, the "enemy" also of the people of the United States.

Who in this tragedy are indeed the people with good but gullible natures. At least to date. It remains to be seen whether Nixon-and-company, can really sell this Cambodian flick to the multitudes. Does anybody actually want to see Vietnam all over again? We mean, to be concrete, will the American people hold still and let themselves - rather, their sons, brothers, husbands, fathers - be dragged into a bigger and bloodier war that has been provoked by military wiseacres here and abroad?

Soviets Keep Options On Indochina Open

STATINTL

By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, April 27 — The Soviets are having trouble deciding what to do in Indochina, Western analysts here said today.

They also suggested that any major U.S. military aid to Cambodia would shut off some options still open to the Soviets and force them into a more obdurate position.

The analysts, however, found significance in a Soviet reluctance to go all the way with Hanoi. Each new Soviet pronouncement seems to reveal Soviet footsteps hesitating at the water's edge before plunging in at Hanoi's urging, they commented.

In Pravda today, Lev Dyomin labeled Indonesia an accomplice of the Pentagon and the CIA for its suggestion of an Asian conference on Cambodia. Such a conference could not prevent civil war and foreign intervention, he said, because "the civil war in Cambodia is already under way and direct U.S. interference in that country's affairs is evident."

Dyomin said that Indonesia is already shipping arms to Cambodia and called attention to American ties with most of the Asian nations Indonesia was consulting, through the ANZUS and SEATO pacts and bilateral agreements.

In Izvestia, Vasily Tarasov echoed Soviet distaste for the proposed participants in the conference and said, "It is only the Cambodian people that have the right to decide their future. Cambodia must remain a neutral state as laid

down by the 1954 Geneva agreements, and no conference can be vested with the right of deciding her destiny. Those who hatch such plans contribute to Cambodia's involvement in the war, and add grist to the mill of the American aggressors."

Both commentaries omitted any mention of the presence of North Vietnamese or Vietcong troops in Cambodia.

But the Soviets could not go so far as Hanoi in setting up a team of "good guys" from all four countries in Indochina, the Western analysts suggested, because the Kremlin still has not made the final decision to back Prince Norodom Sihanouk against the Lon Nol regime that ousted him as head of state last month.

Dyomin in Pravda therefore referred to the "Phnom Penh authorities" and "Sihanouk's supporters" in the same sentence as though they were indeed equals. This was the more striking because a Tass statement Friday treated the massacres of Vietnamese in Cambodia in such a way as to make "recognition" of the Lon Nol regime more difficult.

The analysts believe that the Kremlin wants to preserve its options in case the Sihanouk forces lose on the battlefield. In a somewhat similar case, the Soviets maintained correct relations with the Indonesian generals who put down the abortive left-wing coup in 1965, even while the generals' followers were slaughtering 500,000 Indonesian Communists.

The Soviets may also have doubts about backing Sihanouk because he has remained

in Peking since leaving Moscow just after the Cambodian coup.

In their desire to maintain strong influence on Hanoi without encouraging an escalation of the war in Southeast Asia that would imperil Soviet domestic programs, the Kremlin leaders have tried to have it both ways.

Moscow has responded to Hanoi's pressures for a hard line against an Asian or a Geneva conference on Indochina. Yet this reduces its chance of gaining new leverage from its dormant role as co-chairman of the Geneva conferences. This chance probably inspired Soviet hints April 16 of interest in a renewal of the Geneva conference. These hints were withdrawn two days later.

The response to Hanoi's pressures also undermines the philosophical basis of Moscow's ill-defined projects for Asian collective security.

The Kremlin has not, however, publicly backed Hanoi's hopes for a joint campaign by North Vietnam, the Vietcong, the Pathet Lao and whatever Cambodian forces are behind Sihanouk.

The problem of timing may explain the Soviet failure thus far to express backing for a four-country campaign in Indochina. But the western analysts here said that the Soviets were probably holding back deliberately to preserve their options on Sihanouk, their independent contact with the Pathet Lao, and their hopes of keeping the war and attendant expenses from escalating.

If the United States comes in with massive military aid to Cambodia, the analysts said the Soviets will probably feel they have no choice but to go all the way with Hanoi and with Peking, which is thought to be already on Hanoi's side.

Soviet military aid will probably then be extended to the Sihanouk forces, great-power prestige will clog more channels that could conceivably lead to fruitful peace talks, and an end to the Indochina war will seem less attainable than ever.

HONOLULU, HAWAII
ADVERTISER

70-135
APR 27 1970

but neutralism vanishing

tolerance, realism guarded Cambodia

By FRANCOIS SULLY
Newsweek Feature Service

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia—By a combination of diplomatic cunning, fortunate geography and a willingness to be pushed around by its neighbors, sleepy little Cambodia has managed to avoid the recent wars that have devastated nearby Laos and Vietnam.

But Cambodian luck seems to have run out at last. For the first time in modern history, battles are being fought over the length and breadth of the Indochinese peninsula. The fighting menaces more than the security of one rather backward Asian state. It threatens to make the new war in Cambodia just one more battlefield of the old war in Vietnam.

In retrospect, the wonder is not that there is now fighting in Cambodia but that it has been held back for so long. The country has served as a supply depot, a base camp and a military highway for some 40,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong on their way to and from South Vietnam.

AT ANY MOMENT, this massive foreign force could have driven through Cambodia's modest defenses to this capital city of Phnom Penh. At any moment, the South Vietnamese, with varying degrees of U.S. support, could have made large-scale incursions into the country aimed at enemy bases.

The Communist troops were not so much welcomed as tolerated by Cambodia's long-time leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. His avowed policy was neutrality between the U.S. and the Communists, but the shading was clearly to the left

of his socialist leanings or perhaps it was merely geographical realism. At any rate, Sihanouk never went so far left as to relinquish national independence.

"I'll keep maneuvering as long as I have cards in my hand," he once said. "First a little to the left, then a little to the right. And when I have no more cards to play, I'll stop."

"EVENTUALLY, of course, he was stopped—by a bloodless military coup on March 18. Though the new leaders immediately proclaimed a neutralist policy, it seemed that in their case the neutrality shaded to the right.

The apparent strong man of the new regime, Gen. Lon Nol, is known to be outraged at the Communist troop incursions in the eastern provinces. And Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, the official No. 2 man who some say is actually the more powerful figure, has harbored an intense dislike for the Chinese ever since his tour as ambassador to Peking.

Both men, however, are realists. Both know they cannot force the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to leave. They also have the American example—and the previous French example—to teach them that Western allies cannot de-Communist an Asian country either.

MANEUVER, diplomacy, opportunism are called for, and the country has long experience in such peaceful means of survival. For centuries, Cambodian rulers have managed to stay afloat while Thais, Laotians

The Vietnamese have been a particular threat through the years. Indeed, it was to circumvent Saigon rule that the Cambodians applied to Napoleon III in 1863 to become a French protectorate. And it was the French who put the then 19-year-old Prince Sihanouk on the throne in 1941. Four years later, Cambodia regained its independence—with Sihanouk still the king.

In 1955, Sihanouk abdicated the throne, but not the power. For the next 15 years he dominated the life of his subjects, editing their newspapers, mildly socializing their economy, running their foreign policy, entertaining them with his florid oratory.

MEANWHILE the economy stagnated, the students grew restive and the military men fumed at the Communist military presence. When the coup came, there was no one to defend the absent leader.

In Cambodia, the quiet that followed in the first

days after Sihanouk's downfall was followed by the ominous first signs of incipient revolt. There were violent demonstrations in several cities. A brother of Prime Minister Lon Nol was hacked to death by a mob. And a virulent anti-Vietnamese hate campaign took a grisly toll in persecutions and mass slayings.

Foreign troops, too, grew more aggressive. Communist forces further secured their sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia, and overran southwestern part of the country.

TO MOST OF the Communist world, the coup caused problems, but no puzzles. Hanoi, Peking, even Moscow seemed to take it for granted that it was all an American operation. From his retreat in Peking, Sihanouk himself has charged that his downfall was engineered by the C.I.A.

The irony of the situation was that the accusations, whether true or not, were given more credence because the Communists acted upon them—and the government reacted in the only way possible. The demonstrations and the new aggressiveness of the foreign troops forced the government to mobilize thousands of new troops of its own—and finally, after weeks of hesitation, to request U.S. military aid.

It was a request that the Nixon Administration had publicly—and reportedly in private, too—tried to discourage. The Democratic opposition became even more uneasy at the prospect of new Southeast Asia entanglements.

But the threat to Cambodia was clear and growing. So, too, was the threat that a widening war would pose for the Vietnamization program and for continued U.S. troop withdrawals.

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 545,570
S - 712,175

APR 26 1970

STATINTL

Study air blow to aid

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON—President Nixon was reported Saturday to be under strong military pressure to launch a secret, Laos-type bombing campaign in Cambodia to arrest a rapidly deteriorating situation.

Military commanders here and in Vietnam concentrated on the bombing option on the face of a high-level Army study questioning whether any aid on the ground could be provided soon enough to save the new anti-Communist regime in Cambodia.

As military men conceived it, the President is confronted with the choice of doing nothing or unleashing the Air Force for widespread raids on North Vietnamese units in Cambodia.

Mr. Nixon, who is at Camp David, Md., for a short weekend, presumably will make a decision in the crisis at a National Security Council meeting in the White House Monday.

Some weapons provided

The President already has intervened in Cambodia by approving the transfer of several thousand captured, Russian-type automatic rifles from South Vietnam. He also has encouraged other countries, notably Indonesia, to provide additional weapons and military advisers.

But Mr. Nixon has yet to indicate whether he is prepared to provide direct U.S. aid in the form of arms and men.

The President's civilian advisers, principal-

Cambodia

ly on the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency and also to some extent in the Pentagon, are urging caution.

They report private hints of Soviet interest in a diplomatic settlement and they question whether these prospects, no matter how slim, should be jeopardized by U.S. military action that may be of no avail in any event.

Outside the military there is extreme skepticism here of the value of another bombing campaign in view of the disappointing results in North Vietnam and Laos. However, the Cambodian government reportedly has requested U.S. air strikes, particularly by B-52 bombers.

Blow against Reds seen

The Army and the Air Force argue that a defeat of the 40,000 North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia would eliminate the Communist

sanctuaries and staging areas there. Then, it is contended, Viet Cong resistance in the lower half of South Vietnam would wither for lack of support.

Civilian officials, on the other hand, believe the North Vietnamese still would be able to move enough supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail to maintain their forces in South Vietnam.

They fear a direct U.S. intervention in Cambodia would lead to a wider Indochina war that could shatter Mr. Nixon's troop withdrawal plans. There will be no change in the military situation in South Vietnam, they insist, even if Cambodia is completely overrun.

The White House has laid the groundwork for a possible intervention by characterizing the Cambodian conflict as a "foreign invasion" by the North Vietnamese.

25 APR 1970

STATINTL

SANE urges no arms to Cambodia

By TIM WHEELER

WASHINGTON, April 24—The SANE Committee sent a telegram yesterday urging that President Nixon refuse arms to the Lon Nol junta in Cambodia.

"We urge you to reject Cambodia's request for military aid direct and indirect," says the telegram, addressed to Nixon's foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger. It was signed by Sanford Gottlieb, executive director of the anti-war group.

The telegram said that U.S. military aid "would lead to further embroilment in widening war and violate the sense of the Senate (Commitments Resolution)."

This was the resolution passed 70 to 16 by the Senate last year forbidding the President to commit the U.S. to military actions abroad without the consent of Congress.

While the peace movement and a large fraction of the Senate warned Nixon against intervening in the Cambodian crisis, U.S. advisers and arms were already embroiled in expanded aggression inside Cambodia.

The peace movement here warned that this is an exact replay of the Vietnam war scenario in which the Pentagon secretly embroiled the U.S. in war by sending so-called advisers, then handed the people a fait accompli. The result was five years

of war and 45,000 Americans dead.

Nixon meanwhile, in a play for time, canceled a National Security Council meeting today. Observers believe that Nixon would prefer to set up a puppet operation to cover expanded U.S. aggression in Indo-China rather than send U.S. troops.

But Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) warned recently, "It has been reported and photographs have been made showing that armed American military personnel have already crossed into Cambodian territory several times in recent days." Presumably this refers to Green Beret and CIA advisers who are leading forays against pro-Sinhouk liberation forces in Cambodia.

Church, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has joined with Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to introduce a resolution "prohibiting the introduction of American combat troops" into Cambodia. He said the developments in Cambodia "create dangerous pressures for deepening America's involvement" and will "add fuel to this spreading fire."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unhappy with the level of intervention, are stepping up pressure here for a full scale adventure in behalf of the Lon Nol junta.

Alarmist reports, inspired by "top officials" in off-the-record interviews with the press corps, predict the imminent collapse of the junta and a "Vietcong takeover."

The hysteria-mongering is coupled with arguments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "swift and substantial" intervention in Cambodia will enable the U.S. to "smash the Vietcong sanctuaries" and bring quick victory for the U.S. in Indo-China. But Sen. Ja-

Vietnam war would be strongly opposed in Congress and the nation as a whole. In strictly military terms, 'victory' would likely prove to be at least as illusory in Laos and Cambodia as it has proven in Vietnam."

OTTINGER CHARGES CIA PUSHES SECRET LAOS WAR

NEW YORK, April 24 (UPI)—Rep. Richard L. Ottinger, D-NY, today accused the CIA of conducting, with Presidential approval, a "secret, illegal war in Laos" that could plunge the United States into "another major, bloody land war in Asia."

He said he based his charge on on-the-spot information gathered by his aides.

Ottinger, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the U.S. Senate, charged Nixon and the CIA with working out "a new formula" for conducting a secret military operation in Laos "without risking public or congressional scrutiny."

Shaky Cambodia military turns to Saigon, Thailand

Daily World Foreign Department

Cambodia's new military regime took new steps to bolster its rule Friday by moving to "normalize" relations with pro-U.S. regimes in Thailand and in Saigon.

In Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, informed Cambodian sources reported that the arms shipped there Wednesday night by the U.S. were brand-new American-made M-16 rifles, not captured Soviet-made weapons.

Liberation forces in Cambodia were reported Friday to have cut the vital north-south Highway 3, near Ang Tasom, about 50 miles south of Phnom Penh. Earlier, Highway 2, another north-south road, and the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville railroad were cut near the southern provincial capital of Takeo.

Mercenary aid

Heavy fighting was still raging east of Phnom Penh for control of east-west Highway One, which runs between Saigon and the Cambodian capital. Saigon puppet troops, estimated by U.S. news sources at more than 8,000, backed by regular Cambodian army units, "civilian volunteers" and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency mercenaries, battled liberation forces in Cambodia's eastern provinces.

The CIA mercenaries, usually described in Western news re-

ports as members of the "Civilian Irregular Defense Groups" (CIDG), man U.S. Special Forces and CIA base camps along the Cambodia-South Vietnam border. They are "ethnic Cambodians," or Khmer Krom, members of the Cambodian minority living in South Vietnam.

On Friday, the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia announced it was reopening its western border with Thailand, which had been closed in 1961. The new move was taken to facilitate "commercial exchanges" between the two countries.

Thai aid sought

However, observers believe that the Lon Nol government, hard-pressed to keep control of its eastern and southern areas, is laying the groundwork to bring in pro-U.S. Thai forces to suppress any possible revolt in western Cambodia.

Saigon puppet Social Welfare Minister, Tran Nguyen Phieu, will head a delegation to Cambodia on Saturday to make arrangements to "repatriate" 60,000 Vietnamese to South Vietnam. This will be the first formal contact between Cambodia and Saigon since 1965 when Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian chief of state, broke off relations with the Saigon regime.

The 500,000 Vietnamese living

in Cambodia have been the target of an intense chauvinist campaign by the Lon Nol government. Hundreds of Vietnamese have been massacred by regular Cambodian army units and hastily-armed "civilian volunteers."

STATINTL

U.S. intrigue is behind Cambodian coup

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

For 15 years, U.S. policy in Cambodia had aimed to overthrow neutralist head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk and reverse his policies which kept Cambodia out of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and in friendly relations with the socialist world. On March 18 this aim was achieved.

Whether Sihanouk was overthrown by local right-wing forces acting in line with what they knew Washington wanted, or by the U.S.-Saigon Command making policy on the spot, or on direct orders from the Nixon administration is immaterial. There are similar unknowns about the September 1969 U.S. military drive in Laos on the Plain of Jars. What is certain is that the Cambodian affair will boomerang and turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the U.S. just like the one in Laos six months earlier.

U.S. hostility toward Sihanouk and his foreign policy had been maintained by each U.S. administration since 1954-55 when Sihanouk resisted the strong pressures to join SEATO and repudiated SEATO "protection" after this was proclaimed without any consultation with the Cambodian government. But there is plenty of evidence that Sihanouk was overthrown in this recent period because of President Nixon's policy of finding new ways of continuing the war in South Vietnam—"Vietnamization"—and ensuring pro-U.S. regimes in the perimeter states of Laos and Cambodia.

The sequence of events immediately prior to the rightist coup was as follows: On June 11, 1969, diplomatic relations were reestablished with the U.S. They had been severed since May 1965, following repeated warnings by Sihanouk that further U.S. attacks against Cambodian frontier villages would result in a severance of diplomatic relations, if Cambodian lives were lost. The condition for restoration of relations was that the U.S. must pledge to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia within its present frontiers. Washington finally adopted this formula in April 1969, with some very ambiguous reservations, once relations were restored.

CIA personnel and military attaches comprised a high percentage of those turning up as embassy staff members. A few months after the U.S. embassy opened its doors, certain sections of the Phnom Penh press started a virulent chauvinistic and racist attack on the Vietnamese community of Cambodia—estimated at about 600,000.

First act of defiance

In September 1969, Gen. Lon Nol, who had been appointed prime minister a month previously, left for France for "health reasons," leaving in charge as acting premier, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, a personal rival of Sihanouk, known for his pro-U.S. and pro-Japanese attitudes. He was immediately asked to accept U.S. aid to solve Cambodia's economic difficulties. At Sirik Matak's initiative

National Assembly approved legislation dissolving various measures of state control over banking and foreign trade. Sihanouk opposed this legislation and four ministers loyal to him resigned in protest. Sihanouk urged that the resignations be held in abeyance until the return of Prime Minister Lon Nol. But within hours, Sirik Matak announced that the resignations had been accepted. This was the first open act of official defiance of Sihanouk.

During the preceding six months, the offers of U.S. aid, expected when the U.S. Embassy reopened, failed to materialize. In a visit to Phnom Penh in Oct. I had been informed that the U.S. expected Cambodia to "liberalize" the economy, make the country more attractive to foreign investors and show a more friendly attitude towards the "free world" before any dollars would be made available.

Sihanouk responded to Sirik Matak's minor coup by calling a People's Congress of Sangkum (the Popular Socialist Community which he had founded in 1965 as Cambodia's ruling party). Calling such a congress was a device he often employed to speak directly to the people through delegates from all parts of the country and to obtain popular support for his policies. The People's Congress approved his position and a few days later, Sihanouk, accompanied by his wife and a senior advisor to the throne, Penn Nouth, left for France.

Ostensibly Sihanouk also went abroad for reasons of health, arriving in France Jan. 10. As far as Sihanouk's intentions could be known, they were to let Sirik Matak "stew in his own juice" for a while and then to make a leisurely return journey having talks in Paris, Moscow and Peking, before returning home with offers of political and economic support from what Sihanouk always described as Cambodia's great friends—France and the countries of the socialist world, notably the Soviet Union and People's China. Thus he could counter or at least balance any offers Sirik Matak had received from his U.S. and Japanese friends.

Anti-Vietnamese attacks

I was in Phnom Penh again during the first half of February and by then the anti-Vietnamese attacks in certain newspapers, said to be receiving generous U.S. subsidies, had reached explosive proportions. They were in sharp contradiction to the officially proclaimed policy of friendship to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, both of which had embassies in Phnom Penh. The press attacks were paralleled by a propaganda campaign launched by some pro-U.S. embassies, historic quarrels between Cambodia and Vietnam and the supposed imperative for Vietnam to push outwards into under-populated countries like Cambodia. This campaign actually

CIA trained Cambodia killers

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

The horrifying massacres of Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia are being carried out by American CIA-trained "Khmer Serei" ("Free Cambodia") traitor troops until recently stationed in Thailand.

The U.S. organized them, paid them, armed them and most probably sent them on their mission of death against thousands of unarmed Vietnamese within Cambodia's borders.

According to Cambodian sources in Paris and travelers reaching here from Phnom Penh, these commando-type mercenaries are playing the same role in Cambodia as the CIA-trained "Vang Pao Meo" mercenaries in Laos, which were also stationed in Thailand.

The Khmer Serei, brought back to Cambodia to lead in the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's neutralist regime last month, had previously been based in South Vietnam. Their main bases were overrun by the NLF and they were transferred to Thailand.

Their previous raids into Cambodian territory invariably failed. Large numbers were captured, a few leaders executed, others jailed.

In 1969, there were mysterious large-scale defections—whole companies and even battalions—to the Cambodian government. In one day, 700 crossed the border from Thailand and gave themselves up. Credit for the "defections" was given to Gen. Lon Nol, then Defense Minister, now heading the largest group that overthrew Sihanouk. The deserters were welcomed by the Cambodian government at the time, given cash awards and even decorations.

In fact they were decisive CIA contributions to the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak conspiracy. They were the stormtroopers who spearheaded the attack on the embassies of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Provisional Revolutionary Government in Phnom Penh and on whom Lon Nol mainly relied for his coup.

One of the first acts of the new regime was to release "political prisoners." It was claimed that "progressives" jailed by Sihanouk were being freed. In fact a few were, but the majority freed were the Khmer Serei recruits for the Lon Nol stormtroopers. And for every progressive released a dozen more took their places in the jails or concentration camps to await execution.

The counterpart of the lie that it is "North Vietnamese" and "Vietcong" troops that have liberated large areas of Cambodia is that it is "only" Vietnamese who are being executed. In fact, although the Lon Nol regime has incited Nazi-type racial pogroms against anyone of Vietnamese origin regardless of sex or age, Cambodian leftists are also being rounded up and murdered in cold blood by Khmer Serei execution squads.

The Lon Nol regime in Cambodia is trying to repeat the type of bloodbath that General Suharto perpetrated in Indonesia, substituting Vietnamese for Chinese. But Cambodia is not Indonesia. There are two important differences which even President Nixon's CIA experts must take into account. Cambodia is neither geographically or politically isolated as was Indonesia. And the general staff of the Cambodian progressive movement never came out into the open to reveal itself and be decapitated as did the leaders of the Indonesian Communist party.

The old resistance bases which the French were never able to liquidate in Cambodia have remained intact since going underground in 1954. So has the old political and military infrastructure, including its key cadre. So too, has the traditional solidarity between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and their resistance movements.

intact since going underground in 1954. So too, has the traditional solidarity between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and their resistance movements.

It is for this reason that vast areas of Cambodia have already been converted into liberated zones, controlled by the National United Front. Even Lon Nol has had to recognize that the key provinces of Ratamkiri, Monduliri and Svay Rieng, which adjoin South Vietnam and Laos are "almost entirely" controlled by the Cambodian resistance forces. Another five provinces which have common frontiers with the rest of South Vietnam and the southern coastal areas of Cambodia are "half controlled."

All battalions of Lon Nol's forces, including the battalion assigned to the defense of Phnom Penh itself, have defected to the Cambodian resistance movement. Virtually all the territory east of the Mekong River is now firmly in the hands of the Cambodian National Liberation Army.

The massacres are a measure of the frustration of the Lon Nol regime and the refusal of an increasingly large part of his armed forces to play the part of U.S. puppets in a civil war. The armed forces in the past have shown little enthusiasm in fighting against their compatriots who had taken to arms and even less today when their resistance has the official blessing of Sihanouk and is clearly aimed against U.S. imperialism.

In a little over one month after the coup the situation has developed exactly the opposite to that planned by Lon Nol and his American backers. Instead of catching NLF forces in the frontier areas in a trap, and cutting off their quite legal rice supplies from Cambodia—paid for in hard cash at top prices when Sihanouk was in power—these areas are now firmly in hands friendly to the NLF. It is the Lon Nol troops that are caught in a trap between the South Vietnam and Cambodian liberation armed forces.

STATINTL

CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

E - 461,357

APR 24 1970

The coup that got out of hand

Cambodian whirlwind catches U.S., Reds by surprise; even generals who ousted Sihanouk may be sorry now

By Keyes Beech

Daily News Foreign Service

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — "It is perfectly clear," Prince Norodom Sihanouk wrote to the Paris newspaper LeMonde in 1968, "that Asian communism does not permit us any longer to stay neutral and withdraw from the conflict between the Chinese-Vietnamese and the Americans.

"Not being able to make us into allies offering unconditional support, Asian communism strives to overthrow our regime from within.

"The tournament has only just started."

THE TOURNAMENT ENDED for Sihanouk on March 18. While he was in France on one of his periodic "health cures," he was stripped of power. He had ruled his country almost singlehandedly for nearly 30 years. But Sihanouk's ouster — and he may yet return to Cambodia to reclaim what he considers rightfully his — does not dim the luster of his prophecy.

With the possible exception of Singapore's irascible Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Sihanouk was the shrewdest judge of communism in Southeast Asia. He was also shrewd enough to predict his own downfall.

"When resistance will no longer be possible," he said, "Sihanouk will withdraw and the army, which is anti-Communist, will take over."

Sihanouk did not withdraw. He was kicked out. But with that difference, his forecast was correct. The army, headed by Gen. Lon Nol, is in control of the government, and Cambodia, which for more than a decade managed to remain a tranquil island in the heart of seething Southeast Asia, has at last been drawn into the war it sought so desperately to avoid.

Insight

Veteran correspondent Keyes Beech has been covering the deepening crisis in Cambodia for The Daily News. In this dispatch, he puts Prince Sihanouk's ouster in perspective and explores its effect on the war in Vietnam.

ONE MONTH AFTER the event, it seems that Sihanouk's ouster was not a very good idea. Cambodians have turned against Cambodians; more Cambodians are fleeing the Vietnamese Communists; and Vietnamese civilians are fleeing a vengeful Cambodian bloodbath. Nobody is happy. Not Peking, which regards the new regime as downright hostile, and certainly not the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, who have reacted vigorously to the threat to their Cambodian sanctuary. Four of Cambodia's most populous provinces bordering on South Vietnam are for the most part under Communist control.

If the Communists aren't happy, neither are the Americans. The United States is faced with a wider war at a time when it is disengaging from South Vietnam, and President Nixon is faced with the agonizing decision on whether to grant Cambodia's request for arms at the risk of provoking a flare-up in domestic antiwar dissent. It is difficult, however, to see how he can refuse if his Guam Doctrine is to mean anything, for if ever a country was the victim of Communist aggression from both within and without, it is Cambodia. Yet it is legitimate to ask if American arms come, can American troops be far be

hind? It also is legitimate to ask if arms alone will do the trick. No experienced observer who has seen the Cambodian army in action or inaction can doubt that it would be a pushover for disciplined Vietnamese Communist regulars.

Mass Red intrusions

All this would seem to be a high price to pay for the overthrow of Norodom Sihanouk. So it is, but it isn't all that simple.

Disastrous as the events of the last month may be, they should not be allowed to obscure one very important thing. Cambodia is in the mess it is today because of mass Vietnamese Communist intrusions, not because of the United States or South Vietnam or for that matter Thailand. Except for occasional border incursions in the heat of battle — for which the United States duly apologized and often paid indemnities — the United States respected Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity. The Communists did not.

By Sihanouk's own estimate, Hanoi poured more than 40,000 North Vietnamese troops into their Cambodian sanctuary to wage the war in South Vietnam. If Cambodia managed to stay out of the Vietnam War during the last five years, it was as much due to American forbearance as it was to Sihanouk's political cunning.

NOR CAN SIHANOUK escape blame for his country's agony. Intoxicated by his own cleverness, he played one side against the other in a dazzling display of diplomatic pyrotechnics. When he thought the Communists were going to win in South Vietnam, he compromised his own neutrality by giving them sanctuary. Not only that, he supplied them with rice and allowed Chinese-owned trucks to move arms from Sihanoukville to Communist staging areas over a \$48 million U.S. built Friendship Highway.


NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

24 APR 1970

IT'S ALL ONE WAR

Cambodia toppled its longtime ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Snooky), some weeks ago.

Red North Vietnam's Viet Cong puppets are trying to capitalize on the resulting confusion by grabbing as much of Cambodia as they can.



One Southeast Asia peninsula—
one war.

The new government at Phnom Penh, headed by Gen. Lon Nol, has asked the U.S.A. for help. President Nixon is sitting on this request, officially.

However, some U.S. and some captured Communist weapons are getting to Lon Nol. U.S. air strikes at the Viet Cong in Cambodia continue, and our Central Intelligence

Agency (Department of Dirty Tricks) almost certainly is helping Lon Nol in various quiet and cagy ways.

All this, we think, is for the best. The struggle in Cambodia is part of the struggle for control of all Southeast Asia. Moscow, Peking and Hanoi are shrewd enough to realize that this is all one war. We should be equally shrewd—though it would seem inadvisable to go so far as to send U.S. ground troops into Cambodia.

If Indonesia can promote the Asian conference on Cambodia for which it is asking, fine; and it would be still finer if Asians could solve this Asian problem satisfactorily.

Meanwhile, Hanoi is hurting badly from the long war in Vietnam, and Soviet Russia and Red China are struggling for the position of Big Brother-Boss of Red North Vietnam in case the latter wins this war—which appears less and less likely provided our side plays its cards smartly.

Therefore, it seems clear that the U.S.A. should encourage the Moscow-Peking power struggle, stand by its Saigon ally without faltering, and give the new Cambodian government all feasible unofficial military and economic aid. Why back down now?

Cambodia needs help

PRESIDENT NIXON'S decision to send rifles to the beleaguered government of Cambodia was a correct one in a very unpromising situation.

A sensible next step would be to send in the 3,000 Cambodian mercenaries that the Central Intelligence Agency has working for it in neighboring South Vietnam. They could help the Cambodian army, which is badly in need of stiffening.

Neither step, to be sure, will insure the survival of Gen. Lon Nol's anti-Communist regime. If the 40,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in Cambodia really make an effort, they can probably take over the entire country.

Nevertheless, a modest American aid program is worth trying. It might prevent the Communists from having a cake walk in Cambodia. And it could conceivably deter them from pressing their illegal invasion of that peaceful and neutral land.

Unfortunately what happens in Cambodia may determine the outcome of the whole Vietnam War. If Cambodia can stay free and not be a sieve for North Vietnamese supplies, Hanoi's troops will be less able to threaten Sai-

gon and the Mekong Delta. If, however, they can turn all of Cambodia into a sanctuary and supply area, South Vietnam would appear to be doomed.

With so much at stake, Mr. Nixon should disregard his dove critics and do what he can to save Cambodia. The South Vietnamese army, for instance, should get carte blanche to attack the North Vietnamese inside Cambodia. There is no reason for Saigon to be a stickler for borders after Hanoi has spread the war by openly invading South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Given the mood of this country, the President will not send U.S. combat forces to Cambodia (altho, from a hard-nosed geopolitical point of view, it might be a good investment). But if the Cambodians show any will to fight in their own defense, Mr. Nixon should give them aid—short of our troops.

Incidentally, as the Communists ravage a near-helpless country, we trust nobody has missed the old double standard at work. If we "imperialists" had put so much as a platoon across a border, the howls would be heard in heaven. But when Hanoi tears apart a small neutral nation, there is absolute silence from our own doves and peace movement, from the Communist bloc and from the professional Afro-Asians at the United Nations.

It is so hypocritical that it sinks.

STATINTL

BALTIMORE, MD.

SUN

M - 180,656

E - 209,655

S - 347,939

APR 23 1970

Cambodia Beckons

Cambodia's appeal for American assistance in repelling North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacks is couched in seductive terms. There is no request for direct American military intervention. Rather, the new government which took over from Prince Norodom Sihanouk last month asks explicitly only for American military equipment, and implicitly, for the return of certain Cambodian troops allegedly trained by the CIA and presumed to be fighting in South Vietnam.

In the murky situation in both Laos and Cambodia there is no clear form an American response should take. But there is one principle that should guide the President: America should avoid, above all, a direct military link, either in the form of advisers or as a direct supplier of military equipment to either of these countries.

This would not be a reversal of policy. It would be a continuation of what has been, at least ostensibly, Washington's course over the past decade. Whatever the commitment to South Vietnam, Washington has been at pains to support the essentially neutralist posture of the other two countries of Indochina. That posture was shaken badly by internal events when Sihanouk, who had in fact walked the tricky tightrope, was deposed by more militant elements. But this is no reason American policy should change.

The Cambodian regime has appealed not only to the United States but to other countries, including Australia. If there is to be any assistance, let it be channeled through some kind of international group formally and firmly committed to limited assistance in support of Cambodia's neutrality.

Even this might provide some tricky problems and potential pitfalls. But they can be weighed in detail when such an arrangement is examined. For the moment, the important thing is for Washington to avoid any direct unilateral commitment.

23 APR 1970

Nixon parries queries on next Cambodia move

By TIM WHEELER

WASHINGTON, April 22 — "No arms to Cambodia" urged a leaflet distributed to thousands of White House visitors this morning by Mrs. Ray Kagar.

"There must be no wider war," Mrs. Kagar said. "President Nixon promised the American people that he would withdraw from Vietnam. Does this mean that we leave one Asian country to enter another?"

Mrs. Kagar, a member of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, picketed the White House and called on the peace movement to join with her. The timeliness of her warning became evident at this morning's White House press briefing.

Reporters barraged press secretary Ron Zeigler with questions about the personal letter sent to Nixon by military usurper Lon Nol of Cambodia requesting "military assistance."

Dodges direct answer

"I can confirm that a letter from Prime Minister Lon Nol has been received," Zeigler said, adding that the letter was a request for general "military assistance."

He said the request is "under study" and therefore "I wouldn't characterize or discuss it."

"Does the President have the authority to extend the aid?" a reporter asked.

"I would assume he would," Zeigler replied.

This remark appears to run counter to the resolution on "foreign commitments" passed last year by the Senate, as well as the recent Senate-passed resolution repealing the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The Senate has been demanding that the President consult them before launching new foreign adventures.

Reporters have also been demanding a reaction from the White House to the mass extermination campaign against Vietnamese civilians committed by the Lon Nol regime.

"Is the President getting reports on these massacres in Cambodia and what he is doing to give

arms to Cambodia?" one newsman asked.

Zeigler parried: "Well, in terms of the White House having a position on the killing of what have been reported to be innocent people, we consider this, of course, abhorrent, and actions that would warrant condemnation."

While the pro forma condemnation was being offered, reports from Cambodia today indicated that two CIA operatives were flown by helicopter from South Vietnam to the Cambodian provincial capital of Svay Rieng "to coordinate military operations against enemy forces."

After emerging from the helicopters, the two agents were handed maps indicating "enemy positions." Within minutes U.S.-provided airplanes flown by South Vietnamese puppet pilots were dropping napalm on pro-Sihanouk Cambodian forces.

Camouflaged intervention

Then on Monday, the reports continue, more than 5,000 Saigon puppet troops in hundreds of U.S. armored personnel carriers, crossed the Cambodian frontier to join in the attacks.

U.S. reporters are being driven away from the scene by U.S. troops.

According to reports here, Nixon is "studying" the possibility of a diplomatic subterfuge to camouflage U.S. intervention in Cambodia, possibly by funneling U.S. arms, and even troops, through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or one of its anti-Communist allies, such as Thailand or Indonesia.

Adam Malik, foreign minister of Indonesia, has proposed an Asian meeting "to maintain the neutrality of Cambodia."

Adam Malik, foreign minister of Indonesia, has proposed an Asian meeting "to maintain the neutrality of Cambodia."

SAIGON TROOPS AGAIN CROSS CAMBODIA BORDER

Daily World Foreign Department
Saigon puppet troops have made their fourth heavy attack across the Cambodian border within the past week, military sources in Saigon said. It came barely 24 hours after a large-scale armored thrust into Cambodia by Saigon puppet Ranger and tank units.

Soldiers from the Saigon forces who participated in the latest assault told U.S. newsmen that they went at least 15 miles deep into Cambodia. The Saigon regime, however, is still denying that any of its units have crossed the border.

The latest Saigon attack began late Tuesday and took place near the Mekong Delta border town of Hong Ngu, 75 miles west of Saigon, just opposite Cambodia's Svay Rieng province.

The Saigon troops claimed they killed 32 "Vietcong" and destroyed more than 90 buildings.

Viet civilians used as shield
In Cambodia, Brigadier-General Sustene Fernandez of the Cambodian army predicted his troops would take Saang, 20 miles south-east of the capital of Phnom Penh, despite the fact that the majority of Cambodian troops "have been in the army only a few days."

On Tuesday, Fernandez used 110 Vietnamese civilians brought from Phnom Penh as a human shield for his attacking troops to force the "Vietcong" to reveal their positions when they opened fire.

"We saw how they held their fire yesterday despite everything we threw at them," he said. "That's why we used psychological warfare."

The Cambodian regime yesterday announced it would "concentrate" all Vietnamese who want to be repatriated to South Vietnam.

23 APR 1970

U.S. Help Reported In Viet Border Raid

SAIGON, April 22 (AP)—More than 5,000 South Vietnamese troops are reported to have driven as deep as 15 miles into Cambodia, seizing enemy bases and arms caches and skirmishing with North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops.

The operation, which began Monday, may have been set up early last week when two Americans flew to the Cambodian provincial capital of Svay Rieng, 25 miles west of the border, to confer with the province chief, informed sources said.

They said the Americans, dressed in civilian clothes, were believed to be from the Central Intelligence Agency.

It was reported that the Svay Rieng Province chief met with the Americans and pinpointed the locations of North Vietnamese and Vietcong bases and supply caches. The men flew in and out of Cambodia in two South Vietnamese helicopters, by this account.

The 5,000 government forces include 11 ranger and infantry battalions and elements of armored cavalry with more than 100 armored personnel carriers.

South Vietnamese troops were said to have captured nearly 1,000 weapons in the

operation, which stretched along a 30-mile front. They also destroyed 90 storage huts.

The South Vietnamese claimed to have killed more than 220 enemy soldiers in the first two days of the operation, which government communiques placed on the South Vietnamese side of the border.

Field reports said South Vietnamese casualties were at least 26 killed and 101 wounded.

Another new government operation was reported 30 miles farther west and within half a mile of the ill-defined border, but it was not clear whether the force of about 1,000 South Vietnamese troops had crossed into Cambodia. A communique said 32 North Vietnamese and Vietcong were killed in this operation Tuesday.

The U.S. Command announced the loss of eight aircraft—one last Thursday, six Tuesday and one today—including five over southern Laos. A ninth aircraft, a light observation helicopter, was shot down but not destroyed.

American casualties were one killed, four missing and two wounded. The eight losses realised to 6,684 the number of U.S. aircraft listed as lost in the Vietnam and Laotian wars.

BARRE, VT.
TIMES-ARGUS

E - 12,353

APR 22 1970

U. S. Policy In Vietnam, Part II

By JAMES M. MOORE
Norwich U. History Professor

We participated in the Geneva conference of 1954 but we did not sign the final agreements. Neither did South Vietnam, for that matter. While stating that we would not be bound by the 1954 agreements, rather peculiarly (or contradictorily) we did agree in a unilateral declaration to "refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations." We also supported the idea of unification elections — but neither we, nor the various South Vietnamese governments we have backed, ever really seriously considered giving effect to this idea. On six different occasions between 1956 and 1960 North Vietnam was willing to permit free general elections by secret ballot under the supervision of international inspectors.

About a month after the 1954 conference we arranged the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol (Sept., 1954). Of the participating nations only three were truly Asiatic. We have used this treaty time and time again to intervene militarily in various "treaty areas" (including Laos and Cambodia, non-member states) without the required unanimous consent of all the treaty signees. We have ignored the article (6) whereby the United Nations was recognized as being mainly responsible for international peace and security.

The Laotian Declaration of Neutrality (1962) which we promoted and signed (as well as the two Vietnams) and which temporarily brought peace between the Pathet Lao (Communist) and the Royal Laotian Government — both sides agreeing to a coalition government — has been ignored by us ever since the Pathet Lao withdrew from its role in the government of 1963.

The Royal Laotian Government by the 1962 Declaration agreed to "not recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO." On April 22, 1970, we learned that SEATO was our cre-

ation. Reciprocating the Laotian desire not to be "protected," the signatories (including the U.S.) by Article 2, paragraph "f" stated that "they will respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO." Furthermore, as a signer we agreed by Article I of the Protocol to refrain from sending civilians into Laos "connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials."

The reason for our intervention in Laos and Cambodia has always been, we insist, that so many thousands of North Vietnamese governments have used these neutral nations as sanctuaries. Furthermore, military necessary would obligate a continual bombing of the Ho Chin Minh trail, a major supply route running through Laos and used by the North Vietnamese in a vital logistic way.

As the late authority on Vietnam, Bernard Fall, has indicated in his celebrated work, "Street Without Joy," the extent of North Vietnamese effectiveness in Laos has always been a "numbers game" indulged in spasmodically by some representatives of the American press with the encouragement of "hawkish" American officialdom.

Laotian officials themselves have always taken a casual view of Communist activity. The strategic Plaine des Jarres seems to exchange hands almost yearly. Brothers Prince Souphanouvong and Prince Souvanna Phouma, respectively Pathet Lao leader and premier of the Laotian government, continue following the rules of the game — whatever it might be. However, of late, heavy-handed American intervention — whether called for or not — with its obliterating B-52 raids and displacement of populations has rather alarmed the somewhat easy going Laotians.

Brothers Souphanouvong and Souvanna Phouma in April, 1970 were both asking for negotiations on the basis of the 1962 Declaration of Neutrality. The International Commission

on Laos — a body that has had a humiliating existence since its inception and whose recommendations have usually been ignored by all, including the United States. Perhaps the Laotian princes — left and right — have become alarmed over such muscular statements as that of Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird to the effect that he would recommend continued bombing of Laos, even against the wishes of a new Laotian government!

Despite President Nixon's gradual withdrawal and Vietnamization policy in South Vietnam it almost appears that the stage might be set for seriously escalating the war into Laos and Cambodia.

The coup d'etat against neutralist Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia in March, 1970 has added to Southeast Asian complexities. President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam has expressed his great pleasure at having a "more amenable Cambodia" under the new premier, Lon Nol. Prince Sihanouk, in exile, has charged that Cambodian rightwingers — in the parliament and the army — "nostalgic about American aid, which would enable them to lead an easy life," had contacted the United States, "whether through the embassy, the CIA or any such like organization."

Lon Nol's Cambodian military forces presently are supposed to be operating against North Vietnamese and Vietcong infiltrators. Sometimes South Vietnamese forces with American advisors join the fray. However, it is all very confusing and probably many innocent Vietnamese-Cambodians are being hurt in the cross-fires. Phnom Penh, the capital, alone has 120,000 Vietnamese — many coming in during the French colonial period.

It is no secret, of course, that the United States has actively intervened in Laotian and Cambodian affairs for some time — whether in a military or non-military way, whether invited or not.

Our Men Are There

High level bombing raids into Laos have become "accidental" bombings into Cambodia have frequently

occurred. American military assistance missions, too, have been "disguised" in different ways — such as transferring regular armed service personnel — especially Green Berets — to the Central Intelligence Agency and assigning military supply missions to non-military U. S. private airlines. If the North Vietnamese have thousands of their effectives in Cambodia and Laos — well, we have our forces there too. And, the Nixon Administration, even as the Johnson Administration before, continues giving fervent lip service to the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962.

Perhaps it is understandable that most of the signers of the Geneva accords — and including, of course, the Russians who were co-sponsors and co-chairmen with the British — have been a little cynical about President Nixon's pleas to the signers to exercise their "responsibilities" under the accords. Furthermore, many world leaders have tended to discount American peace efforts at Paris.

Talks have been going on at the French capital since May, 1968. On our side, top echelon negotiators like Averell Harriman and Cabot Lodge have been replaced by those of less renown. This really makes no difference anyway as we apparently have no intention of agreeing to any proposals made by either North Vietnam or the National Liberation Front (now called the Revolutionary Provisional Government in negotiations) whereby the Van Thieu regime — or shall we say, one like it — might end.

On the other hand, North Vietnamese delegates along with representatives of the NLF have stuck with the Ten Point Proposal which seems to be in the spirit of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Amongst other things, the proposal calls for the withdrawal from South Vietnam of all "foreign" military personnel in accordance with the 1954 agreements and the holding of democratic elections in which all parties and groupings would be represented. We have never really favored any such elections because they probably would result in an NLF victory.

STATINTL

CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

E - 461,357

APR 22 1970

Report CIA helping Cambodians

Informed sources in Saigon said Wednesday two Americans thought to be Central Intelligence Agency agents flew to the Cambodian provincial capital of Svay Rieng last week to map military operations against the enemy.

They reported the Americans flew in two South Vietnamese helicopters and were met in Svay Rieng, 25 miles west of the South Vietnamese border, by Cambodian officials with maps showing enemy positions in the province.

Shortly thereafter, they added, South Vietnamese fighter bombers began attacking enemy positions along the border. This was followed Monday by a drive across the border by as many as 5,000 South Vietnamese troops and hundreds of armored personnel carriers.

THE INFORMANTS said that in the first two days of the operation, South Vietnamese forces have killed 221 enemy troops. South Vietnamese losses were given as 26 killed and 101 wounded.

Little other battlefield action was reported from South Vietnam, but the U.S. Command announced the loss of four American planes over southern Laos and three helicopters in South Vietnam.

PHNOM PENH, the Cambodian government announced Wednesday it is taking steps to protect the 600,000 Vietnamese residents of Cambodia and to repatriate any who want to re-

22 APR 1970

STATINTL

CIA Reported Coordinating Cambodia Military Attack

SAIGON (AP)—Informed sources said today two Americans believed to be from the Central Intelligence Agency flew into the Cambodian provincial capital of Svay Rieng last week apparently to coordinate military operations against enemy forces.

They reported two South Vietnamese helicopters flew the Americans into Svay Rieng, 25 miles west of the South Vietnamese border.

The informants gave this account:

When the helicopters landed the two Americans were met by Cambodian officials carrying maps in their hands. The Cambodian officials pointed out to the Americans the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong positions inside Svay Rieng Province.

Shortly after the meeting, South Vietnamese fighter-bombers began attacking suspected North Vietnamese base camps and troop positions along a 30-mile stretch on both sides of the border. Their effort was aimed at softening up the enemy positions for a division-sized infantry assault that was to follow.

At daybreak Monday, as many as 5,000 South Vietnamese troops and hundreds of armored

personnel carriers began a drive across a 30-mile line stretching from the South Vietnamese district town of Tuyen Binh, 55 miles west of Saigon, to the district town of Tuyen Binh, 55 miles west of Saigon, to the district town of Hong Ngu, 75 miles west of the capital.

Sources said that in the first two days of the operation, South Vietnamese forces have killed 221 enemy troops, seized nearly 1,000 new weapons from base camps, and destroyed 90 huts apparently used as storage areas. Field reports said South

Vietnamese forces suffered 26 troops killed and 101 wounded.

Efforts to reach CIA officials in Saigon for comment were fruitless. There was no answer at the agency's phone.

Sources have said the South Vietnamese and Cambodian local officials are collaborating in efforts to crush up to 20,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in base camps in southeastern Cambodia.

APR 20 1970

M - 11,056

S - 12,970

The War Abroad

Melvin and the Pirates

The planet Uranus was discovered by the astronomers because, observing the conduct of other planetary phenomena, it had to be there. By much the same type of logic, the ordinary citizen may detect the presence of America's department of subversive services, the Central Intelligence Agency.

Restating the planetary logic as it might apply to international intrigue: An invisible organization is likely to be doing what it might be expected to do even while spreading denials that it is doing it. A corollary: Coincidence is the last explanation of fortuitous events.

IT IS LEFT to some remote archivist to describe the development of the C.I.A. role in the Cambodian coup d'etat. Years from now, when the reputations and policies have passed which today engage so much passion, the declassification of official documents (those not destroyed) will reveal the only remaining identifiable traces of this violent passage, while the consequences of intervention merge into the stream of history.

But it is rather surprising that there has been so little speculation on the visible course of events. Has the usually cynical press caught napping? It is true that several Senators quickly denied that the C.I.A. was involved. But the Senators who might complain are not informed of Guatemala's in advance and those that might be are quite capable of mendacity in the national interest.

The observations upon which an assertion of clandestine involvement depends, do not include the strange piracy of the Columbia Eagle. But that episode was surely eccentric enough to arouse at least the suspicious of the most credulous reporter. How strained is the co-incidence that two treasonous defectors would successfully seize a handy munitions ship and flee to Cambodia on the eve of revolution from the Right, thence conveniently disappear-

ing from sight? A modest fancy can conjure up a picture of the origins of this episode. A select handful of counter-intelligence specialists on the west bank of the Potomac hunched over Contingency Plan 3, code name, "Operation Eagle's Eggs."

But the persuasive evidence of the C.I.A. presence does not depend on flight of fancy. Much more convincing is the fruit of policy analysis. Policy determines action. If events evolve which promote the ends of a particular policy, it is probable that the events were predetermined by the advocate of that policy.

Policy Profiles

By John Havelock

In 1953 the announced policy of North Korea was reunification of North and South Korea under a northern style regime. At the opening of that war, each side accused the other of invading its territory. The South Korean Army caved in almost immediately. The North Koreans swept swiftly down most of the length of the Korean peninsula.

The safe conclusion: The war was initiated by the North Koreans.

The policy context of the coup d'etat in Cambodia is a little more complex because neither side has been quite so clear in its policy pronouncements. In the last months of the Johnson administration, policy was in flux. In the first year of the Nixon administration we must search for policy indications preceding the Nixon inaugural.

The selection of Melvin Laird in 1968 as Secretary of Defense designate was widely considered as a triumph for policy positions with which he had expressed sympathy as a member of Congress. In his role as leader of the opposition for military affairs in the House of Representatives, Laird, an advocate of a limited military leadership, had developed personal alliances with those military officers who had grown most restive

under the control of the McNamara defense department.

Within the Pentagon, as publicly, the question of hand-tieing came down to whether you viewed the Viet Nam war as a hot center surrounded by diplomatic political and territorial grey zones of decreasing temperature or whether the grey zones were viewed as sanctuaries for the enemy.

The extreme positions of each view were equally untenable. Every war short of nuclear holocaust will have its sanctuaries, a borderline of conduct that is not passed for fear of provoking conflict in a broader arena. In the 60's, neither the North Vietnamese nor ourselves waged all out war. Popularly denounced among the unleash-the-military school were the bomb moratorium on Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam and restrictions on operations against North Vietnam Army supply lines in Laos and the staging areas for Viet Cong guerrilla operations in Cambodia. Less publicized in this country were sanctuaries recognized by the North Vietnamese. Our aircraft carriers, which were (and still are) targets vulnerable to short range missiles, were left alone. Saigon could, in practice, be made all but unlivable by Viet Cong rocket attacks. A Viet Cong initiative to do just that was quickly cooled when our President indicated he was considering trading off of their sanctuaries for this unwelcome innovation.

On the other hand, the advocates of the grey zone approach frequently overestimate American capabilities to wage the new style of warfare. Wars of attrition, wars without territorial boundaries, wars with more than one set of rules, wars fought with political means are alien to the American temperament. We understand the nineteenth century military strategist Clausewitz: "War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means." But we are unprepared for a contest in which war

APR 19 1970

M - 174,906

S - 204,225

Cambodia—

The Dilemma Becomes

By JAMES McCARTNEY

Observer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The time was two years ago. The problem: Cambodia.

U.S. reconnaissance planes from Vietnam had spotted a virtually unprotected Communist camp in Cambodia near the South Vietnamese border.

The U.S. military waged a major fight behind the scenes in the Johnson administration for permission to bomb the camp with B52s. One plan called for the use of U.S. ground combat troops to contain the communists if they sought to flee.

The secret, backstage fight went all the way to President Johnson — who finally vetoed any strike against the camp. He ruled that such action might touch off a new war in Cambodia.

But the military didn't give up.

After President Johnson's top-level decision one high military officer boldly threw a new suggestion into the pot.

"How about a B52 strike that we could claim was accidental?" he asked.

Again the answer was a flat "no."

The incident illustrates the dilemma that U.S. policymakers have faced in Cambodia for years — a dilemma that persists today.

Now it is developing into a full-blown crisis in the Nixon administration.

How far should the United States go in seeking to fight the communists in Cambodia?

If the United States is to fight, what techniques should it use?

And what are the risks?

President Nixon faces an even more volatile situation now than President Johnson faced two years ago.

Today Cambodia is in wild turmoil.

South Vietnamese troops are waging aggressive warfare against the communists across the Cambodian border.

They apparently can't be controlled by their U.S. advisers.

They are trying to reach some 50,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese troops who have been operating from sanctuaries in Cambodia — protected in the past by an official policy of "neutrality" by the Cambodian government.

The new, right-wing Cambodian government of Gen. Lon Nol wants to get rid of the North Vietnamese.

But the aggressive South Vietnamese have already learned that they are playing with fire.

An anti-Vietnamese propaganda drive has been mounted by the new government, and apparently many Cambodians dislike all Vietnamese, North or South.

The Cambodians have been taking vengeance on Vietnamese in wholesale massacres.

Hundreds of Vietnamese already have been killed, according to reports, many of them civilians.

Some 400,000 Vietnamese live in Cambodia as a minority.

State Department officials say that the new regime is apparent-

A Crisis

ly playing on deep-seated, historic hatreds of Cambodians for their Vietnamese neighbors.

The official U.S. objective has been to stay out of the turmoil. The United States says it would like to see Cambodia neutralized once again.

But the United States is already deeply involved in fighting North Vietnamese in both South Vietnam and in Laos.

And to some extent the United States is already involved on at least a limited scale in Cambodia — in spite of official protests to the contrary.

The United States in fact, has already acknowledged many activities relating to Cambodia — while protesting that it wants to stay out of trouble there.

U. S. fighter bombers are making regular "retaliatory" strikes across the Cambodian border from Vietnam.

U. S. Helicopter gunships have been involved in action against the communists in Cambodia in the last few weeks.

U. S. helicopter gunships have been spotted in Cambodia.

One frustrated Pentagon official said this week: "Frankly, I don't know what kind of a ball game we're playing over there."

One reason he doesn't, in all probability, is that the Central Intelligence Agency is playing a strong hand in Cambodian affairs — just as it has played a strong hand in neighboring Laos.

WORCESTER, MASS.
TELEGRAM

M - 62,339

S - 108,367

APR 18 1970

Death and Opium in Cambodia

Two recent disclosures raise new questions about what the United States thinks it is doing in Southeast Asia.

The first is the brutal slaughter of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Vietnamese living in Cambodia.

The second is the inadvertent involvement of the CIA in the immense traffic in opium from Cambodia. Some of that opium may feed the heroin markets in this country, according to some observers.

The massacre of the Vietnamese is the result of the bitter hostility felt by the Cambodians against the Vietnamese, but it also is condoned by the government. Some of the Vietnamese may be Viet Cong, but others are merely victims.


The U.S. involvement in the opium traffic stems from the CIA decision to back one group of Meo tribesmen against another, in an effort to build up resistance to Communist pressure.

But the dominant Meo group is apparently more interested in protecting its poppy fields and immense opium monopoly than in fighting for freedom as we understand that term.

Most Americans do not think that freedom to produce opium is one of the freedoms worth fighting for. But in Southeast Asia, opium production is a fundamental fact of life and society.

It is becoming plainer all the time that the tangled history and politics of the region are as baffling to the western mind as the jungle swamps of the Mekong are to western techniques. We simply cannot hope to unravel all those intricate strands of culture and tradition.

Our hope is that we can somehow stabilize the political situation so that Communist power does not overrun the peninsula. We may yet achieve that. But if we think we ever will set up Jeffersonian liberalism in that foreign land, we are sadly mistaken.



Editorials

Atrocities in Cambodia

Who are responsible for the horrible massacres of Vietnamese civilians, including women and children, now going on in Cambodia?

The Nixon Administration would like us to believe these atrocities are the work solely of Gen. Lon Nol and other members of the military junta that seized power during the absence of Chief of State Prince Sihanouk last month.

That the Lon Nol clique of traitors are guilty of these mass killings is indisputable. An Associated Press dispatch from Neak Leung, Cambodia on April 15 asserted these CIA stooges "have been whipping up an anti-Vietnamese campaign directed not only at the thousands of Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops who operate back and forth across the border with South Vietnam but also at the 600,000 Vietnamese who live in Cambodia."

But these lackeys of imperialism, like their counterparts in Saigon and Seoul, are merely the triggermen of the master-criminal, the boss murderer — United States imperialism.

It is U.S. imperialism that bribes Thai people to kill Laotians, Cambodians and Vietnamese; that uses Meo tribesmen in Laos to kill Laotians, Vietnamese and Cambodians; that organizes Saigon Vietnamese to help Cambodians kill Vietnamese in Cambodia; that employs Koreans to kill Vietnamese; that pays Vietnamese to kill their fellow Vietnamese.

It is U.S. imperialism, specifically the No. 1 agent of U.S. imperialism, President Richard Milhous Nixon, who has given this sickening program of mass killings the name of "Vietnamization." It is nothing more nor less than using Asians to kill other Asians for the benefit of the war-profiteering U.S. monopolies.

It is a criminally racist and inhuman policy of genocide which all U.S. men, women and children who truly love this land and would salvage its name and honor are obligated, at whatever cost and sacrifice to themselves, to bring to an end.

The Nixon Administration can be forced to end its intervention in Indo-China this year of 1970. A majority of our citizens want it done. What is required to achieve it is

continued

the . . . Unity of all who want peace.

That the time is ripe for such people's unity for ending the aggression in Southeast Asia was indicated by the taxpayers' rallies, the fasting and the giant protests that involved hundreds of thousands this week.

But some of the trade union participants, pro-peace politicians and spokesmen for liberal organizations correctly point out that the struggle to achieve unity of all pro-peace forces is still encountering obstacles, and not only the massive obstacle of the economic, political and ideological pressure from the arms monopolies and the Nixon Administration.

Divisive forces are at work among the pro-peace forces themselves. They include not only paid provocateurs and police agents, of whom there are many, but also well-intentioned idealists and self-styled "revolutionaries" as well as kooks, downright fools, and racist hoodlums who, under the guise of fighting for Black Liberation, carry on organized disruption, even exploiting the banner of the Black Panther Party.

With such elements loose among the peace forces, Nixon, the FBI and the police can assume a pose of nonchalant indifference, as happened in New York during the disruption of peace demonstrations Wednesday. These disrupters can be relied on to do the dirty work heretofore assigned to thugs and informers, the work of splitting the peace movement, driving away masses who desire to participate, and alienating — with the help of the commercial mass media which invariably highlights their disruptions — a majority of the population who earnestly desire to end the war.

The repudiation of these divisive and destructive elements by the peace movement and their exclusion from participation in protest demonstrations is a mandatory initial step toward building unity to end the war. /

17 APR 1970

Cambodian regime admits massacres of civilians

Daily World Foreign Department

Spokesmen for the Cambodian military regime admitted yesterday that hundreds of corpses reported floating in the Mekong River south of Phnom Penh were Vietnamese civilians. They claimed, however, that the corpses, of which there were hundreds, some with hands tied behind their backs, were "Vietcong" or "Vietcong collaborators."

A Cambodian Information Ministry spokesman denied that the bodies came from a single massacre, such as the one that took place at Prasaut, in Cambodia's Svay Rieng province, last Friday, in which at least 90 Vietnamese refugees were massacred by armed Cambodian "civilian volunteers."

Cambodia's military dictator, General Lon Nol, has issued a call for a campaign to drive the Vietnamese out of the country. The Lon Nol regime evidently has distributed arms to "civilian volunteer" forces it has rounded up.

In South Vietnam, the U.S. Special Forces and CIA have drawn heavily on the Cambodian minority for recruits for their mercenary forces.


The CIA-organized mercenaries are referred to in U.S. news re-

ports as "Civilian Irregular Defense Groups" (CIDG).

The CIA mercenaries man nearly all the "Special Forces" camps along the South Vietnam-Cambodia border.

In the Paris peace talks yesterday, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary government of South Vietnam blamed the U.S. for the massacres of Vietnamese now going on in Cambodia. PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi said the U.S. plotted the coup which brought Lon Nol to power in Cambodia on March 18, and therefore the U.S. "must be held responsible for the criminal acts of its henchmen in Cambodia and for the consequences of these acts."

The DRV and PRG delegations said the U.S. side's call for a "slowdown" in the war was "arrogant" and hypocritical, when the U.S. was doing ev-



everything it could to step up and expand the war.

In Washington yesterday, Senate Democratic majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont) urged the Nixon administration to turn down the Cambodian government's appeal for U.S. arms. Mansfield said the Lon Nol regime is "already in deep trouble" and the U.S. should take no action to rescue it. He said the cry for arms has dragged the U.S. "time and again ever deeper into the morass of Southeast Asia."

M - 9,205

APR 17 1970

STATINTL

The War Spreads While The White House Fiddles

Twenty-nine days after a right-wing coup deposed Prince Sihanouk as Chief of State of Cambodia, the new government was appealing to any and all nations for whatever military help it could get.

It was at war with the Viet Cong.

It is well to recall the swift sequence of events which followed Sihanouk's ouster—a move which the Russians—and many Americans—believe might well have been precipitated by the CIA. That organization, originally formed as a super-spy system, has gravitated into a policy-making paramilitary organization which operates under the cloak of utter secrecy in the name of "national interest."

(It has been engaging in military operations in Laos, clandestinely for a long time, finally smoked out by the recent advances of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese.

(Senator Albert Gore, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recently hinted that testimony from the CIA indicated that its Laotian military role was assumed on orders of the National Security Council. When the order was issued, no one knows except those directly involved, because the National Security Council, like the CIA, operates under wraps. Its decisions, however, affect the future of the country, for better or for worse).

While Sihanouk ruled Cambodia, that country managed to

and he kept his country out of the bloody mess in Vietnam and Laos.

While he was out of the country—under rightwing pressure—seeking aid to get the foreign troops out of his country, his political foes unseated him.

Within two weeks the new military government called for "volunteers" to man an army. And shortly thereafter, Cambodians were fighting Vietnamese. The conflict was only two weeks old when the news came that 100 villagers of Vietnamese extraction were massacred by Cambodian troops. At first the reports said they were killed by crossfire of Cambodian and Viet Cong troops, but it was later revealed that Cambodians performed the genocide.

And so while the Nixon Administration has been refusing to come to realistic grips with the Vietnamese war, it is spreading—to Laos, now Cambodia.

When will the citizens of this country demand of their government that it end the nightmare of Southeast Asia? When will our people awaken to see our country as it is seen by the rest of the world—as a giant power, meddling in the affairs of people 12,000 miles away, killing them, destroying their crops, ruining their land with poison chemicals?

The U.S. role is the outrage of the century, a blight on our nation's proud history, a cancer that will devour our ideals, our dreams, our nobility. For this reason, if not for the agonized Vietnamese, the war should be terminated.

15 APR 1970

STATINTL

Sihanouk hits Cambodia massacre

Daily World Foreign Department
The Cambodian rulers claimed yesterday that 90 Vietnamese refugees killed April 10 in Prasaut, in the "Parrot's Beak" area

which juts into South Vietnam, were only victims of "the hazards of war." They denied reports by U.S. newsmen that the Vietnamese were massacred. They asserted the slain Vietnamese had been caught in a cross-fire between Cambodian soldiers and what it termed "Vietcong" forces.

Jack Walsh, of UPI, a veteran of 18 months' reporting of the Vietnam war, had said on the scene in Prasaut that the victims all seemed to have been killed at close range within the refugee compound after having been told to run by the armed Cambodians.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in a Radio Peking broadcast on Monday accused the Lon Nol government of massacring more than 500 since taking power.

In Cambodia's southern Takeo province, where regular army troops killed 109 pro-Sihanouk

demonstrators last week, the Lon Nol government charged that "several hundred Vietcong" invaded a military post and took police and army personnel prisoner, about 45 miles south of the capital of Phnom Penh. More fighting was centered in Chrey Thom, 36 miles east of the capital, where the Lon Nol regime said "1,000 Communists" had attacked the town.

In southern Laos, the Lao Patriotic Front took the town of Muong Phalane, about 50 miles east of the Thai border.

Muong Phalane was a base for the U.S. CIA's clandestine army in Laos. The U.S., through the CIA and Agency for International Development (AID), as well as other agencies, trains, equips and directs the "Royal Lao" armed forces, and finances the Lao military budget.

YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO
VINDICATOR

E - 100,987
S - 155,644
APR 15 1970

STATINTL

War Has Ensnared Nixon, Newsman Tells YSU Rally

"Nixon has lost his chance politically to blame the war on the Democrats. It is now thoroughly his war and he is trapped as badly as Johnson was because he won't admit the whole thing is a mistake," Blair Clark, associate publisher of The New York Post, said Tuesday at the main spring moratorium activity at Youngstown State University.

"The prospects of the war in all of Indo-China are terribly ominous," he said, "and the war definitely is spreading to other countries like Cambodia and Laos."

"The evidence of the spreading war," he said, "lies in the fact that our hand, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, has been active in both countries. The language in which we discuss the war is getting more and more bellicose. Nobody talks anymore about anything but the enemy, whereas Dean Rusk used to call them the other side."

"I feel there is a growing atmosphere of repression in this

country," he said, "so much so that a meeting like this one may actually be dangerous in a few months."

"This repression is led by (Vice President Spiro) Agnew and the threat of the liberty of the press and people who disagree with government policy," he said.

While seemingly touching all the bases, Clark referred to the moon shot as an investment of billions of dollars in the military-industrial complex.

He said, "We must think whether this whole program is the right way of investing billions of dollars. It is a perfect

trial complex selling its policies to the government."

Clark, former campaign manager for Eugene McCarthy and vice president of CBS News, was introduced by the Rev. Burton Cantrell.

His appearance was sponsored by the YSU Community of Concern and Youngstown Chapter of SANE, both organizations seeking to end the war in Vietnam.

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W - 28,782

APR 14 1970

Goodell Again Presses Nixon on War

Senator Charles Goodell is carrying his independence still further in saying he would have "grave questions about support" for President Nixon in 1972, if the Vietnam war is intensified.

According to the most recent Gallup Poll, Mr. Goodell has considerable public support for his anti-escalation stand. For the first time, the poll showed that less than half of the voters support the President's handling of the war. The public support for Mr. Nixon's de-escalation plan has been eroding gradually since last fall.

he has had amazing success, winning popular support and his party's endorsement. Perhaps Mr. Nixon will announce a speed-up of troop withdrawals Thursday night, further enhancing Mr. Goodell's position.

A speed-up would be most welcome news for the public, as well as Mr. Goodell.

THE PENTAGON HAS now announced that the latest troop withdrawal has been completed ahead of schedule, but we still have more than 400,000 troops in Vietnam.

In recent weeks, the war has escalated, not only in South Vietnam but also Laos and Cambodia, raising questions of our helping out in the latter two countries. Our military also has reportedly urged Mr. Nixon to delay further troop withdrawals, pending a clarification of the Communists' intentions.

There has also been the temptation for us to expand our operations into Cambodia and to beef up our CIA efforts in Laos. Fortunately, the White House appears to be playing it cool on both questions.

In light of the new situation, a new peace demonstration this week, and the growing lack of support the President's war strategy, Mr. Nixon is likely to seek to bolster his position when he addresses the public on the war this Thursday night.

MR. GOODELL MAY BE foolhardy in attacking his own party's President in the senator's biggest election year, but so far

13 APR 1970

EDITORIALS

The Third Indo-China War

It is the nature of governments to deceive. In the perspective of its two-century existence, the government of the United States is no worse than others. In fact, in its early history, its candor was considerably better than the average. Now, however, it appears to be making up for lost time. Mr. Nixon may plead, plausibly enough, that Vietnam is not his war. He did, however, undertake to get us out of it. The plain fact is that the war is being extended, and so far Mr. Nixon has done nothing to prevent its spread. On the contrary, his policy of Vietnamization is dragging us deeper into the Indo-Chinese quagmire. Unless he takes forthright action to arrest this trend, it will be difficult to avoid the suspicion that he is not averse to developments that will enable him to keep massive American military power in Asia, and that recent events have been largely of our making.

Of course, that is not the official scenario. Officially, we were taken by surprise when the coup ousted Prince Sihanouk; we are now waiting for the dust to settle, and perhaps hoping for events to take a turn that might redound to our advantage. There is a suggestion that Sihanouk was overthrown because the enemy is losing, is being pushed back, and that this accounts for the turn to the right in Cambodia which, though nominally neutralist, had been giving shelter to some 40,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese or Vietcong troops.

That scenario warrants scrutiny. It begins in Laos, where there was a tacit standstill with the enemy. It was incomplete, to be sure, but fighting was at a low level. The CIA upset that balance by egging on its mercenaries, deployed with the aid of American "advisers." The enemy retaliated and seized a major piece of the Plain of Jars. Did the CIA plan it that way? They may have been as innocent as unborn babes, but that is not their usual role. Anyhow, it happened; and it now appears that Laos is in dire straits—another domino is in danger of falling. There is one difference, however, from the earlier domino game: the public does not seem to be concerned. It does not demand that we "save" Laos; it would rather that we got out of Southeast Asia, and the sooner the better, as long as we retain some shreds of superpower dignity.

The illicit scenario continues with the coup in Cambodia. Whoever pulled the strings, the result was very much to the liking of the Pentagon and the CIA, and perhaps of an Administration bent on keeping a big, sprawling foothold in Asia. (See Michael Klare: "The Great South Asian War," *The Nation*, March 9.) It passes understanding that Prince Sihanouk's rivals should have acted so boldly, unless they had substantial covert backing. It may be assumed that the CIA no longer delivers sledgehammer blows, as in 1953 when Mossadegh was eliminated in Iran. Whatever weight the CIA threw into the scales may

have been tossed indirectly—perhaps through Thai intermediaries. (We know that Thai troops have been fighting on the American side in Laos, and that the Thai satraps are unexcelled in intrigue.)

So now the Vietcong and North Vietnamese who have been using the Cambodian sanctuary are caught in a squeeze between, on the east, the South Vietnamese, aided by reinforced American detachments close to the border and by American gunships firing into Cambodia, and on the west, such forces as the new government of Cambodia can muster. From the standpoint of the Pentagon and the CIA it is a much more agreeable situation than when Prince Sihanouk held the reins. It is worth noting, also, that General Westmoreland has long advocated military action against Cambodia.

Can our Southeast Asian allies act in matters of such importance without American approval and some kind of commitment that, if the gamble turns against them, Uncle Sam will not let them go down the drain? The Cambodians say they are not asking for American military help now. They do not say they will not ask tomorrow.

What has happened took considerable rigging. Did the President know about it? Did he want to know about it? How much control has Mr. Kissinger got over operations in the field? Does even General Abrams know exactly what goes on while he runs the war from a desk in Saigon and with an occasional visit to the numerous fronts for which he, or the CIA, is responsible?

In the news these latest developments are referred to as the second Indo-China war. The count seems short. First there was the war in which the French lost the flower of their officer corps and got the *coup de grâce* at Dienbienphu. Then there was the second Indo-China war, engineered mainly by Lyndon B. Johnson, and which proved his political nemesis. Now we have the third war. Will it rescue Mr. Nixon politically, or ruin him? He must be thinking hard; his risks are not small.